Spis treści

Who are we and where do we go? Contemporary Ukrainians in search of their identities (introduction) – Nadiya Trach

Representation of People’s Foreign Policy Orientations in the Public Communication of Ukrainian Power Elites – Oleh Ivanov

Denaturalisation of Collective Identities within pro-Euromaidan Discourse (on field of Facebook Representation) – Iuliia Soroka

Symbolic Representations of Maidan in the Ukrainian and Polish Press: Comparative Analysis – Zhanna Bezpiatchuk

Foreign perspectives on ‘Euromaidan’ – An analysis of the three major weekly magazines Der Spiegel, Der Stern and Focus – Anja Lange

“Together we are power!”: Identities and Values in Euromaidan Slogans – Nadiya Trach

Конструирование национальной идентичности в медиа: украино-российские взаимные образы сейчас и 15 лет назад – Гнит Юлия, Людмила Малес, Богдан Мотузенко, Виктор Рымжа, Наталия Фреик

Координата «национальная идентичность» в современной украинской публицистике: дискурсные кластеры – Юлия Вышницкая

Вербализация новой украинской идентичности в блогосфере – Татьяна Монахова

Проявление национальной идентичности украинцев посредством актуализации лексики – Ольга Тулузакова

Marriage Announcements in Lviv during the Interwar Period: Ethnic and Gender Aspects – Liudmyla Pidkuimukha

Kwestia tożsamości narodowo-kulturowej w radzieckim literaturoznawstwie ukraińskim w latach 20. XX wieku – Lesia Demska-Budzuliak

Identity building through perpetual choice: lyrical self in Vasyl Stus’s poetry – Yelyzaveta Taranukha

Thou Shalt Not Speak: Divine Violence in Serhiy Zhadan’s The Life of the Virgin Mary (2015) – Natalya Domina

Sameness/Otherness: Identity, Time, and Body in Iryna Shuvalova’s Poetry – Iryna Borysiuk

Fotogaleria – Anja Lange

Rewolucja zaczyna się od słowa. Recenzja książki „Разом – Сила!”: Риторика українського спротиву, Nadia Tracz, Wydawnictwo „KLIO” 2015, Kijów – Łukasz Kutyło

War on the other side of the camera. Review of the book Ukraine’s War as Viewed by TSN Journalists (Війна очима ТСН) publishing house “Osnowy”, Kyiv, Ukraine – Liudmyla Pidkuimukha

Who are we and where do we go? Contemporary Ukrainians in search of their identities (introduction)

Nadiya Trach

In a postmodern world, every person carries several types of identity, using them according to social situations and the social roles played within them. The issues of identities become especially important in the times of social anxiety and tensions, when the sense of belonging to a certain community or nation assists in overcoming these negative emotions. Naturally, in the case of military conflicts the issues of identity are on the agenda, while in the period of war they become even more acute, as even the world picture undergoes changes and finally tends to be divided into two parts: black and white, ours and enemies.

“Who are we and where do we go?” These two main questions were on the minds of Ukrainians for centuries, and in the last two-three years they have been heard more often and more vividly. It was a revolutionary protest known as “Maidan” that became a turning point in a contemporary Ukrainian history.

To some extent, the revolution became possible due to enormous efforts of journalists and media workers. Soon after that, the Russian annexation of Crimea and a military aggression in Donbas provoked the battles of identities. Hence, today historians argue whether this confrontation of identities may be the main reason for a lasting Russian-Ukrainian war, or if the explicit markers are actually brought up by the implicit conflict of business interests or other non-identity related reasons. Nevertheless, the issues of different identity types – primarily national and transnational (European and post-Soviet), but also gender, social, regional, religious are on the agenda of public debates in Ukraine and about Ukraine abroad, including in Europe and North America.

An ongoing decommunization in the Southeastern Ukraine has changed the linguistic and cultural cityscapes. Furthermore, the democratic reforms in various social realms have proven the European choice of Ukraine. Volodymyr Kulyk described the main trends in identities changes that took place in the last few years: The very meaning of belonging to a Ukrainian nation has changed; this change was most vividly manifested in an increased alienation from Russia and a greater embrace of Ukrainian nationalism as a worldview and, accordingly, as a historical narrative (Kulyk, 2015, p. 607).

Media and literature are the main domains for identity construction and representation, for they play the role of idea communicators and narrative transmitters, while also being the major instruments to unite people: Hence, the identities and issues identified are as much about who takes it up, in what manner it is taken up, and to whom communication is communicated (Djenar, Mahboob, Cruickshank, 2014, p. 6). Media and literature could be also seen as a range of semiotic resources, many of which are multimodal (Paltridge, 2014, p. 23) that contribute to development and strengthening of various identities. Finally, identity is made visible and intelligible to others through cultural signs, symbols and practices (Ciepiela, 2011, p. 10).

The task of this volume is to answer the following questions:

- ▶ Has Maidan actualized the existing identities or created the new ones? How has it been mirrored in the rhetoric of the protest and its media coverage within Ukraine and abroad?

- ▶ How is the Russian-Ukrainian ongoing war affecting construction of identities? In which way is the image of enemy created on both sides of the barricades? What are the linguistic models to describe the situation and the participants of conflict in different media? Does identity construction become a part of information war?

- ▶ How has the conflict changed various types of identities, i.e. gender, social, linguistic, cultural, religious etc? How has the conflicts of identities been described by media?

- ▶ How are reforms transmitted by media? What vision of the future and expectations of an average Ukrainian are portrayed and constructed in media? In what way is the Soviet past deconstructed in public debates on decommunization within a state?

- ▶ Are identity issues anchored to political decisions and debates? How do the right and left wing political parties influence contemporary identity construction processes? How has it been reflected in a mass-media language?

- ▶ What is the image of Ukraine and an average Ukrainian in your national media (press, television, radio, and social media)? What linguistic markers have been used to describe Ukraine and Ukrainians in the state of a de facto war? Which topics are popular to be covered about Ukraine? With what connotation (neutral, positive, negative) are journalistic statements and conclusions made?

We received articles from the scholars in various fields – sociologists, linguists, media analysts, and literature scholars. This diversity of views, domains and approaches gives a holistic mosaic picture of the current processes in the political, social and cultural life of Ukraine. We included to this volume not only the articles that refer to the present events, but also those studies that share a historical dimension. We do believe that historical analysis enables a deeper understanding of the present state of affairs, as it sheds light on how the current identities have been shaped, reshaped, and negotiated, what factors caused a conflict, what are the possible ways to find its solution, and, finally, how identities have been anchored to cultural and memory policies.

To begin with, Oleh Ivanov in his article examines the tendencies and strategies in the sphere of Ukrainian foreign policy, as well as its formation and communicating from political elites to general public. A comparative analysis conducted by the author calls attention to the crucial changes that differentiate the periods after the Orange revolution 2004 on the one hand and after Euromaidan 2013–2014 on the other. On the other side, the article shows the continuity of Ukrainian political process and clarifies the models of political communication used in Ukraine particularly for international readers. In the following article, Yulia Soroka presents the strategies of naturalization and denaturalization in Facebook posts on the current events in Ukraine. Indeed, Facebook has become a new place for discourses and identities battles. It is a well-known fact that the Revolution of Dignity began with a Facebook post of a Ukrainian journalist Mustafa Naiem, and still social networks keep being an arena for negotiations of attitudes, values and identities. This piece of scholarly work underlines the importance of reflection on this type of new media and its influence on a mass audience.

Further on in this volume, Zhanna Bezpiatchuk demonstrates the similarities and difference in symbolic representations of Maidan in Ukrainian and Polish press. Her analysis reveals the ten most visible symbols of Maidan and their different representations by media. Being linked to the theory of symbols and illustrated with the numerous examples of media contexts, this article represents an in-depth reflection of how the complex reality of current events is transmitted via media that shows internal and external viewpoints. Anja Lange undertakes another foreign perspective on a Euromaidan media coverage. On the material taken from the three German weekly newspapers and applying content-analysis as the main research tool, she examines what political figures and players were the key personalities in Euromaidan depicting, which revolutionary events triggered media interest to Ukraine, and, finally, which historical and geopolitical context these events were put into. In my contribution to this volume, I emphasize the role of language in identity renegotiation during the Maidan events. On the material of revolutionary slogans, I show how the issues of identities and values have been actualized during the conflict and how linguistic creativity and protesters’ self-expression made these changes visible to general public and the world community.

In a collective contribution to this volume prepared by Yuliia Hnit, Lyudmyla Males, Bogdan Motuyenko, Victor Rymzha and Nataliia Freik, the authors focus their research interest on a crucial in the times of military conflict point – the Ukrainian-Russian mutual images. Showing these issues in a comparative paradigm encompassing 15 years, this article gives a reader the understanding of how the post-imperial national identities are formed, and in which manner a conflict changes the images of heroes and enemies. Furthermore, Iuliia Vyshnytska sees identity as an important component in constructing mythological scenarios in a contemporary Ukrainian journalism. How can a conflict provoke the division of a world picture into “ours” and “enemies” and what are the linguistic markers and discourse clusters used to describe this division? The main clusters revealed by the author are geocultural, colonial and postcolonial. On the material of the essays, the elements of the scenarios are depicted and analyzed.

On the material of the social networks posts, Tetiana Monakhova also reflects on the issues of identity representation. Three text-building strategies in identity construction are observed by the author – narodnik, modernist and postmodernist with the dominance of neonarodnik within the frame of contemporary social networks. Linguistic markers of each model are described in detail. In the next study, Olga Tuluzakova on the material of Ukrainian modern texts, demonstrates how sociopolitical changes are mirrored in contemporary vocabulary of Ukrainian language, which lexical groups are actualized, as well as how word’s connotation created by contemporary Ukrainian authors change the word’s meaning and its perception, and in a broader sense influences the readers’ identities.

Turning to historical dimension, Liudmyla Pidkuimukha explores formation of gender identities in a concrete historical period – a multicultural interwar Lviv. How were women and men describing themselves in newspaper dating advertisements, which were the valuable features of appearance, character and social status on the marriage market back then? Depicting and analyzing that sort of material provides a deeper understanding of the general sociocultural situation, sociology of love and its expression via language and media means, as well as reveals the details of everyday life of Lviv citizens. On the other hand, Lesia Demska-Budzuliak sheds light on another important historical period – the beginning of the XXth century in Central Ukraine. She aims her attention at the sociocultural practices, represented in the literary journals of that period. How were inclusive and exclusive discourses constructed in a media domain, how was a literary canon formed and transmitted to readers? Three competing cultural discourses – Marxist, neoclassical (modernistic) and historical are analyzed in detail and explained with illustrations.

Along with history, literature is another fruitful field for identity construction and examination. Yelyzaveta Taranukha features identity construction via a lyrical self in Vasyl Stus’s poetry whose texts remain to be a symbol of resistance in contemporary Ukrainian culture and thus were cited frequently during the Euromaidan events. The author of the article suggests that the notion of perpetual choice is central for understanding Stus’s poetry and at the same time is the major instrument for a poet’s identity formation. Following the line of poetry analysis, Natalya Domina examines poetry of a contemporary cult Ukrainian poet Serhiy Zhadan, who also positioned himself as a symbol of resistance during the Revolution of Dignity and nowadays actively participates in building a dialogue between the opposing sides of the military conflict in Donbas. The phenomena of a divine and subjective violence are highlighted on the material of his poetry book The Life of Virgin Mary (2015) where biblical allusions are echoed with the ongoing Russian-Ukrainian war, lives of displaced people and war victims. Iryna Borysiuk underlines the importance of interaction between the extremes of such dichotomies as self vs other, private vs national, female vs male in identity formation. The texts of a contemporary Ukrainian poet Iryna Shuvalova reveals the complexity of such an interplay and shows the dynamics of identity construction.

Finally, the two reviews conclude this volume – Łukasz Kutyło’s analysis of a book on Euromaidan slogans and Liudmyla Pidkuimukha’s presentation of journalistic coverage of the ongoing war events. Thus, the volume not only opens a door for the Polish and international readers to the crucial facts of current events, but also offers reflections and narration models on this subject made by Ukrainian scholars and journalists. The volume is illustrated with Euromaidan pictures made from a foreign perspective, among which are those presented by Anja Lange, a German DAAD lecturer in Kyiv and by Magdalena Patalong from Free University of Berlin. These illustrations give readers the enhanced feeling of atmosphere of the current events in Ukraine and call attention to identity changes, so visible now in contemporary Ukrainian cityscapes.

Summing up, I would like to express my gratitude, first of all, to Łukasz Kutyło who has welcomed me as a guest editor of this volume and put his enormous efforts to assist me in this process, reading the texts from the standpoint of a Polish reader and Polish scholarly traditions. Then, I would like to thank all the authors for the brilliant and in-depth contributions to the volume, as well as for provided visualizations. Finally, my special gratitude goes to Olena Samsonova for her careful stylistic revision of this introductory chapter, as well as of my article in this volume.

Every time we speak, we are negotiating and renegotiating our sense of self in relation to a larger social world, and reorganizing that relationship across time and space. Our race, social class, ethnicity, or gender among other characteristics, are all implicated in the negotiation of identity (Ciepiela, 2011, p.9). I do believe that this volume not only examines identities from different methodological perspectives that despite their mosaic character still have a multitude of common threads, but also represents the identities of contemporary Ukrainian scholars – in their manner of building arguments and narrations, limiting selves and describing others, overcoming methodological challenges. This is an important step in building a Ukrainian-Polish and a broader, general European, dialogue in these tough and yet bright times of sociopolitical anxiety, tensions and changes.

Literature:

Ciepela, K. (2011). From language as identity marker to language as toolkit for identity performance, In: Identity through a language lens, ed. by K. Ciepiela, Bern, Peter Lang, 7–20.

Djenar, D., Mahboob, A. Cruickshank, K. (2014). Identity and mode as a frame for understanding social meaning, In: Language and identity across modes of communication, Berlin, 1–14.

Kulyk, V. (2016). National Identity in Ukraine: Impact of Euromaidan and the War / Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 68, No.4, June, 588–608.

Paltridge, B. (2014). Language, identity, and communities of practice, In: Language and identity across modes of communication, Berlin, 15–26.

Representation of People’s Foreign Policy Orientations in the Public Communication of Ukrainian Power Elites

Oleh Ivanov
National University of “Kyiv-Mohyla Academy”

Abstract:

The article presents the preconditions and empirical limitations for implementation of ideal-type deliberative democratic decision making in foreign relations sphere which exist in Ukraine. Communicative representation theory explains the stability of the Ukrainian public system in the foreign policy dimension (Ukraine-Russia relations case) through the functionality of foreign policy determined by elites, social tension and conflict of orientations in the transformation period. Politicians’ communication is generalized through media-strategies: the hidden (nomenclatura-styled), ambivalent, and confrontational. A computer algorithm for structural and morphological analysis of large amounts of text data (Ukrainian and Russian messages on official web-sites) created. Text corpuses are transformed into the semantic network of an issue, combined with all of the attributes which an analyst may be interested in (time, place, author, potential audience, etc.). For the analysis of large number (hundreds) of surveys with different sample size and different wording of questions the technique of thematic clustering of questions with the use of content analysis applied.

Keywords:
representation, communication, power elite, international relations, Ukraine, Russia, political orientations.

Introduction

Ukraine is one of the central powers in the post-Soviet area due to many reasons, which can be combined under general conception of “transboundary” or “cleft” country (Huntington, 1993). West-East communication in a broad sense is going through Ukrainian territory. Main energy corridors – gas and oil pipes, airways, as well as informational and cultural exchange are among examples of this communication.

After Russia’s annexation of Crimea and the start of the military conflict in Donbas region, the transboundary role of Ukraine transformed into the frontier of European security zone (Blockmans, 2015). Therefore, the strengthening of Ukraine is not the sole interest of its people, but also among key preconditions of European Union even existence (Snyder, 2015).

“Strengthening” for transition state means not only the development of the military, but also the acceleration of modern European democratic structures formation and consolidation of the socio-political system of Ukraine. Studying of democracy in Ukraine and social mechanisms of its functioning requires the development of indicators of implementation of citizens will by the power elites, i.e the level of publics-elites consolidation. Without conceptual and especially methodological tools for studying of representative democracy in Ukraine, we have to rely on expert estimates and statements of political leaders about the quality of people’s representation. Modern representative democracy crisis (Piattoni, 2013; Poguntke, Roßteutscher, Schmitt-Beck, & Zmerli, 2015) requires theoretical and empirical reconsideration of political representation itself.

Among the key obstacle of society consolidation towards democratic reforming is the inefficiency of public communications (Журба & Андрусів, 2015) which leads to the impossibility of making consensus decisions involving power elites, experts, and the public. For instance, Kyiv International Institute of Sociology study shows that publics tend to exaggerate the scale of corruption mainly due to its representation in media, but not due to their own experience (КМІС, 2016, pp. 27–63). The scholar and analytical problem in this area is the lack of knowledge about the mechanisms of representation in the public discourse of politics, lack of reliable tools for measuring the level of representation and integrated operating model of communication links between the subjects of social and political processes in the framework of representative democracy.

The sharpest and the most manipulative is socio-political discourse around issues which divide society into groups which are comparable in size but opposite in views. Since 1994 presidential elections in Ukraine foreign policy vector became such an issue. Leading candidates started to manipulate through pro-/anti-Russian sentiments (Birch, 1995). This political technology has been used in each campaign for more than a decade already (Frye, 2015; Хмелько, 2006).

Taking all these arguments altogether, we think that studying of the representation of citizens’ foreign policy orientations by Ukrainian power elites is timely and relevant for government communication policy development. Our study based on tools developed and data gathered during our Ph.D. thesis study (Іванов, 2012) as well as new data collected for the period after the Euromaidan revolution.

The main goal of our study is to explore the peculiarities and dynamics of representation of foreign policy preferences of the general public and particular electoral groups in public communication of power elites in Ukraine.

We will reach that goal through the following steps:

1. 1. show the explanatory power of social representation theories for the study of political representation in transitional society;

2. 2. consider political communication as a unifying mechanism of social systems of modern societies and exemine the suitability of communication paradigm of representation for the study of democratic development;

3. 3. propose the conceptual model of communicative representation in foreign policy domain;

4. 4. propose a quantitative method of comparative analysis of aggregated Ukrainian survey data and public communication of power elites data coded via computer-aided content analysis tools;

5. 5. compare Yushchenko’s presidency period and after Euromaidan period using methodology developed by the author.

Theoretical background and conceptual model of representation via communication

The topic of political representation is quite broad and connected with several spheres of social research (see the diagram below).

Scheme 1. Theoretical prerequisites for studying political representation

Source: Ivanov (2011)

First of all, if we talk about representation we have to address the general theory of social representation. The study of the various types of representations at the highest level – in culture and society – traditionally associated with Durkheim’s concept of “collective representations” (Дюркгейм, 1996, pp. 6–74) . The largest contribution to the study of this phenomenon has made by the French School of Sociology and one its leading representatives Serge Moscovici. It was he who used the term “social representation ” for the first time in 1961 to study the perception and use of ideas of psychoanalysis in France in sense of collective “processing ” of social object by the community in order to improve behavior and communication (Moscovici, 1963). Moscovici defined social representations as system of values, ideas, and practices with a twofold function; first, to establish an order which will enable individuals to orient themselves in their material and social world and to master it; and secondly to enable communication to take place among the members of a community by providing them with a code for social exchange and a code for naming and classifying unambiguously the various aspects of their world and their individual and group history (Moscovici, 1973, pp. ix-xiv).

Moskovici, unlike Durkheim, understood representation as an active process, not just as the display and reproduction of some external reality. There is a symbolic space of development and coordination of the various versions of representations because all people have the opportunity to creatively change the way of representation so that every person is a social agent in this process. He recognizes the possible coexistence of competing, sometimes entirely mutually exclusive versions of the perception of reality as part of the same community and culture (Howarth, Foster, & Dorrer, 2004). His follower Sandra Jovchelovitch proposes to consider social representation as a space that connects individuals and society, as well as object and subject of the action into the one system, and as rooted in areas of origin (Jovchelovitch, 1996).

Martin Bauer and George Gaskell (1999) offered to formalize social representations in a model consisting of three components: subjects – bearers of social representations (for instance, experts, journalists, politicians or other people’s representatives); objects, actions or ideas that are represented (for instance, government policy attitudes); project-image of the social group for which social representation matters (for instance, groups of interest, electoral groups, etc.). This conceptualization is called “Toblerone model” of social representations – from the name of Swiss chocolate “Toblerone”, which has an elongated triangular-pyramidal shape. Let us keep these three components in mind as we will use them in our model of communicative representation.

Political representations are of doubly complex nature, as they are related to issues of power, democracy, elites. Studying representation in political sphere presumes following the framework of delegation and functioning of citizens’ representatives. As a sacred legal concept (Гадамер, 1988) representation is authorized representation. In the analysis of representations in political sphere, two general approaches could be distinguished: delegative and representative. Within delegative approach the main carrier of power is a social group which delegates their representatives, therefore, the actions of the latter should always be guided by the position of those who nominated them. The elected persons cannot develop their own policy, but should only meet the desires of the electorate. Such an approach is closer to the American political tradition in which the greatest possible control over the public authorities is the part of liberal rights and freedoms guarantees (Hamilton, Madison, Jay, & Goldman, 2008). A representative approach presumes that voters give all the power to those who represent them. Politicians decide what actions they can do for the benefits of the represented social groups. This approach is typical for European political tradition in which the effectiveness and the power of the ruling elite take precedence over the individualistic vision of human freedom.

Within those two general approaches, Pitkin (1967) proposed to classify four types of political representations theories:

- ▶ formalistic (or institutional) – the key mechanism is the rotation of representatives;

- ▶ symbolic (representative, as a symbolic embodiment represented);

- ▶ descriptive theories consider the degree of objective similarity between a representative and represented: similar social background, physical appearance etc.;

- ▶ substantive theories are about actions of representatives and how they meet the interests of the represented.

Still all formal-legal approaches do not consider the ability of politicians to respond to public opinion fluctuations. This problem was initially approached in theories of politics as a vocation. Max Weber (1919) distinguishes political (focused on electoral preferences) and bureaucratic (linked to standards and development of tactical solutions) types of governing. This theory was empirically verified in a study by Joel Aberbach, Robert Putnam, Bert Rockman (1981), in which it was found that hybrid forms of government exist, and “creative dialogue ” between elites of various types are presented as a condition for good governance. In this context, specific areas of policy (e.g. international relations) and transitional societies were not studied. In electoral democracies, which are characterized by the compliance with the minimum standards of government representatives’ elections, political communication is of special importance. Therefore, the theory of political representation in the context of the Ukrainian political system can be meaningfully verified only in a study of specific areas of policy, communication and interaction between the publics and elites.

How do we assess political communication potential for the democracy development and political system consolidation? In terms of the theory of communicative action and deliberative democracy (Habermas, 1987) communication is a factor of social solidarity and democratic decision-making, if it is rational, and if there is a culture of pluralism in society, as well as some common interests (implemented through the “invisible hand of the market”). Ideal-type representation presumes (Dahl, 1989, p. 307) the following:

1. the presence of socially important issues in public discourse;

2. their unequivocal formulation and evaluation by stakeholders;

3. the availability of basic values that enable communication;

4. communication between power elites and the public which is two-sided and leads to unambiguous regulatory decisions;

5. the process is continuous, the rules are changed according to the new circumstances.

The first conceptual model within the communicative approach to foreign policy domain has been applied in studies of international conflicts and integration at the Stanford University (Holsti, North, & Brody, 1969). Its effectiveness for the analysis of negotiation in crisis environment has been proven, thus, as a first approximation, we can use it to explore the interstate communication between Ukraine and Russia. However, a significant drawback of this model is its disregard of internal processes in each country involved in this communicative system. Potential interactions between non-state (or, more precisely, out-of-power, non-elite) actors (publics) in the communications space are ignored too. In addition, media are absent as independent actors that can influence if not the content of the communication, then, at least, the placement of accents (“agenda setting”) in international relations at the public level. This lack is postulated a priori: any media within this model is only a tool of power elites, through which they carry out communication with the publics.

A wider view of the problem is suggested by Matthew Baum and Philip Potter (2008). Their conceptual model partially overcomes the disadvantages of the simplified two-tile “behavioral” Stanford school model. The authors conclude that today almost all parts of the interaction at the international level are studied. However, there are no empirical studies that have combined within a single conceptual and methodological approach all of the data about interactions in a specific period and for specific actors. Also, we must note that this model represents the interaction in terms of one country. We understand that the authors had in mind the possibility of mirroring elements of models for 2 or more actors. Furthermore, we assume the possibility of links between elements of two “mirror” models (see. Scheme 2).

Scheme 2. The theoretical model of interaction between media, public opinion and foreign policy: the interstate context

Source: Ivanov (2011)

Note that Baum and Potter do not take into account the impact of foreign actors on the domestic media of the studied countries. Media systems of Russia and Ukraine through the last 25 years were rather related, so assuming such complete independence would be incorrect. Therefore, the existence of such influence we also show in Scheme 2. In the same way, we do not neglect the influence of foreign media upon the country’s ruling elite. So the relationship here is two-sided.

The main object of our attention is the representation of foreign policy orientations of Ukraine’s population by power elites Ukraine, so we do not intend to operationalize the whole conceptual scheme outlined above. Our conceptual scheme shows the relationship between public opinion and the ruling elite in the most detailed way. However, we consider all the elements of the theoretical model, which directly affect the present communication (see Scheme 3).

Scheme 3. A conceptual scheme.

Source: Ivanov (2011)

Thus, this conceptual model is useful to study the level of representation of foreign policy orientations of Ukraine’s population (1) by power elites (2). Foreign policy orientations of the population can be studied using quantitative opinion polls (3), which is also the channel of communication through which thoughts and orientations of the population can be perceived by power elites. Representation of popular orientations by elites can be studied through content analysis of their public communication. There is also a difference from the original model: we do not consider the media as the sole actor. Baum and Potter noted (p. 40) that modern researchers consider the media from the two opposite positions: either as an independent actor that shapes public opinion on foreign policy and often modifies the initial communication intentions of the publics’ representatives; or as a “transmission mechanism” that transmits the position of the elite to the public. We argue that the media can be both.

Independent media communicates with the public, interpreting statements of politicians in its own manner, and selecting the most important (according to journalists) expressions, thus creating “agenda”. Here we will consider the independence of journalism in Ukraine and Russia, as a topic for a separate study. Just take into account that media can be independent, and partly is. However, there is a special type of media, which in any state, regardless of its level of democracy, is meant to represent the official views of politicians in full, with accents that are important for politicians, with a minimum of additional interpretation. These are information outlets of political forces and their leaders: official pages of politicians and political parties on the Internet, newspapers, video and audio recorded by the public relations assistants of politicians. These media directly reflect the intentions of politicians and, which is important, select a media presentation of specific policy positions, which the latter considers the most “right”.

If we want to study representation by power elites, but not its interpretation by media, the best of the available options is the content analysis of official media, totally controlled by political leaders (4). We propose to analyze the official websites of politicians. On the one hand, this is the most dynamic type of media that will quickly respond to changing situations and promptly submit politician’s statement on a particular issue, and on the other – the Internet is an integral media that combines text, video, audio and still images. The official websites of politicians are practically ready databases of politicians’ expressions, both exclusive – placed only on these sites, and copied materials from the other media – newspapers, radio, television, Internet resources. Clearly, the official website will not copy materials, which, according to politician and his or her team, distort their position. And if they are, these materials go only with “appropriate” comments.

Political leaders, expressing a position on foreign policy have to take into account the potential position of the leaders of the opponent countries. Thus, there is communication between them, including public communication (5). It is an external factor that affects the way the elite represent the orientations of the population. Here we also offer to analyze official websites of political leaders in both countries. But as this is a two-way communication, then we use a two-sided “stimulus-response” model described above. In order to follow trends of reciprocal influence between political leaders, opposing each other, this interaction should be arranged across the timeline. This will allow, on a certain level of reliability, to conduct the causal analysis of communication acts of politicians.

Finally, we consider public opinion in Russia as an external factor affecting the content of communication between political leaders of both countries and the opinion of Ukraine’s population through social relations between the two nations. The overall analysis of the representation and the environment that affects it should take place inseparable from the socio-political and historical context of international relations, i.e. the events taking place in the international sphere (6).

In sum, the proposed conception of analysis covers four relationships (or 6 if bilateral ties count as 2) in the model of international relations, including the media, public opinion, the ruling elite and the historical context of the events:

1. the relationship between the foreign policy publics’ orientations and the content of public communication of elites (elite’s representation of voters); analyzed through quantitative analysis of public opinion surveys, quantitative content analysis of public statements by politicians and multivariate time series analysis (analysis of survey data and speech coding within a dynamic statistical model);

2. the interaction between the positions of power elites of Ukraine and Russia in the framework of public communication on the international level; analyzed through quantitative content analysis of public statements by politicians and multivariate time series analysis;

3. the potential impact of the public opinion in the opponent countries;

4. the potential effects of context (events).

In this article, we will only verify the first type of relationship. The others are considered in our dissertation for the Yushchenko presidency period (Іванов, 2012) and can be applied in further research.

Method

In this section we present basic terms, the period of our analysis, sample of actors and messages, technique of automated content-analytical coding, statistical apparatus for the representations assessment.

We use the terms in the following meaning:

A message is a publicly expressed opinion statement, which contains an attitude to certain issues, and is limited by clear time frame and / or place.

Communication strategy is a potentially realizable way to achieve certain goals through communicative acts. It is characterized by a specific manipulation with ideas and judgments available in public discourse, for example, their opposing, association, suppression. The expected purpose of a communicative action in our study’s context is the support of politician by communication recipients.

Target electorates are the voters who are most likely to support a particular politician or political party, and on which they rely, wanting to keep or gain the power.

Attitudes are a support (direct or indirect), a denial (direct or indirect) or assertions of neutrality regarding certain issues.

- ▶ Direct support – expressed statements that directly reflect the specific orientation of the public.

- ▶ Indirect support – expressed statements that deny the content of the statement that is not supported by the public.

Foreign policy orientations of the population – the general attitude to foreign policy vector. It includes consent with a need or unacceptability of convergence between states or unification of certain countries, international communities and other actors in intergovernmental politics. It also covers attitudes to actions of subjects of international politics and their representatives, credibility to foreign countries representatives. In this study, an external entity of international politics is Russia and organizations to which it belongs or which are led by it.

Power elites are persons who control the highest authorities in the country or are in parliamentary opposition and exercise the greatest impact on the particular state institutions.

We compare two periods of modern Ukrainian history: Yushchenko’s presidency and the period after the Euromaidan. Both periods characterized by the presence of pro-Western state leaders (Kuzio, 2015; Tudoroiu, 2007). However, during Yushchenko’s presidency “orange”[1] politicians failed to consolidate Ukrainian population around Western foreign policy vector (Геополітичні орієнтації населення і безпека України, 2009, p. 47). After the Euromaidan, for the first time, the supporters of European integration overwhelm the supporters of the union with Russia (Sakhno, 2015). Obviously, there was no Russian military aggression during Yushchenko’s presidency, which is a considerable factor of influence upon Russia image in Ukraine. Still, we should compare power elites communication in both periods to see if there any arguments which are different from “external enemy” rhetoric which is not enough for sustainable European society development.

Our data originate from two specific time spans: from August 1, 2005 till August 31, 2008 (3 years) and from February 22, 2014 till February 29, 2016 (more than 2 years). The reason for the first time span is that we have week-by-week public opinion polls of the Ukrainian adult population for this period. As a rule, these polls contained questions about respondents’ geopolitical orientations. This time span represents Yushchenko’s presidency at the height of his power. The reason for the second time span is that on 22 of February 2014 Ukrainian parliament removed president Yanukovych from the office. The same day Turchynov became new acting president, thus, new western-oriented authorities came to power in Ukraine. This period of modern Ukrainian history continues till now. On 29 of February 2016 we finished data collection for this research (both opinion polls and communication data).

Polls were conducted with structured individual interviews by Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS), the Razumkov Center, and Fund “Democratic initiatives ” in 90–132 settlements in all regions of Ukraine and Crimea[2]. The sample is representative for Ukraine, for 24 regions and Crimea. The number of respondents varies from 1019 to 2040. With the method of personal (face-to-face) interviews were surveyed respondents who were at least 18 years old at the time of interview. The error margin excluding the effect of design with a probability of 95% does not exceed 2,3–3,5% (depending on the sample).

For the analysis we selected answers to questions that are connected with Russia, its representatives, organizations to which it belongs or which are led by it, foreign and domestic issues in Ukraine for which its representatives have expressed their views. Some of them repeated from study to study, others were unique for a particular poll. To measure the foreign policy orientations, we used 34 variables (including responses to multiple choice questions). Examples of the statements assessed by the respondents are the following:

- ▶ The threat to the sovereignty of Ukraine from Russia is one of the three major threats to Ukraine in the coming year.

- ▶ Would you support the completion of Ukraine’s participation in the activities of Eurasian Economic Union on the principles of multi-level and multi-speed integration?

- ▶ Do you expect the establishment of friendly and mutually beneficial relations with Russia from the Ukrainian government?

- ▶ Whom do you support in the Georgian-Russian conflict?

- ▶ Integration with Russia and the Commonwealth of Independent States should be the central area of Ukrainian foreign policy.

A full list of questions’ wordings in the Ukrainian language can be found in the supplement of our Ph.D. thesis (Іванов, 2012, pp. 317–326).

Typically, during the first period a survey was conducted every week, but not always. Also, not all questionnaires included all relevant issues. Therefore, in the comparative analysis of surveys and messages only 86 data sets were involved (in total for both periods), and the comparison with the results of statements of politicians coding was conducted monthly with accumulated frequencies.

For the second period we calculated index variable which consists of three components:

- ▶ exclusive support of joining the European Union;

- ▶ exclusive support of joining the non-military union with Russia;

- ▶ other positions.

By “other positions” we mean “joining both”, “joining neither”, “hard to say” or “refuse to answer”.

This index was calculated from the following questions:

- ▶ How would you vote on the referendum about Ukraine membership in EU? – “For”, “Against”, “Would not take part in referendum”, “Hard to say”.

- ▶ If there was a referendum about which union should Ukraine join, how you would you vote? – “Join the EU”, “Join the Customs Union with Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan”, “Join neither, but maintain good relations with both”, “Hard to say”.

To identify target electorates we used the question “How would you vote if the presidential elections took place in Ukraine next Sunday?”. It was repeated in all polls we used for our analysis.

In accordance with our conceptual model and operational definition of power elites, we selected the following politicians whose messages should be collected. For the first period: President of Ukraine Viktor Yushchenko (in office from 23.01.2005 till 25.03.2010); leader of one of the two most powerful political forces at the time – Yulia Tymoshenko; the leader of the most powerful opposition political forces at the time – Viktor Yanukovych. The particular reasons are the following:

- ▶ The President of Ukraine is the head of Ukrainian state and according to its legal framework is the most influential official. The President represents Ukraine at the highest level in foreign relations and directs the work of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

- ▶ Yulia Tymoshenko was the Prime Minister of Ukraine twice over the period and for the longest time of all premiers of this period: from 04.02.2005 till 08.09.2005 and from 18.12.2007 till 11.03.2010, i.e. 55% of the time of this period. The Prime Minister of Ukraine has a key influence on the economic content of foreign relations. Under the Constitution that was in force during the study period, the Prime Minister could be appointed only by a parliamentary coalition, thus was independent enough from the President. In addition, Tymoshenko was a BYuT, the second largest parliamentary faction, leader.

- ▶ Viktor Yanukovych was the leader of the largest opposition faction in Parliament at the time of Yushchenko’s presidency – the Party of Regions. He was the Prime Minister of Ukraine from 04.08.2006 till 18.12.2007 (27% of the time). Russia expected his victory in the presidential election in 2004: Russia’s President, Vladimir Putin congratulated Viktor Yanukovych on his victory before election results were officially announced[3]. Therefore, the role of this politician can be considered special.

For the second period we also choose to analyze messages of politicians who, on the one hand, are the most influential and, on the other, have alternative views on foreign relations. They are:

- ▶ Olexander Turchynov – from 22.04.2014 till 29.07.2014 was Head of the Ukrainian parliament, and from 23.02.2014 till 07.06.2014 was acting president of Ukraine.

- ▶ Petro Poroshenko – from 07.06.2014 till now is the President of Ukraine.

- ▶ The reasons to include the messages of these two are the same as for Yushchenko.

- ▶ Arseniy Yatsenyuk – from 27.02.2014 till 14.04.2014 was the Prime Minister of Ukraine. The reason to include his messages is the same as for Tymoshenko when she was a prime minister.

- ▶ Yulia Tymoshenko – the leader of the most popular (КМІС, 2016) pro-Western opposition (Zawada, 2016) faction.

- ▶ Yuriy Boiko – the leader of the largest opposition faction “Opposition block”, which mainly consists of the former Party of Regions members. We also include all messages of other representatives of this block which appears on its official web-site.

In total we collected 27 818 messages. The sources were the following:

Table 1. Sources of messages data collection.

Politician

URL

Date of copy

Total messages saved

Yuschenko

http://www.president.gov.ua/

27.01.2010

10 084

Tymoshenko (first period)

http://archive.tymoshenko.com.ua/

29.01.2010

6 285

Yanukovych

http://www.partyofregions.org.ua/

19.10.2010

969

Turchynov

http://www.turchynov.com/

20.05.2016

326

Poroshenko

http://www.president.gov.ua/

20.05.2016

5424

Yatsenyuk

https://yatsenyuk.org.ua/

https://www.facebook.com/yatsenyuk.arseniy/

20.05.2016

3937

Tymoshenko (second period)

https://www.tymoshenko.ua/

20.05.2016

757

Boiko and other “Opposition block ” representatives

http://opposition.org.ua/uk/

20.05.2016

36

Firstly we used lemmatized word form “Russ*” (the word covers Russia, the Russian Federation, Russian and others in all possible grammatical forms). In this way were selected 1106 messages by Yushchenko, 446 – by Tymoshenko and 478 – by Yanukovych. Next were selected messages related to issues present in questionnaires. The whole list of keywords used in this procedure is given in Appendix E.3 of our Ph.D. thesis (Іванов, 2012, pp. 328–329). We used both Ukrainian and Russian counterparts.

Selected messages were analyzed using the algorithm of structural-morphological analysis developed by us. First, we used a specially structured common lexical dictionary (for Ukrainian and Russian language) instead of a predefined analytical dictionary. The dictionary is based on POS-tagging projects (Nguyen, 2015; Rysin, 2016) and structured as a matrix, which serves as a grid, within which the program is “reading ” the analyzed text.

Matrix is conceptually shown in Table 2. The rows correspond to all the words, which are different in meaning and morphological characteristics (as in any ordinary lexical dictionary). Column A contains a numeric code of each word, which serves as an internal reference to a word within the dictionary. Column B contains the lemma of the word, i.e. the unchangeable part of it. Column C contains the original form of the word, i.e. the form that the program uses for presenting the results of calculation.

Columns D1… Dk and D'1 … D'j contain pairs of words and their grammatical identifiers, such as gender, number, etc. In this case (1 … k) and (1 … j) is the complete paradigm of each token. Each form ID consists of a unique combination of numbers for each row.

Table 2. Analytical dictionary structuration

A

B

C

D1..k

D'1..j

Word index

Lemma

Original form

Form of a particular time, gender, number, etc.

Code of grammatical form

1…n

Lemma+xx|0

Lemma +xx

E

F

G

J

I

Code of morphological characteristics

Synonyms

Antonyms

Contextual synonims, defined by the user

Contextual antonyms, defined by the user

For the standardization of internal dictionary links, each form identifier is presented as an n-digit number, where n – the number of all possible forms of all parts of the language. This code consists of numbers starting with 1 representing the value of each grammatical characteristic, and 0 – to indicate the unsuitability of a characteristic for a particular part of speech.

Column E contains morphological identifiers of each word, which is a part of speech tag. Here we use the same coding principle, but with different values. This allows the analyst to present frequency analysis results in the form of significant categories of words. In any European language nouns denote some concepts or phenomena, adjectives denote characteristics of these concepts or phenomena, verbs denote the action of certain subject-nouns, etc. So, during the first stage of text data processing, we can figure out which concepts (nouns) are in the text and what are their frequency.

Columns F and J refer to lexical synonyms and antonyms in the form of their index in the matrix. Thus, the “value clusters”, i.e. words with all their synonymous, can be calculated and summarized. The last two columns – J and I are user-defined contextual synonyms to be automatically transcoded into the corresponding index words. In order to identify these contextual synonyms, we can count the frequency of meaningful words and deduce that some of them are synonymous. In this case, of course, there are no strict rules of synonymization. However, if, say, we have in one text the word “president ” and his name, we can say that the word “president ” and this name are contextually synonymous.

Besides the sole functionality of each column, we can benefit from their combined use. Using the comparison of indexes and positional analysis at the level of sentences we tried to solve one of the problems of automated content analysis: “Is a word directly connected to other words, if they occur in the same sentence?”. Method of determining the direct connection involves two consecutive steps: (1) identifying the position of each significant word around keyword (word under analysis) within a sentence by fixing the relative position of spaces and continuous sequences of letters and parallel reconciliation with matrix vocabulary; (2) comparing morphological code of a keyword with meaningful words near it. The rule of meaningful connection is the following: if a keyword and one of the nearest meaningful words have similar codes and there are no other words with the same code between them, these words relate grammatically and meaningfully. The similarity of values means that no value starting from 1, cannot be compared with zero, which means the unsuitability of certain characteristics for a given word.

Identified relations were manually coded as positive or negative statements on selected issues (values from polls). Then a triangulation was performed on a subsample of 100 messages: it was recorded by two other coders. The procedure was repeated until the reliability of coding reached the required level (Kripendorf’s α = 0.77).

As a result of the coding we received data matrix with the following variables:

1. the date of the message;

2. a variable which relates to the message,

3. modus of the message in regard to a variable (favorable or negational)

4. the recipient of the message.

The last variable allows to check the possible impact of addressee type on a message content. We define 5 types of recipients:

1. Southeast region. It is the addressee of public statements in the Dnipropetrovsk, Odessa, Mykolayiv, Kherson, Zaporizhzhya, Kharkiv, Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts and Crimea.

2. Central West region. It is the addressee of public statements in Volyn, Rivne, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Ternopil, Khmelnytsky, Transcarpathian, Chernivtsi, Zhytomyr, Vinnitsa, Kirovograd, Cherkasy, Poltava, Sumy, Chernihiv, Kyiv oblasts and Kyiv.

3. The entire population of Ukraine. It is the addressee of any media messages in nationwide scale.

4. The West. It is the addressee of public statements in Western and Central Europe, Eastern Europe members of the European Union, North America, Georgia.

5. East and Russia. It is the addressee of public expression in the countries of CSTO[4].

These types defined by the electoral characteristics of these regions and geopolitical division (Ivanov, 2016).

The last but not least is transforming surveys and content analysis results to a common measuring scale. The respective algorithm is conceptually presented in table 3.

Table 3. Messages vs public opinions comparison algorithm

Statement Х

Electoral group

+

=> n(+)>n(–)^p 0,05^«0 ”<50%

+

Power elite representative

–

=> n(+)<n(–)^p 0,05^«0 ”<50%

–

+– || “0 ”>50%

|| “0 ”

If the number of people who approve certain statements (choosing a certain answer to the question) is greater than the number of people who deny certain statements (or choose the opposite answer), and the difference is significant at p≤0.05, while the number of those who chose the answer “do not know” or refused to answer is less than half of valid sample set (ignoring missing values), then this statement is considered to be supported. It can be equated to the favorable statement of a politician. Similarly were determined negative statements that are equated to the negative statements of politicians.

If the number of people who approve certain statements (choosing a certain answer to the question) does not differ on a statistically significant level, the number of people who deny the specific statement (choose the opposite answer) and / or the number of those who chose option “do not know” or refused to answer more than half of valid sample set (ignoring missing values), the attitude to this statement is considered ambivalent. Such statements are equated to the absence of favorable or negative statements (“silence”) for the comparable period (we used 1-month frame) or to the equity of favorable and negative statements (“communicative ambiguity”) for the comparable period.

Approval, denial or ambivalence we define for each variable, for all Ukraine’s population and for the target electorate of each politician. To determine the key statements that unite the electorate of each politician (the factor of orientations) and the population as a whole, we have combined all the data sets by the key variable of electoral preferences and conducted a factor analysis on the variables that determine the foreign policy orientation. The electorate was divided into supporters of pro-Western politicians (Yushchenko, Tymoshenko, Yatsenyuk, Turchynov, Poroshenko) and supporters of pro-Russia politicians (Yanukovych and “Opposition block”). Thus was obtained a solution that explained 43% of the variance. We also determined statements that unite the majority of Ukraine’s population, and the approval of which continued over time. These variables were used in the further comparative analysis to identify whether politicians represent the two largest electoral groups and the population as a whole.

As we analyzed time series of data, we faced the challenge of the small data “saturation” in each of the comparable periods. To overcome the problem we applied the following algorithm to compare the preferences of voters (citizens) and statements of politicians in the time dimension:

1. after each relevant survey it is assumed that target electorate’s orientations remained unchanged until the next survey detected the change;

2. target electorate’s orientations compared with the statements of politicians on a daily basis using the Granger causality test (Granger, 1969), which allows us to estimate the likelihood of policy of orientation expression at different delay of reaction (lags) between the point when public opinion on a particular issue became known and representation (or denial) of this opinion by a politician;

3. comparisons are grouped by the factor of orientations;

4. within each group we leave only the most probable causal relation for each point on the scale of lags.

Results

First period

Western and all-Ukraine publics were the most popular addresses among Ukrainian politicians during the first period (see table 4). Among Tymoshenko’s messages about foreign policy the highest percentage of publications were in the Western media. In the Russian media there were mostly articles in liberal and opposition press. Others were in national newspapers and regional media of the central-western region. Yushchenko’s statement mainly focused on the population of Ukraine and the West. Among the recipients of Yanukovych’s statements there was a significant percentage of the Russian publics, which he tried to convince in his commitment to Russia.

Table 4. Addressees of the messages

Addressee

Coded statements

Tymoshenko

Central-Western

36

Ukraine in general

36

West

71

Russia-East

18

Eastern-Southern

25

Yushchenko

Eastern-Southern

15

Central-Western

37

Ukraine in general

226

West

165

Russia-East

30

Yanukovych

Ukraine in general

53

West

46

Eastern-Southern

0

Russia-East

20

Unexpectedly Yanukovych’s messages to his target voters – residents of the southeastern region – are missing on the official site of the Party of regions[5]. Although he could use rather tough statements in concordance with the preferences of the target audiences, after the 2004 elections Yanukovych’s team began to filter out material that could give rise of criticism of his position from the general publics.

The factor of “Blue-white ” (Yanukovych’s electorate) orientations included the following statements:

Russian should be state language;

- ▶ The problem of the language is real;

- ▶ Ukraine should join with Russia in economic union (ЕЭП);

- ▶ Good relations with Russia are among the top priorities for state authorities;

- ▶ In Georgia-Russia conflict Russia should be supported;

- ▶ Integration with Russia and CIS should be among priorities;

- ▶ For cheaper gas national interests can be partly sacrificed;

- ▶ We can trust president of Russia;

- ▶ Ukraine should join the geopolitical union of Russia and Belarus.

The factor of “Orange ” (Yushchenko and Tymoshenko electorates) orientations included only two statements:

- ▶ Gas tariffs grow because of RosUkrEnergo activity;

- ▶ Russia intervene Ukrainian internal affairs.

All-Ukraine orientations are the following:

- ▶ Ukraine-Russia relations will improve after top-level visits interchange;

- ▶ With his visit to Ukraine Putin support Yanukovych.

- ▶ Improvement of Ukraine-Russia relations means stabilization of gas price.

Firstly, let us compare the aggregated data of population, two electoral groups, and politicians’ positions on every issue. The surveys were aggregated by the number of approvals / objections for the entire study period. For the statements the most frequent modus is presented. In both cases equal number or frequency is presented as ambivalence. To illustrate representations of foreign policy statements by politicians we use the coloring scheme: green-colored text means approval of a statement, red color – its disapproval, black color – missing of a position or ambivalence.

Thus, Yanukovych’s representation was the following:

- ▶ There is a threat to the sovereignty of Ukraine from Russia.

- ▶ The Russian language should be state language.

- ▶ The problem of language is real.

- ▶ Ukraine should join with Russia in the economic union (ЕЭП).

- ▶ Good relations with Russia are among the top priorities for state authorities.

- ▶ Improvement of relations with Russia will make gas cheaper.

- ▶ NATO membership will reduce Ukraine’s dependence on Russia.

- ▶ NATO membership will worsen relations with Russia.

- ▶ Gas tariffs grow because of RosUkrEnergo activity.

- ▶ In Georgia-Russia conflict Russia should be supported.

- ▶ Integration with Russia and CIS should be among priorities.

- ▶ For cheaper gas national interests can be partly sacrificed.

- ▶ Current gas price indicates good relations with Russia.

- ▶ Recognition Holodomor as genocide will worsen relations with Russia.

- ▶ We can trust the president of Russia.

- ▶ Russia worsens relations between countries.

- ▶ Ukraine-Russia relations will improve after top-level visits interchange.

- ▶ With his visit to Ukraine Putin support Yanukovych.

- ▶ Improvement of Ukraine-Russia relations means stabilization of gas price.

- ▶ Improvement of Ukraine-Russia relations means no borders check.

- ▶ Improvement of Ukraine-Russia relations means equal conditions for work in Russia.

- ▶ Improvement of Ukraine-Russia relations means new projects in business, science and culture.

- ▶ Improvement of Ukraine-Russia relations means protection of Russian language in Ukraine.

- ▶ Improvement of Ukraine-Russia relations means protection of Ukrainian language in Russia.

- ▶ Improvement of Ukraine-Russia relations means simultaneous entrance to WTO.

- ▶ Improvement of Ukraine-Russia relations means no trade restrictions from Russia.

- ▶ Russia will raise price of gas for Ukraine.

- ▶ Ukraine should join the geopolitical union of Russia and Belarus.

- ▶ Ukrainian Orthodox church should be under Moscow patriarchy.

- ▶ Ukraine should give its gas transporting system under Russia control for cheaper gas.

Yushchenko represented foreign policy in the following manner:

- ▶ There is a threat to the sovereignty of Ukraine from Russia.

- ▶ The Russian language should be state language.

- ▶ The problem of language is real.

- ▶ Good relations with Russia are among the top priorities for state authorities.

- ▶ NATO membership will reduce Ukraine’s dependence on Russia.

- ▶ NATO membership will worsen relations with Russia.

- ▶ Gas tariffs grow because of RosUkrEnergo activity.

- ▶ In Georgia-Russia conflict Russia should be supported.

- ▶ Integration with Russia and CIS should be among priorities.

- ▶ Current gas price indicates good relations with Russia.

- ▶ We can trust the president of Russia.

- ▶ Russia worsens relations between countries.

- ▶ Ukraine-Russia relations will improve after top-level visits interchange.

- ▶ Improvement of Ukraine-Russia relations means stabilization of gas price.

- ▶ Improvement of Ukraine-Russia relations means no borders check.

- ▶ Improvement of Ukraine-Russia relations means equal conditions for work in Russia.

- ▶ Improvement of Ukraine-Russia relations means new projects in business, science and culture.

- ▶ Improvement of Ukraine-Russia relations means protection of Ukrainian language in Russia.

- ▶ Russia will raise the price of gas for Ukraine.

- ▶ Ukraine should join the geopolitical union of Russia and Belarus.

- ▶ Ukrainian Orthodox church should be under Moscow patriarchy.

The other statements were suppressed or presented ambivalently.

Tymoshenko clearly represented the following statements:

- ▶ There is a threat to the sovereignty of Ukraine from Russia.

- ▶ The Russian language should be state language.

- ▶ Good relations with Russia are among the top priorities for state authorities.

- ▶ NATO membership will reduce Ukraine’s dependence on Russia.

- ▶ NATO membership will worsen relations with Russia.

- ▶ Gas tariffs grow because of RosUkrEnergo activity.

- ▶ In Georgia-Russia conflict Russia should be supported.

- ▶ Integration with Russia and CIS should be among priorities.

- ▶ For cheaper gas national interests can be partly sacrificed.

- ▶ Current gas price indicate good relations with Russia.

- ▶ Russia worsens relations between countries.

- ▶ Ukraine-Russia relations will improve after top-level visits interchange.

- ▶ With his visit to Ukraine Putin support Yanukovych.

- ▶ Improvement of Ukraine-Russia relations means stabilization of gas price.

- ▶ Russia will rise price of gas for Ukraine.

- ▶ Ukraine should join the geopolitical union of Russia and Belarus.

- ▶ Ukraine should give its gas transporting system to Russia for cheaper gas.

We can see that Yanukovych represented his target electorate in 7 of 9 statements, Yushchenko – only in the statement about intervention in Ukrainian internal affairs, Tymoshenko represented all “orange” electorate orientations.

To analyze representation in time dimension we applied Granger causality test to standardized survey and coded communication data (see Method section). The results are illustrated in the following figures 1–3. The red line represents the probability that publics’ orientations influence the content of the messages (p-value). The blue line represents lag, i.e. time span in days between survey and communicative reaction. The green line stands for Fisher statistic values.

Figure 1. Tymoshenko: “blue-white ” orientations factor

Figure 2. Tymoshenko: “orange ” orientations factor

Figure 3. Tymoshenko: “all-Ukraine ” orientations factor

The analysis of time series indicates that Tymoshenko used “contrasted” communication strategy, i.e. systematic denial of the “blue-white” factor. At the same time, high levels of representation of the whole population caused primarily by sequential repeating of the thesis about the need to stabilize gas prices as a sign of improving relations with Russia.

Figure 4. Yushchenko: “blue-white ” orientations factor

Figure 5. Yushchenko: “orange ” orientations factor

Figure 6. Yushchenko: “all-Ukraine ” orientations factor

Yushchenko better represented the “Orange” factor of orientations. He quickly responded to changes in public opinion of his electorate and the society as a whole.

As for Yanukovych, time series analysis found no causality at any level of probability for any delay in response for all factors. This means that Yanukovych in public communications presented on the Party of regions official website, did not try to systematically respond to changes in the orientations of the population.

Second period

The distinctive feature of the second period is the presentation of Russia as an aggressor by most public speakers in Ukraine. Moreover, Russia was officially recognized as the aggressor by the Ukrainian parliament (Верховна_Рада_України, 2015). This was a strong factor of influence on both public orientations and public communication of power elites. Pro-Russian sentiments and messages became stigmatized as “separatists’” and socially undesirable. Still, there were differences in foreign orientations of the publics and their representations by the politicians.

First of all, it is notable that Opposition block tried to conceal foreign relations topic and focus itself on domestic issues: only 36 relevant messages were collected for the entire period (see Table 1 above). The differences in aggregated counts for pro-Russian, ambivalent and pro-European messages for all communicators are presented in table 5.

Table 5. Representation of foreign policy orientations during after the Euromaidan

Orientation

pro-Russian

ambivalent

pro-European

Communicator

Opposition block

2,8%

38,9%

58,3%

Poroshenko

0,2%

6,8%

93,0%

Tymoshenko

0,1%

5,4%

94,4%

Turchynov

0,3%

5,2%

94,4%

Yatsenyuk

0,3%

6,4%

93,3%

Total

0,3%

6,6%

93,2%

We must note that “pro-Russian” messages in no case meant support of Russian actions in Eastern Ukraine and Crimea, or the will to join the union with Russia. They include statements like the following: “With peaceful Russia that treats us with respect, you need to trade and cooperate.” Ambivalent statements include positive assessment of the talks with Vladimir Putin while condemning the aggression of the Russian Federation.

Yet the population of Ukraine is much less united than the elite. While the majority of publics supports joining the European Union after February 2014, this percentage is only above 50% and is not stable (see the diagram below).

Figure 7. Changes in geopolitical orientations of Ukrainian adult population

Source: Kyiv International Institute of Sociology.

This means that the elites did not fully represent publics’ orientations, especially in electoral groups dimension (see table 6).

Table 6. Representation of foreign policy orientations in time dimension[6]

Lag (in months)

p-value

F-statistics

Opposition block

General population

1

0,011703

0,0846

2

3,0914

0,8988

3

10,57

0,91234

Target electorate

–6

Poroshenko

General population

1

6,36

0,01577

2

1,10

0,3439

3

1,08

0,3753

4

2,93

0,04411

5

2,58

0,06801

6

1,68

0,2228

7

1,24

0,4402

Target electorate

1

5,52

0,02443

2

2,21

0,1276

3

1,01

0,4039

4

0,32

0,8629

Tymoshenko

General population

1

1,3445

0,2535

2

4,9896

0,013

3

3,0519

0,04625

4

2,0086

0,132

5

1,7109

0,1968

6

3,1714

0,06733

7

0,94774

0,6024

Target electorate

1

0,57395

0,4909

Turchynov

1

0,57395

0,4909

Target electorate

–

Yatsenyuk

General population

1

2,9793

0,09135

2

0,051864

0,9495

3

0,31337

0,8156

4

0,125

0,9721

Target electorate

1

0,058577

0,8101

2

0,26301

0,7704

3

0,8572

0,4756

4

0,38521

0,8166

5

0,52356

0,7547

6

0,22331

0,9579

7

0,041766

0,9993

We can see that Opposition block, Tymoshenko, and Turchynov better represented the general population of Ukraine, then their target electorates. Poroshenko and Yatsenyuk, on the contrary, were more ideologically oriented in their public messages. Still, Tymoshenko reacted more quickly to changes in orientations of her electorate, then other politicians.

The communication strategy used by Yanukovych and Opposition block we call “nomenclature strategy”, the strategy of Tymoshenko during the first period is a “radical-sensitive”, and the strategy of Yatsenyuk and Poroshenko during the second period is a “compromise”. Neither of them is ideal for the rapid change of society.

Conclusion

Comparing two periods of modern Ukrainian history – after the Orange revolution and after Euromaidan – we can say that after February 2014 the changes in both publics’ foreign policy orientations and their representation by power elites are significant.

The publics became much more unite in their European aspirations and this was consistently represented by power elites. However, several features remain common for both periods. These features may transform into threats for sustainable European development of Ukrainian society.

The position of the Ukrainian government in relations with Russia independent of foreign influences make impossible the complete representation of constantly changing foreign policy orientations of different electoral groups. However, ignoring the latter in times of crisis and a sharp abandoning of isolationism can lead to a confrontation within the country. During the first period politicians represented mainly their electoral groups, while during the last two years they move to representation of the general public.

Ukrainian politicians differ in terms of the level of representation and sensitivity to changes in public opinion. For the first period the rating in descending order was the following: Tymoshenko, Yushchenko, Viktor Yanukovych. For the second period, Poroshenko and Yatsenyuk became more representative. Tymoshenko was more radically focused on the electorate, which changed during the second period. Yushchenko less represented the population in general, with a level of representation decreased from the beginning of his presidency to the dissolution of Parliament, when his target electorate orientation has become more rigid. Most sensitive to the circumstances of communication in the first period was Yanukovych, who changed the content of communication according to the audience, used neutral statements or suppressed disputable messages. We can see that Opposition block uses the same strategy, which could be the hidden threat in case of the aggravation of economic and military crisis.

Social tensions and conflicts of the orientations in the transformation are functional, while the formation of foreign policy is essentially elitist. The contradictions that exist regarding the foreign policy direction, on the one hand, contribute to the structuring the political forces, on the other – to creating a stable balance in which disproportionate strengthening of one of the groups is compensated by mobilizing their opponents. Such interaction has both positive and negative effects on social development. On the one hand, it hinders the development of any vector of foreign policy, but on the other – potentially improves the quality of the implementation of this vector by the rotation of elites. As a result, it is possible to develop a model of foreign relations, which somehow satisfy all groups.

Oleh Ivanov, PhD. is a Senior Lecturer at the Department of Sociology, the National University of “Kyiv-Mohyla Academy”, and analyst at the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology, Ukraine. In 2012, defended “summa cum laude” PhD thesis “Representation of People’s Foreign Policy Orientations in the Public Communication of Power Elites.” Scholar interests cover political sociology, sociology of mass communication, military sociology, and content-analytical methodology. Since 2014 is a member of the Editorial Board of the international peer-reviewed journal “Social, Health, and Communication Studies Journal” which is published collaboratively by MacEwan University (Canada), and the National University of “Kyiv-Mohyla Academy” (Ukraine). Since 2016 is a deputy head of the Young Scholars Association at the National University of “Kyiv-Mohyla Academy”.

Affiliation:

Department of Sociology, National University of “Kyiv-Mohyla Academy”.

E-mail: ivanovov@ukma.edu.ua

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Społeczne reprezentacje orientacji zagranicznych Ukraińców w dyskursie publicznym ukraińskich elit politycznych

Streszczenie:

Artykuł przedstawia warunki konieczne (a także empiryczne ograniczenia), które pozostają niezbędne do wdrożenia w sferze ukraińskiej polityki zagranicznej demokratycznego i deliberatywnego procesu decyzyjnego. Teoria reprezentacji wyjaśnia stabilność ukraińskiego systemu społecznego w tym wymiarze (np. w odniesieniu do relacji między Ukrainą a Rosją) poprzez to, jak polityka ta była kształtowana w okresie transformacji ustrojowej przez elity, napięcia społeczne oraz konflikty dotyczące kierunku rozwoju państwa. Komunikacja polityczna upowszechniana jest poprzez określone strategie dyskursywne: ukryte (formułowane w stylu właściwym dla nomenklatury), ambiwalentne oraz konfrontacyjne. Dla strukturalnej i morfologicznej analizy tych strategii utworzono określony algorytm komputerowy, obejmujący znaczną ilość danych (wiadomości obecnych na ukraińskich i rosyjskich stronach rządowych). Korpusy badanych tekstów zostały przekształcone w semantyczną sieć dotyczącą danego zagadnienia, połączoną z tymi wszystkimi cechami, które stanowiły przedmiot zainteresowania samego badacza (np. czas, miejsce, autor, potencjalna liczba odbiorców itd.). Z kolei do badania dużej liczby sondaży przeprowadzonych na różnych próbach i z użyciem odmiennych pytań zastosowano technikę tematycznego skupiania pytań za pomocą analizy zawartości.

Słowa kluczowe:
reprezentacja, komunikacja, elity władzy, stosunki międzynarodowe, Ukraina, Rosja, orientacje polityczne.

1 The supporters of Yushchenko during 2004 Ukrainian presidential elections.

2 After the annexation of Crimea and starting of the hostilities in Donbas region the data from these regions are not strictly representative. After 18 March 2014 there were no reliable data from Ukrainian sociological organizations based in Crimea. And the data from Donbas is representative enough only for territories under Ukrainian Army control.

3 http://ekmair.ukma.edu.ua/bitstream/handle/123456789/1216/hubenko,%20paper.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y

4 The Collective Security Treaty Organization led by Russia.

5 Remember that we analyzed 2010 version of this site.

6 No causality at any level of probability for any delay in response.

Denaturalisation of Collective Identities within pro-Euromaidan Discourse (on field of Facebook Representation)

Iuliia Soroka
V.N. Karazin Kharkiv National University

Abstract:

The spreading violence beyond Euromaidan space in Kyiv have become one of the main issues of Ukrainian society in winter 2013–2014. For Euromaidan supporters their relatively safe space of every-day interaction came under pressure of discourse which divided the whole world into “friends and enemies”. The naturalisation of collective identities of Euromaidan supporters and their opponents served the purpose of symbolic struggle and provided the simplified social worldview. The last one is, on the one hand, a useful tool of social mobilisation but, on the other hand, this kind of worldview (simplified, “Black and white”) provokes violence. The topic of this article is a denaturalisation as an opposite strategy which creates the complicated worldview. The research issues of this article are the following: does denaturalisation exist within pro-Euromaidan discourse; in what kind of discursive strategies and modes does it appear? Online social networks, Facebook in particular, were chosen as a field of study. The research method is traditional analysis of text. The implication of this research is revealing of internal dynamic of pro-Euromaidan discourse.

Keywords:
denaturalisation, Euromaidan, pro-Euromaidan discourse, symbolic struggle, nominations, online social networks, internal dynamic of pro-Euromaidan discourse.

Introduction

Among many questions of the current situation in Ukraine let me focus on the following one: why did peaceful protest on Euromaidan turn into violence (Onuch & Martsenyuk, 2014; Kulyk, 2014)? This question is mostly answered from either ideological or psychological perspective: some groups or categories of people are recognised as aggressive, warlike or dangerous (in case of Euromaidan these are “berkut”[1] and “Pravyi sector”[2] for instance). Another common explanation appeals to geopolitics or money. According to sociological view, action (and violence as such) is influenced by networks of meanings and is supported by cultural symbols. Therefore I propose to study the processes in Ukrainian symbolic space, i.e. naturalisation and denaturalisation, which influenced the escalation of violence.

Researchers of Euromaidan symbolic space usually define only two competing discourses: pro-Euromaidan and Anti-Maidan. This view corresponds to the binary vision of mass protest movements, which are supposed to have two opposite camps, standpoints and languages. On the contrary the pro-Euromaidan discourse seems to have greater diversity and dynamics, which are reflected in naturalisation and denaturalisation.

Naturalisation is a discursive tool of mass mobilisation via producing an enemy with the help of a simplified worldview (Barthes, 1972 (1953); Foucault, 1980). Berkut, titushky[3], Pravyi sector, colorady[4], etc. are the examples of naturalised group (and collective identities) nominations. These group nominations usually fall into two binary oppositions, i.e. people–power and Ukrainian–Russian. Naturalisation helps to legitimise violence, to spread it beyond the immediate place of conflict and to destroy the relatively safe space of every-day interaction. Denaturalisation (Batler, 1990) is an opposite process which returns complexity to social world and safe space of every-day interaction. It is important to emphasize that denaturalisation is becoming a part of the pro-Euromaidan discourse, helping to develop and reinforce the correspondent values and ideas.

Naturalisation as communicative strategy claims to be dominant in public representation, in pro-Euromaidan discourse in particular. Denaturalisation can be considered as a kind of resistant against naturalisation. The naturalisation–denaturalisation interaction produces a specific context of symbolic struggle and internal dynamics of the discourse itself. My research helps to explain the mechanisms of exclusion as a discursive and practical strategy of mass protests movement, which is recognised by researchers (Baysha, 2015) as one of the most important causes of its failure.

The blogosphere of Euromaidan is considering in this article as a space of naturalisation and denaturalisation processes, taking OSN (online social networks), Facebook in particular, as a specific field of my research. As a rule OSNs in mass protests movements (Occupy (US), Tahrir (Turkey), Bolotnaya (RF), Euromaidan, etc.) are considered to be the tools of spreading information, mobilising supporters and organising logistics (Barbero, Mezger 2014; Beriro 2014; Cao, Cheong, Li 2014; Onuch 2014; Szostek 2014). The role of OSNs in discursive dimension is reduced to the circulation of solidarity-building materials and means for sharing interpretation of actions frame, actors, identities (Dickinson, 2014). I propose to study Facebook in the context of internal dynamics within the pro-Euromaidan discourse and as a space of deployment of power relationship in the protests movement.

Conceptual frame of research

The situation in Ukraine in fall 2013 was characterised by rapid growth of social confrontation, aggression and hostility not only in the space of Euromaidan in Kyiv and other cities, but also in online space and social media. These processes have become a challenge for social science, which tried to use concepts of manipulation, informational war, hate speech, xenophobia, etc., for their interpretation. All of these concepts have their traditions and advantages, but they cannot give complete interpretation for the particular process and have essential restriction for using in Ukrainian academic and public context. Concept of manipulation, for example, requires a basic understanding of its potential subjects, “customers” and ability to compare distorted image of reality with its true picture. It is not achievable when the links between group of interests are not transparent, events are accelerated and alternative descriptions of reality are multiplied. These conditions also restrict using of the informational war concept. Explanation of violence through the growth of xenophobia requires a reliable data of dynamics and structure of the events participants. We need time to determine the causes of increasing of xenophobia, which also limits the interpretation of current events. The explanatory potential of “hate speech” concept is weak, because the representative mode of language is still common, like “objectivism” in understanding of social reality.

In other words, we need to use the approach which gives ability to interpret rapid changes in peoples’ behavior, caused not by dynamics of material condition of their life, but by the shifts in common meanings. Cultural-symbolic space attracted my attention, because not only it mediates meanings and actions, but is also a place of construction of meanings, creation and reinterpretation of symbols, which “lead to” action. Symbolic space is also a place of struggle between different competing modes of interpretation of reality (see. symbolic struggle – Bourdieu, 1989) and distinct discourses. According to poststructuralist methodology, used in this research, changeability of symbolic space is correlated to a struggle for domination within society, and the concept of discursive power (or power of discourse, knowledge/power (Foucault, 1980) is crucial for it.

As we know, functionalists and structuralists in sociology considered power as a secondary element of social life, as a subject–object relation and defined it as an intention, a will, an ability to achieve some results. Poststructuralists criticise objectivistic vision of domination as an analogy of natural forces and subordinates as an obedient machines. According to them, power is a type of social relation of domination, which exercise as influence, control, governance, manipulation, supremacy, etc. Power exists everywhere, in all levels of social interaction – societal, interindividual, intergroup and intragroup. Power exercises in different strategies of establishing of hierarchy including persuasion, coercion, force, assessment, competence, credibility, charisma, etc. This interpretation of power base on M. Foucault concepts of power/knowledge or discursive power (Foucault, 1980). It operates horizontally, regulates interaction through knowledge, norms, rules and standards, which become parts of common sense. Discursive power is productive: it creates social reality, establishing groups of people and distinction between them by categories of skin color, sex, age, class, caste, place of living, education, etc. Discursive power does not belong to someone, but to everyone who knows. The concept of discursive power gives us an ability to understand how social power operates through social networks, science, education, mass media, advertising, etc., in other words – in symbolic space.

Symbolic space is a specific dimension of social world where all of position in social space (as a set of available resources of money, power, prestige, etc.) are represented by symbols. They serve to exercise social interaction and communication, to express representation and beliefs, which are used by people, their interpretation of reality. The learning of these representation by means of learning symbols is a content of socialisation and inculturation processes. As Bourdieu writes: Through the distribution of properties, the social world presents itself, objectively, as a symbolic system which is organised according to the logic of difference, of differential distance. Social space tends to function as a symbolic space, a space of lifestyles and status groups characterised by different lifestyles (Bourdieu, 1989, p.20). The notion of symbolic space helps to describe specific dimension of social world, where all of objective properties exists as symbols, as signs of differences. People’s ability to categorise and classify something (for example, it looks intellectual, it looks patriotic) demonstrates them as socialised in particular society where concrete practices and characteristics are related to concrete symbols. Current configuration of social positions correlate to hierarchy of symbols, and this link seems self-evident for people within the society.

Some symbolic systems (like language) are rather stable, but symbolic space of the society is permanently changing. This change is caused by symbolic struggle as a specific form of social interaction, which aim is to legitimate such vision (or interpretation) of world and establish it as a social order. All of us are engaged in this struggle, for example, as an audience of commercial and political advertisement, which manipulate by well-known symbols and creates its new meaning. Mass-media is another actor and space of symbolic struggle, which implements there through nomination of people, groups, events, situations, etc.

Using naturalised nomination is one of power strategies which is deployed in symbolic space for mobilisation of supporters and followers. Nomination (Bourdieu, 1989) is naming or defining of social objects, phenomena, groups, etc. Each social agent nominates social world around themselves but legitimacy of these nominations is limited by each social position. For example, parents make legitimate nomination of their children, teachers – of their pupils, commander – of their subordinates, etc. The right of legitimate nomination within society at all belongs to the state. Each kind of IDs, certificates or licenses (official nomination), produced by state, not only give person certain rights but also confirm a symbolic power of state. Nominations are not neutral, because they are produced in such social position, operate with binaries based cultural categories and correspond with symbolic interests of dominant groups. One of the main functions of nominations is to reproduce a groups border, symbolic relationships between us and them, including construction of enemy. The last one is a kind of naturalised nomination.

R. Barthes considered naturalisation as a function of myth as a secondary semiotic system: Myth hides nothing and flaunts nothing: it distorts; myth is neither a lie nor a confession: it is an inflexion (Barthes, 1972, p. 128). Myth naturalises the concept, transforms history to nature: Everything happens as if the picture naturally conjured up the concept, as if the signifier gave a foundation to the signified: the myth exists from the precise moment when French imperiality achieves the natural state (Barthes, 1972, p. 129). According to this, naturalisation forces to perceive some meanings as natural ones and to “forget” its socio-historical genesis. Naturalisation is a dominative group’s tool for converting their dispositions to common sense for all society. The norms of social recourses division (as many other important social division) are naturalised which helps to reproduce current format of social inequality and hierarchy.

Euromaidan, as a centre of symbolic resistance against state power, has become an alternative subject of legitimate nomination and has produced naturalised nominations of collective identities. Such nomination as maidan, titushky, colorady, vatniki[5], banderas[6] were emerged for naming the participants of confrontation, designation of the border of groups, communication of this groups and others. Nominations, which emerged at that time, have become an object of researches in linguistic and sociolinguistic (Zhabotinskaya 2014, Trach 2015). These nominations were indicating some groups as aggressive, warlike, dangerous or as enemies to each other. This disposition becomes a sustained meaning of these nomination. As a result of naturalisation, using this nomination in description of such situation predetermines its finalisation (conflict, clash, violence, etc.). Choosing such naturalised nomination for identification or self-identification becomes attribution of some person as motivated to violence against opposite group.

Mass-media (printed, electronic, social, etc.), which use naturalised nominations in their messages, become a space of naturalisation. For example, huge number of people were shocked by the video where fighters of berkut humiliate cossack Mykhailo Gavryliuk in January 2014 in Kyiv, separatists abused patriot Iryna Dovgan in August 2014 in Donetsk. Messages like this do not allow the identification of executors of tortures, but spread these meanings (readiness to violence) to all people named by this nomination. Therefore the rest of situations with separatists, berkut and so on with high probability will be interpreted by this generalised definition. Numerous facts of attacked people with ribbon (yellow-blue) or attacking people with ribbon (Georgs’), like, for example, attack on the entrance of University metro station in Kharkiv in April 13, 2014.

There are some conditions which foster perception and adoption of naturalised nominations. These are accelerated stream of events, infringement of social order routine (in our case – mass protests on Independence Square in Kyiv), feeling of uncertainty and unpredictability among people, suppressed reflexivity and critical thinking. People who do not have direct contact to the event area (by themselves or their friends, contact, etc.) but are included to information flow, are insecure. They lose their safe everyday space. Indeed, neighbors, colleagues, random passersby, fellow citizens in your town become a potential source of danger. This danger and simplified world, where all of social categories are reduced to we or them, friends or foes, our or enemy’s, is ready to fight, not to live and need to be denaturalised.

Project design, research question, data

As we explained earlier, naturalisation is one of the main discursive strategies of massive mobilisation. Some groups or categories of people are represented as enemies, who have tendency to violence “from their nature”. Naturalised nominations, which are spreading through mass-media messages, destroy secure space of everyday interaction. Another negative impact of this phenomenon is following: naturalised nominations become a ground for simplified worldview, based on binary oppositions (“white–black”, “native–stranger”), which support social polarisation and encourage violence as a method of conflict resolution.

Denaturalisation is an opposite trend, which breaks down simplified worldview of confronting with brutal enemies and reinvents socio-historic and sociocultural meanings of naturalised nomination. Denaturalisation accent (among others) on relation between meanings and groups, represented by such nomination, their history and intention, their changeability and contextuality. Previous analysis gives opportunity to presume that denaturalisation will be carried out in dis-identification of national (ethnic), state (governmental), territorial and cultural as attribution of groups, actions and objects. Denaturalisation also appears in the spontaneous activity of bloggers.

The research question is: does denaturalisation exist in Euromaidan blogosphere? In what kind of empirical manifestation (strategies and modes) does it appear?

The object of this research is blogosphere (messages of OSN) of Euromaidan. The subject is a demonstration of denaturalisation as discursive practice in posts about Euromaidan and connected events by pro-Ukrainian bloggers.

This research was conducted during Euromaidan events from November, 2013 to November, 2014. The field of research was narrowed to authors newsfeed in Facebook. The total number of friends is 548; there are no official politicians, professional journalists among them. All authors of analysed posts are pro-Ukrainian oriented, live in Kharkiv and are personally acquainted with the author. This filters were chosen in order to exclude falsified and non-spontaneous posts.

The unit of analysis is a post, which includes the message of denaturalisation. The research method is the traditional analysis of text. The posts, which include denaturalisation, were detected from the Facebook news feed. The research data consists of 50 posts containing denaturalisation, 29 posts were chosen for final analysis. Total number of posts’ authors is 15.

Denaturalisation in blogs

The empirical manifestation of denaturalisation in Pro-Euromaidan blogs (in example of author’s news feed) were found during the research. In order to organise data the denaturalising messages were divided in two groups – “strategies” and “modes”. First group was formed by posts where denaturalisation appears in empirical manifestation of different kind of call to audience. The posts from second group direct to some concepts of communication and interpretation, thinking process as such. In other words, one group of messages has intention to recreate the space of interaction, another – the space of thinking. The names of groups are conditional because the level of awareness as differentiation criterion between “strategies” and “modes” in researched posts have to be proven by special study.

At the beginning we would like to demonstrate the first group of results first group of results with the interactive strategy:

For a lot of people from Russia it is just very difficult to understand what is happening here. For example, it is difficult to realise and accept Russia’s participation in our events (new and increasingly credible evidence are persistently needed). And while many people sincerely want to understand what is happening, they have almost no chance, because neither we nor they have ever seen anything like this, and because they consider their position to be “objective”, “above the events” (Denis Kobzin, 16.10.2014)[7].

In Russia, the supporters of the military operation in the eastern regions of Ukraine are convinced that the troops will play a liberating role, that they are needed for the liberation of the friendly people from the “fascist boot”, that all of the protesters are “Bandera”, who will roll back to Galychyna at the first sound of approaching Russian tank column. But supporters of the Maidan in central and eastern Ukraine perceive what is going on as a threat of foreign intervention and do not understand who are those “dispatched kazachky”[8] that Moscow is talking about. After all, in fact, they turn out to be these “dispatched kazachky” (Rostyslav Siryk, 18.03.2014).

Denaturalisation appears here in actualising the disposition of the opposite side of conflict which is named as people from Russia in the first post and more precisely and narrower supporters of the military operation in the second one. As seen, the dispositions of the opposite side is analysed according to its contextual and situational background, the relation between position and disposition is establishing, and only then the judgments is giving.

Another empirical expression of interactive strategy found is self-criticism:

There is a question that bothers me. … I never liked such a singer as Ani Lorak. … But the question remains. What makes us different from the neighboring country, where they announced a persecution of Makarevich, for example? Why do we have to behave like vatniki ? … Prohibition is a big temptation. And then it will be difficult to refuse. It makes me sad to see that we are turning into savages (Zoya Kazanzhy, 4.08.2014).

Friends. People of Kharkiv. Yesterday morning I was standing in front of the RSA[9] – we’re not much better than colorady in our ability to hear the opponent. One woman from their side tried to explain in good faith, … that they also want to be heard, they do not want anything bad for Kharkov, that for many of them (according to her) Kharkiv is Ukraine. In response to that we have started to sing loudly. It is not good. Actually, guys, I think, there are sane people on the other side, who want to be heard (Kateryna Nesmyeliva, 7.04.2014).

The self-criticism strategy does not deconstruct naturalised nomination. Here the attribute of enemy is used for we–group, named by enemy group is humanised, and the emotional neutralisation is achieved.

The call for dialogue interactive strategy was also found. Dialogue is defined here in relation with death: as an opposition to death, as a mean to prevent death, and death as a price of the dialogue:

WE URGENTLY NEED DIALOGUE. The forces, that are trying to tear Ukraine into parts, dream that now everybody should take knives and guns and go to massacre the families of berkut and regionals[10]. They want us to become criminals so that they could deal with us as bandits. We are made to use force in cases when we need a conversation with each other (Rostyslav Siryk, 25.01.2014).

There we have it… Everything changes, when people put their lives on stake. We have led the country to the fact, that other stakes are not accepted. Every human life is a terrible price to pay for the mindless bestiality, which made us hostages. Each death must change something in our mind, that will make the return impossible. Therefore, each death should have a name. And no matter from which ‚side’ this death is. We all pay for one thing: a country which will be good for living (Iryna Red, 2.05.2014).

Another example of interactive strategy which were found is exposing and censuring hate speech:

The victory of the Maidan is a myth invented by contra. The Maidan cannot win by definition. The fight against obscurantism will stop only after it is gone, i.e. never. If you do not want to waste the Maidan, stop using offensive labels – Katsap , Moskal , Sovok[11], Slave. Don’t blacken your soul and don’t pollute the space, otherwise all this mud will eventually pour on you. Do not gloat. Just because it’s petty and ugly. Besides we have not won yet. The struggle continues. Think who your future mayor will be. Arrange public hearings. Suppress provocations. If you want democracy, learn to do democracy instead of hostility (Rostyslav Siryk, 4.03.2014).

Media falsehood is also becoming an object of exposing. It is the kind of denaturalising strategy where the mediator between audience and reality is problematised:

I found a certain channel “Planet” on my TV-set in the kitchen. While they were waxing eloquent about contact of modern civilisations with aliens … I just laughed. Recently, however, they have started broadcasting about Slavic world unity, the disparity between corrupt, selfish Western attitudes and “communal character of the Slavs”. Also, I remember a programme in which they explained that the Romans taught culture to Europe, but it was the Etruscans who had taught the Romans. And Etruscans were an ancient Slavic civilisation (i.e. Russian) (Denys Kobzin, 21.10.2014).

Calls to action, to take part in meeting, to visit Euromaidan were named participatory strategy of denaturalisation. In posts like placed below authors emphasise the importance of personal experience, own practice of participation and observation of the events for ability to talk about it and to make difference between truth and false:

DEAR RUSSIANS! Those who understand that Ukraine is a normal and adequate country! Those who are against the war between Russia and Ukraine! Today in Moscow more than 200 people who came out to support peace, rather than war between Russia and Ukraine have been arrested! Do you want to avoid being arrested? The answer is simple. Come to Kiev, to the Maidan, join us and tell the whole truth about Putin’s regime and that YOU ARE AGAINST THE WAR WITH UKRAINE!!! Here YOU WILL NOT BE ARRESTED! Here the whole world will be able to hear you! Don’t be afraid! WE ARE FRATERNAL PEOPLES AND TOGETHER WE CAN WIN! We are ready to welcome you and all will be happy to meet you! Come and you will see that here you will not be hurt!!! Come to Crimea and tell everybody there that you, Russians, are against the war (Rostyslav Siryk, 2.03.2014).

Another group of posts represent denaturalisation mode which includes two phenomena: dis-identification and reflection. Dis-identification is breaking relationships of identity of some symbols. There are a lot of identifications in everyday and media discourse which used to simplify a message. For example, name of head of state is using to name a national state, state institutions and their activities, etc. Name of country as polysemantic symbol is using to denote territory, national state and institutions, population, culture, people, etc. These semantic links help to transmit some kind relationships, for example hostility, from political leaders to state, to people, to country, to national culture, etc. These kind of meanings transmission becomes a content of political, national or geopolitical mythologies which functions as a mean of mobilisation[12]. Such kind of “loaded” symbols were explained above as naturalised.

The dis-identifications of “national one” and “state one” were found in blogs:

I talked to my mom yesterday. She was against the Euromaidan for all this time. She repeated foolish things about banderas. But yesterday she asked … me: “We don’t have to be in war against Russia! I don’t want destructions. I don’t want the war”. Then the text about national belonging was coming: “Your father is Russian, I am Ukrainian, are we against each other?” But I have learned to differ state pretension from the national ones. And I told her that we were talking about … territorial unity of our magnificent state and I don’t have any objections against people of any nationalities (Anna Sharygina, 3.03.14).

There were also posts with dis-identification the head of state and national culture:

Keep calm, citizens, quietly. Why the hell should I stop loving Pushkin and consider the Russian language as “a language of the enemy State” because of … [Putin]? Pushkin is my poet, and Russian language is my language, they don’t belong to this scum (Vladimir Osetinsky, 4.06.2014).

Another kind of posts is dis-identification of the state and the population of the country:

Friends from Russia write: “Hello Rost. It seems like our mad president is starting a war with your country. Forgive us, we didn’t elect him and don’t support him, don‘t wish evil to your country. Don’t think bad about Russian citizens. Thanks” (Rostyslav Siryk,1.03.2014).

Revolution, excuse me for being a bit theatrical, is a time of hope and love, war is a time of hate. … On February 21, on the largest pro-Maidan demonstration over the three previous months in Kharkiv, one of our slogans was “Russia is not Putin!” (Then we went to the Russian consulate to express our solidarity with the prisoners of Bolotnaya). I remember well a similar slogan in winter Maidan in Kiev … . Among other things, we got to know that some of those who came out to Bolotnaya then, later went to fight against the Donbass “Ukrainian fasсists” or get delighted at the capture of the Crimea. And I still hope very much that someday we will be able to repeat this slogan (Vladimir Osetinsky, 19.07.2014).

Denaturalisation at the level of regional symbols actualises dis-identification of city, city population and administration:

Our city seems like a hostage to me … taken by a gang which will not go away. Huge masses of people want to go out and demonstrate their loyalty to Ukraine …. Our main power is that we are numerous. But it is disarm by the inability of any of the forces to take responsibility for organising a massive demonstration. Any organisation that would do it will be automatically held responsible for the security of people who would come there. … However, the bandits in our city are not marginalise hiding somewhere in the dark streets, they have acquired legitimacy through elections. Kharkiv citizens have chosen the criminal power by themselves. And now this criminals dominate over the law enforcement and collude with the criminal regime …, keeping our beloved city as a hostage. They frighten us with titushky, the authorities inform as about acts of terrorism that could plunge the city into chaos (Irina Red, 18.04.2014).

Some posts found can be named as dis-identification a nation as such:

I am sure that hundreds of people in Moscow brought flowers to the Embassy of the Netherlands. I know there are many people in Russia who do not support anti-Ukrainian politics, and I know how hard it is for these dissenters to live under these false and terrible sign “99.99% support”. Among them there are those who just do not believe in aggression of Russia against Ukraine. I understand why they cannot believe. It’s really scary. And right now, when the war corrupts people’s minds, it is important to remember, that there are no “evil nations”, that scum and heroes exist in any nation, and there are dictators and cowardly dictators (Rostyslav Siryk, 19.07.2014).

Another mode of denaturalisation which was found in blogs is a reflection. It creates such space for thinking where using naturalised nomination is become inadequate or impossible. Reflection as “coming back”, self-analysis, checking own dispositions and thinking methods, critical rethinking of common generalisations help to form sensitivity to distinguish naturalised symbols, to realise functionality and limitation of semantic simplifications. For example, reflection can be directed to reconstruction of processual dimension of reality:

It seems that firstly, I realised myself as Ukrainian (not by blood, of course, by civic identity) in autumn of 2004. Not because I began to feel some special sentiments about Ukrainian history and culture … . But because I felt great respect and admiration for people who can defend their freedom and human dignity in such a way. And it was incredibly cool to feel that I am a part of this nation. … On March 9 this year, during the demonstration in Kharkov that gathered more than ten thousands of people, I, who consider myself as liberal and cosmopolite, was losing my head with joy walking along Sumskaya[13] and waving the national flag of Ukraine. This is what I call evolution, malyata[14] (Vladimir Osetinsky, 26.04.2014).

Another examples of reflection mode including some abstract concepts to interpretation of an event. Citation below includes meditation around concept of civil liberties:

A few days ago a lot of people discussed the video of the picket in front of the entrance of the Kharkov Malyshev factory[15]. … In the immediate rear of the fighting army, in front of entrance of the plant, which produces military hardware, a dozen picketers yelled hysterically about the “junta” and “fascists” and urged the workers to spoil tanks. The picket was guarded by the police … . People, who discussed this video, wrote about criminality of city authorities, which allow this kind of action. And … I’m just thinking, isn’t it the democracy? I mean … that different political forces have possibility to speak freely (during the war!). Maybe this is a civil liberty as such? We were growing up in sovok[16], where it was impossible to imagine such things, and it is terribly difficult for us even to think about it (Vladimir Osetinsky, 25.06.2014).

Metaphoric thinking also can function as denaturalisation mode. There is compare of war and illness:

When you take care of a close person who is seriously ill, it becomes clear, that wars and diseases are twins in terms of their outcomes. If it is your destiny, you will get over it, if not you’ll face the completion of the way. The main point is to start the treatment. The same goes for Ukraine. The truthful diagnosis is that our country is morally sick. We can’t have been healthy to be ready to ruin it for decades, and our citizens begin to hate one another (Alla Konyaeva, 5.08.2014).

The interesting version of denaturalisation mode is self-reflection:

The whole day today I was corresponding with one person, who I don’t know personally, we are not even FB friends. But he has read my comment about disagreement with the march of the UPA in Kharkov, and now we’re engaged in a daylong disputes on historical, sociological and all other possible issues. It seems like I am vatnik :)) It’s very funny, but most of all, it’s true :))) And in Odnoklassniki[17] I have been having a conversation with a friend for six months about the ‚neo-Nazi threat‘. And there I turn out to be “svidomaya”[18] in the bad meaning of this word …. :))) In general, “How terrible life is” (c) :))) (Masha Bakhtigozina, 16.10.2014).

Conclusion

As seen, there is denaturalisation in pro-Euromaidan bloggers posts. Among denaturalisation strategies were found interactive, critique of media, participatory, among denaturalisation modes – dis-identification and reflection. Collective identities which were emerged in Euromaidan space and categories of national, ethnic, and state, country, nation, and its culture, city authorities and population, etc. were denaturalised in some messages.

Dis-identification also can be considered as a competition of some myths about power and nation. Myth of national as ethnic competes with myth of national as states one. Another couple of competing myths is power position and person who occupy it. Competition actualises the question does he or she personalise the state and people will either this person only represents its?

The results of research demonstrate that OSN functioned not only a mobilisation and informational tools for mass protests. It also becomes a space for resistance of hostility rhetoric. Spontaneous bloggers’ activity, as seen, confronts a destruction of safe social interaction space. An image of enemy is destroying through reflection of inhomogeneity within enemies group, self-reflection and dialog. In other hand the research data allow to identify internal dynamics of pro-Euromaidan discourse which determined by the processes of naturalisation and denaturalisation. OSN becomes a conducive space for denaturalisation because unlike traditional media the subject of speech perceives themselves here as addressee of mythological (naturalised) massage.

As research data allow to generalise, the naturalisation precedes denaturalisation. But these processes are correlating with different social interests and therefore are differing in their social force. That is why a waves of naturalisation and denaturalisation can cover or overlap each other. The one o specific conditions which inhibit or even deny denaturalisation is war. When the use of force becomes permanent and positions of enemies objectifies by hostilities, the seizure of territory, destruction and victims naturalising war discourse monopolises public space.

Also need to emphasise that naturalisation and denaturalisation characterise symbolic aspect and discursive practises of consolidation processes within society, including violent, and that is determined further researches.

Iuliia Soroka – professor of sociology at the V.N. Karazin Kharkiv National University (Ukraine). She received her degree of Doctor of Science in Sociology at V. N. Karazin Kharkiv National University (2013). She worked at this university from 1999. She teaches “Sociology of culture”, “Training in Sociology of Culture”, “Methods of Teaching Sociology in Higher School”. She also served as Vice Dean of School of Sociology on teaching process issues (2003–2007). Her fields of scientific interests are sociology of culture, cultural mechanisms of power, social perception of the Other, cultural diversity, teaching of sociology, student-centered education, anti-oppressive pedagogy.

Afiliacja:

Iuliia Soroka

Department of Sociology

Faculty of Sociology

V.N. Karazin Kharkiv National University

Email: soroka70@gmail.com

References:

Barthes, R. (1972). Mythologies: Roland Barthes. New York: Hill and Wang.

Barberá, P., Metzger, M. (2014). Tweeting the Revolution: Social Media Use and the #Euromaidan Protests. Huffington Post. Downloaded from: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/pablo-barbera/tweeting-the-revolution – s_b_4831104.html.

Baysha, O. (2015). Ukrainian Euromaidan: The exclusion of otherness in the name of progress. European Journal of Cultural Studies February, vol. 18 no. 1, p. 3–18.

Beriro, N. (2014). From Tahrir to Independence Square: The Evolution of Digitally Mediated Protest Movements 2009 – 2013. Master’s thesis, Concordia University.

Bourdieu, P. (1989). Social Space and Symbolic Power. Sociological Theory, Vol. 7, No. 1. (Spring), pp. 14–25.

Butler, J. (1990). Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity. London: Routledge, 1990.

Cao, W., Cheong, A., Li, Z. (2014). How Facebook Functions in a Social Movement: An Examination Using the Web Mining Approach. Asian Journal for Public Opinion Research. Vol. 1 No. 4, August.

Dickinson, J. (2014) Prosymo Maksymal’nyi Repost! Tactical and Discursive Uses of Social Media in Ukraine’s Euromaidan. Ab Imperio, 3/2014, pp. 75–93.

Foucault, M. (1980). Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings. Ed. Colin Gordon. Trans. Colin Gordon, Leo Marshall, John Melpham, and Kate Soper. Brighton: Harvester.

Kulyk, V. (2014) Ukrainian Nationalism Since the Outbreak of Euromaidan. Ad Imperio 3/2014, pp. 94–122.

Onuch, Olga (2014). Social networks and social media in Ukrainian “Euromaidan” protests. Washington Post. Downloaded from: www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey – cage/wp/2014/01/02/social-networks-and-social-media-in-ukrainian-euromaidan – protests-2 (accessed 28 February 2014).

Onuch, O., Martsenyuk, T. (2014). Mothers and Daughters of the Maidan: Gender, repertoires of violence, and the division of labour in Ukrainian protests. Social, Health, and Communication Studies Journal, vol. 1, no.1 (November), pp. 105–126.

Szostek, J. (2014). The Media Battles of Ukraine’s Euromaidan. Digital Icons. Studies in Russian, Eurasian and Central European New Media, No 11, pp. 1–19.

Trach, N. (2015). “Together we are power!”: Rhetoric of Ukrainian Resistance. Sociolinguistic Essays. Kyiv: Clio. (in Ukrainian: Разом – сила. Риторика українського спротиву. Соціолінгвістичні есеї).

Zhabotinskaya, S. (2015) Language as weapon in the war of worldviews. Maidan – antimaydan: thesaurus of lexical innovation. (in Russian: Язык как оружие в войне мировоззрений. Майдан – антимайдан: словарь-тезаурус лексических инноваций). Online edition. Website UAKLiP, Kiev. Downloaded from: http://uaclip.at.ua/zhabotinskaja-jazyk_kak_oruzhie.pdf

Denaturalizacja tożsamości zbiorowych w ramach promajdanowego dyskursu (na przykładzie społecznych reprezentacji obecnych na Facebooku)

Streszczenie:

Przemoc rozprzestrzeniająca się poza kijowski Majdan Niezależności stała się głównym problemem dotykającym ukraińskie społeczeństwo zimą na przełomie 2013 i 2014 roku. Dla zwolenników wydarzeń rozgrywających się wówczas na Majdanie, ich względnie bezpieczna przestrzeń codziennych interakcji znalazła się pod presją dyskursu, który dzielił świat na „przyjaciół i wrogów”. Naturalizacja tożsamości zbiorowych, zarówno zwolenników Euromajdanu, jak też i ich przeciwników, była przejawem przemocy symbolicznej i dostarczała nieskomplikowanej wizji świata. Z jednej strony bowiem, ten uproszczony ogląd rzeczywistości stał się użytecznym narzędziem do mobilizacji społecznej. Z drugiej jednak, podtrzymując czarno-białą wizję świata, prowokował do przemocy. Przedmiotem refleksji autorki stała się zatem denaturalizacja, rozumiana jako strategia pozostająca w kontradykcji do tych procesów, umożliwiająca bardziej skomplikowany ogląd rzeczywistości. Punktem wyjścia dla tych rozważań okazały się dwa następujące pytania: „czy denaturalizacja istnieje w ramach dyskursu typowego dla Euromajdanu?”, „za pomocą jakich strategii dyskursywnych się przejawia?”. Badaniem objęte zostały sieci społecznościowe, zwłaszcza zaś Facebook. Sama analiza przyjęła zaś postać tradycyjnej analizy tekstu. Na skutek zastosowania odpowiedniej procedury badawczej autorce udało się zrekonstruować wewnętrzną dynamikę rządzącą dyskursem Euromajdanu.

Słowa kluczowe:
denaturalizacja, dyskursu Euromajdanu, przemoc symboliczna, nominacje, sieci społecznościowe, wewnętrzna dynamika dyskursu Euromajdanu.

1 Disbanded special police unit at the regional Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine.

2 Political party.

3 Collective term for naming the young people are used secretly for political purposes as a mercenaries for the organisation of actions with the use of physical force.

4 Nomination of people who carry “George” ribbon, another naturalised nomination of anti-Ukrainian people or anti-Maidan supporters.

5 Namely, a quilted jackets or padded jackets, naturalised nomination of anti-Ukrainian people or anti-Maidan supporters.

6 Followers of Stepan Bandera, kind of generalised name for pro-Ukrainian supporters.

7 The citations from blogs are demonstrating with name of authors and date on publishing according to permissions from authors.

8 Spies.

9 Building of region state administration.

10 Nomination of “Party of Regions” members and supporters, also of supporters of Victor Yanukovych.

11 Offensive name of soviet people.

12 Trade boycott is functioning according to the same semantical mechanism.

13 A central street in Kharkov.

14 Malyata (Ukrainian word) – addressing to small children, often used ironically to adults.

15 Tank factory in Kharkiv.

16 In Eng. – scoop. Offensive name for a Soviet man.

17 Russian online social network (like Nasza Klasa in Poland).

18 Svidomaya (Ukrainian word) – conscientious person, in some context – Ukrainian patriot.

Symbolic Representations of Maidan in the Ukrainian and Polish Press: Comparative Analysis

Zhanna Bezpiatchuk
National University of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy

Abstract:

This research proposes the comparative analysis of the symbolic representations of Maidan in the Ukrainian and Polish media outlets that comprise tabloid and quality publications. Different types of symbols are identified in the news analysis, reports, and feature stories on Maidan. The typology of symbols is worked out on the basis of the Cassirer’s philosophy of symbolic forms and Langer’s symbol theory. The coded types of symbols include symbol-products, symbol-concepts, symbol-slogans, symbol-situations, symbol-processes, and symbolic actions. With the help of the content analysis it is found that some most visible symbols in the media coverage of Maidan coincide in the Ukrainian and Polish print media. These are the symbol-concept “barricade”, the symbol-concept “Berkut”, and the symbol-process “dispersal of Maidan”. However, there are symbols that have either quantitative or qualitative significance in the Polish press and are absent in the Ukrainian media at all, namely, the symbol-product “blood”, the symbol-concept “solidarity”, the symbol-concept “freedom”.

Keywords:
symbolic representation, Maidan, tabloid, quality press, symbol-product, symbol-concept, symbol-slogan, symbol-situation, symbol-process.

Introduction

The proposed research aims to descend into the meanings that the media of Ukraine and Poland conveyed in their coverage of Maidan. According to the American communication theorist James Carey, the task of cultural studies as well as media studies as its integral part is (…) to diagnose human meanings (…) by descending deeper into the empirical world (Carey, 2009, p. 43). The typical range of possible interpretative devices for this purpose comprises frame analysis, different variations of discourse analysis, description of characteristics of cultural representations, analysis of media templates, news icons, symbolic actions. We attempt to revive for the same kind of analysis the concept of symbol with its focus on micro-meanings. The proposed research design is based on the symbol theory of Susanne Langer that, in its turn, goes back to the philosophy of symbolic forms by Ernst Cassirer, as well as to the American analytical philosophy. This theoretical approach sees symbol as a primary bearer of meanings, namely, explicit denotations, implicit connotations, and conceptual significations. The foundational difference between symbol and any other arbitrary meaning is the former’s reference to some universal law, norm, trend. Susanne Langer (1954) claims that people generally think in symbols and with symbols. The comparison of two contexts – Ukrainian and Polish – neighboring geographically, historically and culturally, could help to investigate to what extent proponents of symbol theories are right claiming that we could not understand culture and society without understanding its dominant symbols. From their point of view, symbols unite different cultures, as well as demarcate them.If we detect similarities of symbolic representations in the Polish and Ukrainian contexts, it is the general confirmation of these claims. It is also important to diagnose the points of divergence in meanings of the same symbols in different cultural contexts.Maidan is a critical case to test what symbolsthe Polish and Ukrainian media “think inand think with”.

Theory

The scholars worked out a number of concepts that help to grasp meanings in media: “simulacrum” (Baudrillard, 1994); “media templates” (Kitzinger, 2000); “cultural resonance” (Wolfsfeld, 1997); “citationality” (Derrida, 1978); “social performance” (Alexander & Mast, 2006); “news icon” (Perlmutter& Wagner, 2004); “pretext” (Taylor, 1994); “media ritual” (Couldry, 2003). Studying meanings researchers often conduct analysis of frames.

Ernst Cassirer’s philosophy of symbolic forms (1923; 1925; 1929) provokes an ongoing discussion of its applicability and adequacy for the contemporary analysis of cultural meanings through vehicles of symbols as they are understood in phenomenology, in general, and in the critique of culture, in particular. Some authors argue that the Cassirer’s philosophical project is exhausted (Svasian, 2010; Minakov, 2007). Svasian (2007) sees the philosophy of symbolic forms as one of the very last meaningful evidence of philosophical tradition of the West before its decline. Minakov (2007) argues that the neo-Kantian philosophical project found its finalization in the philosophy of symbolic form. Ricoeur (1965) criticizes Cassirer for providing overbroad definition of symbol that comprises all forms of synthesis of expressive and intuitive sense-data.

Recki (2004) tries to reinvigorate Cassirer’s philosophy by conceiving it as the critique of culture as praxis. This author pays a lot of attention to the rediscovery of the ethical and moral foundations in the Cassirer’s approach to symbolic forms. Recki concludes that Cassirer asserts the possibility of objectivity of moral judgments; the criterion for the objectivity in praxis is, according to Cassirer, “unity and universality” (Recki, 2004, pp. 156–157). Moreover, “the symbol itself has a liberating (…), ethical power” (Skidelsky, 2011, p. 126).

Skidelsky (2011) optimistically argues that (…) recent years have seen a long-overdue recognition of Cassirer’s originality; it is no longer possible to dismiss him as a “mere” neo-Kantian (Ibid., p. 48). Skidelsky (2011) assumes that for Cassirer it was a question of principle to preserve a link with the philosophical and cultural traditions in the broadest sense.

This approach of Cassirer brought him a name of “the last philosopher of culture”. He represents the humanistic philosophical tradition that is centered around belief in the liberating power of culture and around the notion of succession and tradition. The history of the 20th century provided a lot of dismantling theories that reflected on devastating empirical data (two World Wars, Holocaust, Holodomor, etc.). Contemporary post-structuralism revealed power relations that saturate any symbolic representations. The latter could lead to the symbolic domination and violence rather than freedom and objectification of any human cognition.

In contrast to Cassirer’s foundational acceptance of tradition, succession, the whole[1], cultural entities, symbolic formation, the discursive analyses, namely, those by Michel Foucault (2012), promoted disruption of tradition, dissemination, discursive fragmentation, cultural disparities, disintegrated elements, symbolic deformation, etc. At the backdrop of these trends and innovative intellectual spirit, the Cassirer’s critique of culture could be seen as old-fashioned neo-Kantian theory, although, at the same time, after a certain historical circle it looks more like an alternative, especially in its reconsidered, modernized versions that could combine post-structural interpretative devices with modern symbol theories (Goodman, 1988). The latter draw on Cassirer’s understanding of plurality of meanings with regard to different systems of description and symbolization. If the study of meanings, inter alia meanings in media texts and visuals, are restricted to the deconstruction of power relations with their arbitrariness of any foundations and to the analysis of discursive disruptions, the humanistic tradition gets totally lost and devalued that would cause one-sidedness of the whole scientific process and deprive it of the plurality of views and balance. So, the given media research is an attempt to reinvigorate the cultural humanistic tradition in the realm of media studies.

The other authors find the epistemological potential for the operationalization of the Cassirer’s symbol theory (Langer 1954; Hamburg, 1956; Feron, 1997; Janz, 2001). Some authors that see the potential for the revival of the Cassirer’s philosophical project put emphasis on its notions of objectivity and self-liberation of a person’s spirit through the culture and in the culture (Recki, 2004; Skidelsky, 2011). Any clear and rigorous thinking, in terms of Cassirer’s theory, could find its foundation only in symbolism and semiotics (Svasian, 2010, p. 74).

If we have to answer the framework question why it is necessary and important to study symbols in culture, inter alia in media, we can refer to Ferretti’s and Pierce’s explanation: (…) The symbol makes that world manifest in the light of unity and relation (Ferretti, Pierce; 1989, p. 123). The dictionary’s definition of symbol says that it is either an equivalent of a sign or a concept that means the ability of material things, events, and sensuous images (visual and audible) to convey some special ideal sense – meaning that differs from their perceptible being (Symbol, 2005, p. 180).

A term “symbol” has multiple semantic meanings in the Cassirer’s writings. We can propose a few definitions of Cassirer’s symbolic and symbol.

Ferretti and Pierce (1989) point out that (…) the entire world of the mind is defined and revealed, represented and made unitary, in the concrete tangible symbol (Ibid., p. 116).

Carl Hamburg (1956) argues that (…) symbols are not to be taken as “mere figures which refer to some given reality by means of suggestion or allegorical renderings, but in the sense of forces, each of which produces and posits a world of its own (Ibid., p. 40).

Svasian (2010) claims that the Cassirer’s symbol could be defined as a (…) sensuous embodiment of the ideal (Ibid., p. 32) that is simultaneously subjective as a model of reality and objective as a sense-endowment (Ibid., p. 16). Any symbol in cultural studies should be seen rather as an action than as an end-product.

Verley (2013) concludes that by symbols Cassirer means sensible signs and images that substitute presented matter and data and constitute a representation which is preceded by a synthesis when an appearance becomes a phenomenon and an object becomes represented due to an immediate activity of a mind subsuming particular under universal (Ibid., p. 12).

One of the most self-sufficient and influential reconsiderations of the Cassirer’s philosophy could be found in Susanne Langer’s book Philosophy in a New Keythat was first published in 1942. Symbolism is conceived by Langer as a key to the understanding of the mechanics of making meanings out of dispersed and disintegrated sense-data. While Cassirer was criticized for vagueness of definitions and too broad scope of his symbol’s conception (Ricoeur, 1965), Langer delivers prudent, clear-cut working-out of basic concepts needed to undertake any empirical analysis of symbols, inter alia symbols in media, and she does it from the point of view of symbolic forms and phenomenological conception of representations. So, it has a special epistemological value for the given research.

For Langer a person has need in symbolization, and it is one of human primary activities to refer to things that are absent with the help of symbols (1954, pp. 24, 32) . She conceptualizes symbols as (…) vehicles for the conceptions of objects that allow to retain things (events, facts, situations, processes) for later references, considerations, comparisons, memorizing, living through:

To conceive a thing or a situation is not the same thing as to “react toward it” overtly, or to be aware of its presence. In talking about things we have conceptions of them, not the things themselves; and it is the conceptions, not the things, that symbols directly “mean.” (1954, p. 49)

In order to understand how Langer arrives at this definition, it is necessary to look at her conception of sign. A sign is composed of sign as such, an object (thing, event, condition) which it signifies, and subject that is a reference to something beyond an object (the past, the future, the context of events, etc.) (Langer, 1954, p. 46). A sign and an object are paired together, and a subject enters into the relations with them as an entity but at the same time it has relations with each of them individually. So, a sign is a three-term item.

In a typical sign-function there are three terms: subject, sign, and object. In the simplest type of symbol – denotation – there are four essential terms: subject, symbol, conception, and object (Ibid., p. 52). According to Langer, there are three different types of symbol’s “meanings”: signification, denotation, and connotation (Ibid., p. 52). Denotation is an explicit meaning of symbol. Connotation is its implicit associative meaning. Signification is a meaning that symbol regularly conveys and has conceptual rather than associative nature.

The philosopher distinguishes two fundamental types of symbolism: discursive and non-discursive, namely, presentational. Discursive symbolism is general and universal, it is actualized as soon as it is applied to the concrete sense-data, whereas non-discursive symbolism is specific and individualized, it motivates us to discern more general meaning out of the case (Langer, 1954, p. 232). Discursiveness is successive progress of meanings, presentational symbolism is characterized with simultaneity (Ibid., p. 78). We find discursive symbolism in language whose power is its capability to embody concepts not only of things, but of things in combinations or situations (Ibid., p. 62). She calls it “situation-concept” or “symbol-situation”.

Methodology

The overall goal of this research is to conduct cross-national, comparative quantitative analysis of the symbolic representations of Maidan.

The major research question of this dissertation is formulated as follows:

RQ: What symbolic representations of Maidan could be found in its tabloid and quality press coverage in the period between November, 21, 2013 and February, 27, 2014 across the Ukrainian and Polish media?

Drawing on the preliminary tentative research of the coverage of Maidan across a variety of the Ukrainian and Polish print, online, and visual media, as well as the author’s experience as a journalist that covered Maidan as a RFE/RL reporter on the everyday basis within the whole period of November, 21, 2013 – February, 27, 2014, the following hypothesis is formulated:

H: Symbol-concepts, symbol-situations, symbol-processes are the most visible among all types of symbols in the quality press while in the tabloids symbol-products are the most visible; meanwhile, symbol-concepts, symbol-situations, symbol-processes are either absent or marginalized.

The case study of Maidan is considered to be critical because these three-month protests of 2013–2014 at the central square of Ukraine have the features that are the most attractive for media in such events and processes: violence, deviance, drama, and spectacle (DeLuca &Peeples, 2002, p. 860).

Maidan, or, as it was defined initially Euromaidan, is a grassroots pro-European movement that rose up in protest against the Ukrainian ex-president Viktor Yanukovych’s attempt to revoke the Association Agreement between Ukraine and the EU in November 2013. It received a form of the stationed tent camp with the stage and various self-organized services (kitchen, health care, self-defense) at the central square of Kyiv – Maidan.

In fact, Maidan has accumulated a multitude of civil initiatives, campaigns, protest actions, national gatherings (narodne viche), political opposition’s activities, dramaturgical events, and violent clashes. It had gone through a number of different stages of development from the few thousand peaceful student protest to the violent and radical struggle with the riot police that culminated in the mass killings of protestors in clashes and by snipers. The latter are identified by now by the General Prosecutor’s Office as the riot policemen Berkut. The mass killings took place in Mariinskyj Park, in the streets surrounding it, and in Maidan on February 18–20, 2014.

To study the symbolic representations of Maidan on a cross-country comparative scale we use the media sample of online editions of national press outlets. The media sample comprises quality as well as tabloid press. From each country under study, namely, Ukraine, and Poland, one quality and one tabloid media outlet is chosen.

Among all quality dailies one with the largest readership in each respective country is chosen. For Ukraine this is the Russian-language daily newspaper “Segodnia” (Сегодня) that had the largest audience reach in the country during 2015 (“Newspaper Segodnia – Stable Leader”, 2015). It is owned by the company System Capital Management which belongs to the Ukrainian mogul Rinat Akhmetov. For Poland the daily tabloid “Fakt” is chosen that has been the leading Polish tabloid since 2003 (Konopka, 2012, p. 63).

As a counterbalance to the leading national tabloids the leading quality weekly newsmagazines are chosen for each country. The main criterion for their selection is the readership. In the Ukrainian case the additional criteria is the language of the publication. So, for Ukraine the Ukrainian-language newsmagazine “Ukrainian Weekly” (“Український тиждень”) is selected. For Poland the weekly newsmagazine “Polityka” is selected. This publication is owned by the company founded by the journalists and publishing house workers themselves – Polityka Sp. z o.o. S.K.A.

The period of the given study coincides with the period of Maidan protests. So, it is proposed to focus on the media coverage of Maidan at the time when it unfolded. The general period of study is November 21, 2013 – February 27, 2014.

Types of symbols and criteria for their identification. Summing up and synthesizing the classifications of symbols proposed by Langer (1954), Hamburg (1956), Janz (2011) on the basis of the Cassirer’s philosophy of symbolic forms, we underpin the following typology of symbols for the analysis of symbolic representations:

- ▶ Symbol-product that is a material, physical, tangible trace, namely, material things and complexes of things that convey all three possible types of meanings: denotations, connotations, and significations. The things that have no connotation and no signification could not be defined as symbol-products.

- ▶ Symbol-concept that is close by its meaning to symbol-process. The major difference between symbol-process and symbol-concept is the reference to particular situations that help to grasp the commonly shared goals of parties involved in them. While symbol-process comprises a succession of such situations, symbol-concept focuses on the pure idea that is signified by a symbol or a complex of symbols in the totality of their ideal meaning.

- ▶ Symbol-slogan that is a slogan with meanings that could be understood either in deeper historical context or through the lenses of the general social critique of power. They are actively, repeatedly used by protesters.

- ▶ Symbol-situation that is an interaction of people within the framework of social world which becomes possible due to the exchange of symbols and combinations of symbols or due to the imposition of symbols and their combinations by power on its subordinates and its challengers.

- ▶ Symbol-process that is a succession of situations which are united with the common goals. Although their participants could change each other, and their course could vary within certain period of time, the main integrating elements that make out of bunch of situations a process is the commonly shared goals of each side of the protest.

Two sets of criteria for the identification of symbols are proposed in the given research: the first set includes the possibility to single out in a discursive wording or visual representation (mainly photos) an object, a symbol-vehicle, a subject, a conception, and a concept; the second set of criteria includes the possibility to discern in a discursive wording or visual representation all three types of meanings: denotation (explicit meaning), connotation (implicit associative meaning), signification (conceptual meaning).

Coding Procedure

This research is based on the content analysis of visibility of symbols in the overall amount of the coded symbols in news stories for each country under study. We use the individual Maidan news story as the unit of analysis and coding. The Maidan news story is defined as any news analysis, feature story or reportage whose dominant topic is Maidan protest actions, Maidan’s routine functioning, forecasts of its development, and/or its relations with power of Yanukovych’s regime delimited from other news items by a change of topic. The Maidan news stories are identified with the help of key words in headings, subheadings, and leads that are typed in search engines of the online editions of media included in our sample. These words are as follows: Maidan, Euromaidan, civil protest in Kyiv, Ukraine, civil unrest, violence in Kyiv, Ukraine 2014. The major key words that in most cases allow to find all Maidan news stories in a respective online edition of a media outlet are Maidan, Euromaidan, and civil protest in Kyiv, Ukraine.

Measure of Content Analysis

This study uses one measure for the quantitative analysis: visibility of a particular symbol in the general amount of symbolic representations. For each country under study the general amount of symbols in the media outlets is quantified, as well as the amount of symbols separately – in tabloid and quality press. We try to quantify which particular symbols, as they are named and typified, dominate in symbolic representations of Maidan in the Ukrainian and Polish media.

Findings

We coded 29 news stories in the Ukrainian tabloid daily “Segodnia” and 33 news stories in the quality newsmagazine “Ukrainian Weekly”. In the Polish press we coded 17 news stories in the tabloid daily “Fakt” and 6 news stories in the quality newsmagazine “Polityka”. Overall, we coded 107 symbols of all types, except symbol-slogan, in “Segodnia” and 276 symbols of all types, except symbolic action, in “Ukrainian Weekly”. Altogether 383 symbols were coded in two Ukrainian print media outlets. Within this number 127 different kinds of symbols were identified. It means that the same symbols were used two and more times. The news stories published at the web-site of “Fakt” often included video reports as integral parts and continuation of the written text. These video reports contain full-fledged narration. So, they were considered to be the part of the written news story and coded, respectively. Overall, we coded 133 symbols of all types in “Fakt” and 106 symbols of all types, except symbol-slogan, in “Polityka”. Altogether 239 symbols were coded in two Polish print media outlets. Within this number we identified 113 different kinds of symbols. So, some symbols were also used two and more times. While there are six basic types of symbols, every type might be presented by different kinds of symbols.

So, from the Table 1 we can see that our hypothesis is partly confirmed in the case of the Ukrainian print media: symbol-concepts, symbol-situations, symbol-processes are the most visible among all types of symbols in the quality press while in the tabloid symbol-products are the most visible; meanwhile, symbol-concepts, symbol-situations, symbol-processes are either absent or marginalized. We managed to identify only four kinds of symbol-situation and four kinds of symbol-processes in “Segodnia”: altogether four symbol-situations and ten symbol-processes were coded. In comparison, the coverage of the quality weekly for the same events and the same period included 23 kinds of symbol-situations and 11 kinds of symbol-processes: altogether 33 symbol-situations and 23 symbol-processes were coded. So, these data prove that, in general, tabloid press covers any social experience through physical objects, material products, some basic concepts of social life. However, it does not help people to get information-oriented understandings of situationality, historicity of experiences as well as processes. Only quality press is still able to trace down processes and develop journalism of processes.

It is noteworthy that symbols with the similar objects, symbol-vehicles and subjects are characterized with divergent conceptions and concepts in the Ukrainian tabloid and quality press. The most illustrative example is the symbol-concept “sociology of protest delegitimation” in the tabloid and the symbol-concept “sociology of protest legitimation” in the weekly. While the former used the sociological data as the symbols of lack of social representativeness in Maidan as the grassroots protest, the latter used comparably similar data to substantiate the social representativeness of the same protest.

The other example is the symbol-concept “compromise”. It has different meanings in the Ukrainian tabloid and quality publications: for “Segodnia” this symbol means the unavoidable reconciliation between power and opposition in which protesters are, in fact, excluded as active actor, being represented as passive observers while for “Ukrainian Weekly” it means the unreachable, unattainable goals under the real life circumstances of Maidan. In the Polish press we coded two symbol-concepts with comparable meanings: the symbol-concept “compromise” and the symbol-concept “round table”. “Polityka” writes about “compromise” as something that would lead to the reconciliation only if all demands of protesters are met, including snap presidential and parliamentary elections. So, it puts the special focus on the demands of protesters, their impact on the negotiations. The symbol-concept “round table” has the similar meanings and conveys the special reference to the historical experience of Poland where the peaceful democratic revolution culminated in the Round Table Talks between the trade-union “Solidarity” and communists in February-April 1989.

Table 1. The distribution of the coded symbols in the Ukrainian media.

Media outlets

Types of symbol

Tabloid daily Segodnia

Quality newsmagazine Ukrainian Weekly

Symbol-product

Strike fighters (2), smoke grenades, shields (4), siren, ambulance, explosion, fire, national anthem (2), injuries of Maidan activists, Grifon, Automaidan, Grushevskyj street (4), titushka (3), cocktail Molotov, internal troops (3), fighters with chains, tire, Institutska street (2), buses with black-out windows, flack jacket, stele (3), New Year’s tree, flag of Ukraine, baton (4), tear gas (2), sonic grenade, construction helmet, barrel, firewood, sonic grenade, Mychailovska square/ Mychailovskyj cathedral, sandwich.

Baton (3), titushka (15), internal troops (6), tear gas (4), radical (3), national anthem (3), New Year’s Tree on blood (2), sonic grenade, crowd of many thousands, construction helmet (2), sonic grenade (2), smoke grenade, splinters, balaclava (3), ambulance, injuries of Maidan activists, House of Trade-Unions (3), Lenin’s monument, dispersal of Maidan, flag of Ukraine (2), piano, Institutska street (4), cocktail Molotov (5), presidential palace Mezhygiria (2), flag of the EU, Bankova street, Liadski Gates (2), Grushevska street (7), shield (4), laws of the 16th January (3), black helmet (3), tire, smoke (2), rubber bullets, flack jacket, Mariinka (2), buses with the detained protesters, tent, police snipers (2), first aid post (2), Antimaidan (3).

Symbol-concept

Lustration, sociology of protest delegitimation (2), astrological forecast, people’s power, rebellion, civil activists (3), elite, Berkut (7), peaceful protesters, amnesty, compromise, foreigner at Maidan, barricade (6), European values, volunteer (2), negative energy, positive energy, cleansing (zachistka), European integration (2), Orange Revolution (2), people’s gathering, rebellion, Heavenly Hundred.

People’s gathering, Berkut (13), cleansing (3), European integration (2), European values, provocation (7), revolution (7), repression (9), disappointment of society (3), elite, barricade (11), Orange Revolution (3), sociology of protest legitimation, civil activists (10), compromise (3), social trust (2), elite, rebellion (2), people’s gathering (2), consolidation of opposition, self-defense (6), art of Maidan, political prisoners, March of Millions, dignity (2), terror (2), amnesty, state of emergency (2), Automaidan, Heavenly Hundred (3), self-organization, victory (3).

Symbol-slogan

«Butcher to prison», «Zeka get» (3), «Glory to Ukraine» (2), «Drop in ocean».

Symbol-situation

Opposition leader is ignored and attacked by protesters; protesters demand a single leader; fighters attack empty parliament, night storm.

Storm of the presidential administration (2); Berkut hits a woman; riot police beats people lying on the ground (2); opposition calls people to move without goals; assaults on Maidan activists (4), opposition lost elections in four constituencies (3); repressions against Automaidan activists (3); titushkas attacked Forum of Euromaidans; Kruty battle; search of the journalist’s apartment; Berkut beats a person with white flag lying on the ground; Berkut targets journalists in the Grushevskyj street; Berkut attacks the medical center in the Grushevskyj street; naked person tortured by police; women pick cobbles and bricks; negotiations between power and opposition (3); disappearance of Bulatov, the Party of Regions’ office is set on fire (2); members of parliament save protesters beaten by the police; leader of the Party of Regions’ fraction Oleksandr Yefremov says that he is not ashamed of killed protesters; deaths of protesters almost alive; the gangs of titushkas are headed by policemen; protesters demanded public repentance from PR politician Nestor Shufrych.

Symbol-process

Blocking of road, coming to the aid (2), singing together, dispersal of Maidan (6).

War with own people; slow investigation of assault on journalist Tetiana Chornovol (2), dispersal of Maidan (7); artists distribute tea, rebellion of regions (2); return to the 2004 Constitution (4); anti-terrorist operation (2), deconstruction of oligarchy; thousand people are coming to the place of Heavenly Hundred’s death; trolling of Maidan in social media, resetting of the country.

Note. The figures in the brackets show the number of times that a particular symbol is used in a media outlet under study within the period under study.

From the Table 2 we can see that the hypothesis of the given research is not fully confirmed in the case of the Polish media: symbol-products, symbol-concepts, and symbol-situations of the protest are, generally, more visible among all types of symbols in both the Polish tabloid and quality publication. Symbol-processes are either absent or marginalized in “Fakt” as well as in “Polityka”. We managed to identify and to code 33 kinds of symbol-product, 18 kinds of symbol-concept, 21 kinds of symbol-situation, and just four kinds of symbol-processes in the tabloid. Meanwhile, in the quality press we coded 23 kinds of symbol-product, 22 kinds of symbol-concept, 18 kinds of symbol-situation, and just three kinds of symbol-processes.

Table 2. The distribution of the coded symbols in the Polish media.

Media outlets

Types of symbol

Tabloid daily Fakt

Quality newsmagazine Polityka

Symbol-product

Rubber bullets (2), sonic grenade, cobbles (2), cocktail Molotov (2), snipers of Yanukovych (2), blood (5), fire (3), shots, titushka (3), national anthem (2), Right Sector, Civil Council of Maidan, sandwich (2), hot tea (2), laws of the 16th of January, coffins, Committee of Support for Ukraine (2), balaclava, shield (2), flag of Ukraine (10), tent (4), barrel (2), tank, flag of the EU, New Year’s Tree, crowd of many thousands (2), protesters with flags of Ukraine, smoke, faces of people, construction helmet, sack of snow, Automaidan.

Burnt police bus, cocktail Molotov (3), cobbles (2), tear gas (2), baton, rubber bullets, laws of the 16th January, tent, shield, construction helmet, Right Sector (2), shots, blood (2), snipers (2), baton (2), frost, presidential residence Mezhygiria (2), tire (2), smoke, titushka (2), flag of the EU, House of Trade-Unions, Lenin monument, Association Agreement (3), Instutytska street.

Symbol-concept

Berkut (7), civil war (wojna domowa), storm (3), March of Millions, sanctions, parallels with Ceaușescu, state of emergency, dismissal of Yanukovych, self-defense, barricade (7), freedom (3), round table (2), solidarity, struggle with totalitarianism, anti-terrorist operation (2), truce, revolution, provocation.

Compromise (2), state of emergency (2), Berkut (4), barricade (6), revolution (3), provocation, country’s disintegration (2), amnesty, Orange Revolution (2), Moscow’s embrace (2), snap presidential and parliamentary elections (3), divided opposition, multi-vector politics (2), political crisis, European standards, round table (2), self-defense (3), rebellion, truce, sanctions, self-organization, church.

Symbol-slogan

«Don’t shoot in own people», «The Power of Bandukovych Away!» («Vladu Bandukovycha Get!»), «Gang Away!» («Bandu Get!»), «Police with People!».

Symbol-situation

Berkut targets journalists, Yanukovych invites opposition to negotiations in which he does not participate; Berkut brutally dispersed attacks on presidential administration; Ukraine is bleeding (2); cleaning of Euromaidan; Yanukovych consults with Putin; people die in the streets; father holds the blue helmet of his son killed by a sniper; people with their cars bring medicine, water, food to Maidan; people come to the place where the history of their motherland changes; people ask to hold no negotiations with the criminal; Maidan is again full of people after killings; Polish minister of foreign affairs brought wounded protesters to Poland; dead bodies and blood but they dance; dead and wounded people lying on the ground (4);Lviv administration refuses to subordinate to Yanukovych’s government; Automaidan activist Bulatov crucified; Polish reporter under bullets asks Berkut why it shoots in protesters; people are kidnapped from hospitals; prayer at Maidan; barricades are reinforced, assault on the journalist Tetiana Chornovol.

Opposition leader is ignored and attacked by protesters (2), six year old boy marches with toy saber; woman threatens police with her handbag; president did not address the nation; Ahmetov demands the crisis solution with people’s involvement; Yuriy Verbytskyj found tortured and dead in forest; attacks on medical workers, journalists; people mock Yanukovych, people come «to defend children», beating of children, people threw away party emblems; Yanukovych did not address the nation; release of Yulia Tymoshenko, snipers shot in hearts, heads, backs; Ukrainians get up in a new country; the EU responded to Maidan only when the bloodshed occurred; Party of Regions condemned Yanukovych; Maidan self-defense stopped the car with Tymoshenko and Yatsenyuk to warn against traffic rules’ breach.

Symbol-process

War with own people (2), return to the 2004 Constitution; dispersal of Maidan; singing together.

Dispersal of Maidan (4); people decide destiny of their country in streets; resetting the country.

Note. The figures in the brackets show the number of times that a particular symbol is used in a media outlet under study within the period under study.

We identified ten most visible symbols in the amount of 383 coded symbols in the Ukrainian media, namely, the symbol-concept “Berkut” (5,2 %), the symbol-product “titushka” (5 %), the symbol-concept “barricade” (4,5 %), the symbol-concept “civil activists” (3,4 %), the symbol-process “dispersal of Maidan” (3,4 %), the symbol-product “Grushevskyj street” (2,9 %), the symbol-concept “repression” (2,4 %), the symbol-product “shield” (2 %), the symbol-product “baton” (1,8 %), the symbol-concept “revolution” (1,8 %), and the symbol-concept “provocation” (1,8 %). The rest of symbols are coded six and less times. Such symbols as “Berkut”, “barricade”, “civil activists” could be defined both as symbol-products and symbol-concepts. They fit all definitional criteria of symbol-product. However, from the general historical context of the protests as well as media texts under study we could assume that these symbols cross the boundaries of physical, material traces and get some conceptual meanings. In the Polish press the most visible symbols in the amount of 239 coded symbols are as follows: the symbol-concept “barricade” (5,4 %), the symbol-concept “Berkut” (4,6 %), the symbol-product “flag of Ukraine” (4,2 %), the symbol-product “blood” (2,9 %), the symbol-product “tent” (2 %), the symbol-product “titushka” (2 %), and the symbol-product “cocktail Molotov” (1,7 %). The rest of symbols are coded four and less times.

Symbol is much narrower interpretative device than, for example, frame. In other words, it conveys micro-meanings while frame expresses dominant macro-meaning of the whole contexts and their interpretations. A developed and structured media text could contain numerous symbols. Consequently, their absolute number in any media sample could amount to hundreds and even thousands of symbols. In such samples the visibility of 4–5 % could be regarded as high.

So, three most visible symbols coincide in the Ukrainian and Polish press, namely, the symbol-concept “Berkut”, the symbol-concept “barricade”, the symbol-product “titushka”. They all are indicative of conflict, its escalation, and violence. Meanwhile, such visible in the Ukrainian media symbol-concept as “civil activists” is at all absent in the coded news stories of the Polish press, as well as the symbol-concept “repression”, highly visible in the Maidan coverage of “Ukrainian Weekly”. The Polish media also use symbols of ‘baton”, “revolution”, “provocation” that are highly visible in the Ukrainian press. However, they are less visible in the Polish publications.

There are two symbol-products “flag of Ukraine” and “tent” which are highly visible in the Polish media and used by the Ukrainian media, although they do not belong to the most visible symbolic representations in the Ukrainian press. This difference is mostly caused by much weaker and less frequent use of visuals – both photos and videos in online editions – by the Ukrainian publications. The high visibility of the “flag of Ukraine” in the Polish press is reached due to its presence in numerous visuals that “Fakt” runs along with textual elements of its news stories from Maidan. Moreover, the Polish media often refer to the symbol-product “tent” in their texts whose connotations and signification could be defined as “long-standing protest” of people that stay in their positions day and night.

Overall, the symbols with openly negative connotations and significations related to violence and suppression dominate among most visible symbols in the Ukrainian media coverage of Maidan as well as in the Polish one: “Berkut”, “titushka”, “dispersal of Maidan”, “repression”, “baton”, “provocation”, “blood”, “cocktail Molotov”. It is noteworthy that “Segodnia” and “Ukrainian Weekly” do not use saliently the symbol-concept “blood” even reporting the violence and shootings of protesters by snipers that took place on February 18–20, 2014.The symbolic representations of these events in the Polish media have connotations of massacre (Polish word “masakra” is used). “Segodnia” and “Ukrainian Weekly” avoided such a connotation in their reports provided in the immediate aftermath of the deaths of protesters.

It is noteworthy that, although the Polish tabloids are criticized for oversimplification and commercialization that might lead to superficiality in the coverage of such complicated events as protests (Dobek-Ostrowska, 2011), “Fakt” provides the coverage with substantially more diversified, contextualized, fact-oriented, and elaborate symbols than the Ukrainian tabloid “Segodnia”. While the Polish tabloid uses 25 symbol-situations, in the Ukrainian one we managed to code only four symbol-situation. “Fakt” focuses on the coherent factual story-telling based on eyewitness accounts and reports in the field while “Segodnia” utilizes such mythical or half-mythical story-telling as “astrological forecast”, “tour around Maidan with specialist in human bio-energy” with the respective symbolism: the symbol-concept “astrological forecast” of the ending of Maidan without any outcomes and achievements by protesters, the symbol-concept “negative energy” that dominates at Maidan around the Independence Monument, and the symbol-concept “positive energy” that has to be renewed at Maidan after clashes.

Moreover, there are some other worthwhile differences in symbols between the Ukrainian and Polish media. The Polish publications, inter alia, use the symbol-concepts “freedom” and “solidarity”. They are absent in the coded symbols of the Ukrainian media. Meanwhile, “Ukrainian Weekly” appeals to the symbol-concept “dignity” that is not mentioned by the Polish media. We can assume that the symbols of “solidarity”, “freedom”, “dignity” have the intuition of the same pure idea in its foundation. This could show that different cultural and historical contexts, even neighboring and co-influenced, have own authentic ranges of concepts applicable for the descriptions of the same events.

So, the correspondence between the visibility of certain symbols used in media and the specificity of experience, as well as differences in conceptions and concepts, prove that media, just as people, think in symbols, as Susanne Langer (1954) postulates it.

Figure 1. Visibility of different symbols in the symbolic representations of Maidan by the Ukrainian press (N=383).

Figure 2. Visibility of different symbols in the symbolic representations of Maidan by the Polish press (N=239).

The Figures 3 and 4 visualizes what symbols are the most visible in the general amount of the coded symbols in terms of their types in the Ukrainian and Polish press under study. For example, the most visible symbol-situations in the Ukrainian press are “opposition lost in four constituencies”, “repressions against Automaidan”, and “negotiations between power and opposition”. Just one of them is related to violence. The other two imply the relations of power and opposition. We can see that in the Polish press all most visible symbol-situations are violence-related: “dead, wounded people lying on the ground”, “Ukraine is bleeding”, and “opposition leader (Vitali Klitschko) attacked by protesters”. The only recurrent symbol-processes in the Polish media coverage of Maidan, namely, “dispersal of Maidan” and “war with own people”, also have the significations of violence, conflict escalation, terror, suppression, civil war. These Figures also demonstrate the dominance of symbol-products and symbol-concepts over symbol-situations and symbol-processes.

Figure 3. Visibility of different symbols by their types in the Ukrainian press: the most visible symbol-products, symbol-concepts, symbol-situations, and symbol-process (N=383).

Figure 4. Visibility of different symbols by their types in the Polish press: the most visible symbol-products, symbol-concepts, symbol-situations, and symbol-process (N=239).

We identified nine most visible symbols in the amount of 107 separately coded symbols in the Ukrainian tabloid. The rest of symbols are coded two and less times. Among them there is just one symbol-situation “dispersal of Maidan”. All of them, except symbol-product “stele”, are directly related to violence. The same measure is provided for the Polish tabloid “Fakt”. There are six most visible symbols in the amount of 133 coded symbols in this publication. The rest of symbols are coded three and less times. Among these six symbols there is one symbol-situation “dead, wounded people lying on the ground”. Three of the rest of five symbols are violence-related: symbol-product “Berkut”, “barricade”, “blood”.

Figure 5. Visibility of different symbols in the symbolic representations of Maidan by the tabloid newspaper “Segodnia” (N=107).

Figure 6. Visibility of different symbols in the symbolic representations of Maidan by the tabloid newspaper “Fakt” (N=133).

Out of ten most visible symbols in the amount of 276 coded symbols in “Ukrainian Weekly only one symbol “civil activists” has no connotation of violence. Two out of eight most visible symbols in “Polityka” convey no implicit or explicit meanings of violence, namely, symbol-product “Association Agreement” and symbol-concept “snap elections”. We did not manage to code these two concepts as symbols in the Ukrainian publications. They simply did not focus on these concepts in their coverage. Meanwhile, for the Polish press it was important to explain to their readers the historical significance of this agreement and the importance of protesters’ demands, namely, the demand of snap presidential and parliamentary elections.

Figure 7. Visibility of different symbols in the symbolic representations of Maidan by the quality weekly newsmagazine “Ukrainian Weekly” (N=276).

Figure 8. Visibility of different symbols in the symbolic representations of Maidan by the quality weekly newsmagazine “Polityka” (N=106).

Conclusion

Maidan as a grassroots movement and long-standing protest has characteristics which are the most attractive to media: violence, deviance, drama, and spectacle. In practice, this leads to the extensive coverage of such events by media. Meanings that could be identified and interpreted in media reports on Maidan contribute to the general understanding of media functioning, cultural contexts, social experience, and structural relations of power and subordination in a particular society. We attempted to decipher the meanings that media convey in their reporting of Maidan through the lenses of symbols as an interpretative device. The philosophy of symbolic forms by Ernst Cassirer and the symbol theory of his follower Susanne Langer allow to work out the five-term typology of symbols: symbol-products, symbol-concepts, symbol-slogans, symbol-situations, and symbol-processes. The content analysis of the news stories in the leading Ukrainian and Polish tabloid and quality publications revealed the dominance of symbol-products, symbol-concepts over symbol-processes both in the Ukrainian and Polish media. In practice, it means that in reporting of protests media, especially tabloids, cover any social experience through physical objects, material things, some common sense, stereotypical concepts of life. However, it does not help people to get information-oriented understandings of situationality, historicity, temporality of experiences, as well as processes. At the end the journalism of processes is rather an ideal than reality. However, it is noteworthy that the Polish tabloid “Fakt” uses more symbol-situations in its reporting than the quality newsmagazine “Polityka” for the same period under study and the coverage of the same events, and the Ukrainian newsmagazine “Ukrainian Weekly” still extensively describes processes with symbolic meanings.

Ten most visible symbols in the Ukrainian media include the symbol-concept “Berkut”, the symbol-product “titushka”, the symbol-concept “barricade”, the symbol-concept “civil activists”, the symbol-process “dispersal of Maidan”, the symbol-product “Grushevskyj street”, the symbol-concept “repression”, the symbol-product “baton”, the symbol-concept “revolution”, the symbol-concept “provocation”, and the symbol-product “shield”. In the Polish press the most visible symbols are as follows: the symbol-concept “barricade”, the symbol-concept “Berkut”, the symbol-product “flag of Ukraine”, the symbol-product “blood”, the symbol-product “cocktail Molotov”, the symbol-product “tent”, the symbol-product “titushka”. So, three most visible symbols coincide in the Ukrainian and Polish press, namely, the symbol-concept “Berkut”, the symbol-concept “barricade”, and the symbol-product “titushka”. They all convey the meanings of conflict, its escalation, and violence.

Some symbols with the similar objects, symbol-vehicles and subjects are characterized with divergent conceptions and concepts in the Ukrainian tabloid and quality press. The example is the symbol-concept “compromise”: for “Segodnia” this symbol means the unavoidable reconciliation between power and opposition in which protesters are passive observers while for “Ukrainian Weekly” it means the unreachable, unattainable goals under the real life circumstances of Maidan. In the Polish press the connotation of this symbol is closer to the “Ukrainian Weekly’s”: its “compromise” is something that would lead to the reconciliation only if all demands of protesters are met, including snap elections. This demonstrates how, depending on the political leanings, ideological predispositions, which could be linked with the media ownership, and national historical narratives, media could endow the same signs with contrasted or at least substantially different conceptions and concepts.

Although the Polish tabloids are criticized for commercialization that might lead to superficiality in the coverage, “Fakt” provides more contextualized, fact-oriented, and elaborate symbols than the Ukrainian tabloid “Segodnia”.

Moreover, there are some other variations in symbols between the Ukrainian and Polish media. The Polish publications rely on the symbol-concepts “freedom” and “solidarity”. They are absent in the coded symbols of the Ukrainian media. Meanwhile, “Ukrainian Weekly” appeals to the symbol-concept “dignity” that is not mentioned by the Polish media. We can assume that symbols of “solidarity”, “freedom”, “dignity” have the intuition of the same pure idea in its foundation. The Ukrainian tabloid does not use none of these symbols.

Overall, the elaborate analysis of symbols in media texts help to investigate the representations of the complex reality and common universalities of culture within different national and cultural contexts. We found similarities in the most visible symbols in the Ukrainian and Polish media. The differences are identifiable in nuances of interpretations of less visible symbols.

Zhanna Bezpiatchuk, PhD student of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy Doctoral School, program “Mass Communications”, fourth year of studying. Interests: philosophy of communication, social phenomenology, theories of signs and symbols, Polish contemporary history.

Affiliation:

Zhanna Bezpiatchuk

Mohyla School of Journalism

Faculty of Social Sciences and Technologies

National University of «Kyiv-Mohyla Academy»

z.bezpiatchuk@gmail.com

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Symboliczne reprezentacje Majdanu w prasie ukraińskiej i polskiej. Analiza porównawcza

Streszczenie:

W niniejszym artykule przedstawiono wyniki analizy porównawczej reprezentacji symbolicznych Majdanu w prasie ukraińskiej oraz polskiej, w tym reprezentacji obecnych zarówno w tabloidach, jak i w tygodnikach opinii. Przedmiotem badania stały się różne typy symboli (tj. symbole-produkty, symbole-koncepty, symbole-slogany, symbole-sytuacje, symbole-procesy, działania symboliczne), wyodrębnione w oparciu o filozofię form symbolicznych Ernsta Cassirera oraz teorię symboli Susanne Langer, identyfikowane w reportażach i artykułach publicystycznych poświęconych wydarzeniom, jakie miały miejsce na Majdanie Niezależności w Kijowie w czasie Rewolucji Godności. Dzięki analizie zawartości tych tekstów udało się ustalić, że najbardziej widoczne symbole są, i w prasie ukraińskiej, i w prasie polskiej, podobne. Wśród nich należy wymienić: „barykadę” (symbol-koncept), „Berkut” (symbol-koncept), „rozpędzenie Majdanu” (symbol-proces). Ponadto w prasie polskiej dostrzeżono symbole, jak też idee i pojęcia je wyrażające, nieobecne w prasie ukraińskiej, w tym: „krew”, „solidarność” i „wolność”.

Słowa kluczowe:
reprezentacja symboliczna, Majdan, tabloid, prasa opiniotwórcza, symbol-produkt, symbol-koncept, symbol-sytuacja, symbol-proces, działania symboliczne.

1 The Cassirer’s Whole (das Ganz) should not be understood as “the substance of the cosmos. By the Whole he often means der Geist as “the immanent principle of human culture” (Skidalsky, 2011, p. 105).

Foreign perspectives on ‘Euromaidan’ – An analysis of the three major weekly magazines Der Spiegel, Der Stern and Focus

Anja Lange
National Technical University of Ukraine “Kyiv Polytechnic Institute”

Abstract:

The article provides an analysis of the reporting about the Euromaidan actions of the three biggest German weekly magazines. The content analysis based on specific keywords will show, which politicians and events the journalists refer to. As a part of media reporting about the events that took place in Ukraine 2013–2014, the analysis will show an example of the topics German media talk about. It is obvious that well known Ukrainian politicians, such as Vitali Klitschko or Yulia Tymoshenko, are interviewed. Other politicians, such as Arseniy Yatsenyuk or Oleh Tyahnibok, barely appear in the reportings of the three weekly magazines. They are neither interviewed nor shown in detail. They seem to stand in the background of box champion Vitali Klitschko, who is very well known in Germany. The magazines call him “opposition leader” (that is wrong, he was one of the leaders of the opposition) and “the next strong man in Kiev. The reporting is centered on Tymoshenko and Klitschko. Another conclusion that can be made from the analysis is the perspective of the journalists. The conflict in Ukraine is mostly shown in the German-Russian-relationship and just marginally focused on Ukraine itself. Often, the consequences for Germany and the European economy are discussed.

Keywords:
Euromaidan, Ukraine, Germany, media, analysis.

Introduction

In its 26 years of independence, Ukraine has dealt with three political changes or revolutions. In 1991, there was the ‘Revolution on Granite’ that led to the state gaining independence. In 2004, there was the ‘Orange Revolution’, in which people demonstrated against a massive electoral fraud in the Presidential election. The last revolution, the so-called Euromaidan, took place between 21 November 2013 and 26 February 2014. This article will show, in the light of the response of the three major German weekly magazines, how the media reacted to that revolution. Most of the protest posters and slogans at the time of the revolution showed that Ukraine was concerned with her geopolitical situation: the majority of slogans were pro-European and anti-Russian, as a lot of protesters knew that Russia had a deep impact on the politics of Ukraine. Ukraine, in their opinion, had to become a free country.

The timeframe of the research of the weekly magazines Der Spiegel, Der Stern and Focus is 21 November 2013 to 31 March 2014. In this article, the timeframe is set until the end of March 2014 because, as it will be shown, the Crimean Crisis brought the issue of Ukraine and its protest on the international agenda again. A violent conflict with Russia began and is still on. Hence, the research is not yet complete.

Overview of the magazines

The analyses of weekly magazines make sense in terms of their popularity and circulation. Magazines ‘reflect trends and culture’ (Biagi, 2006, p.72). Daily newspapers try to show what happened the previous day, while weekly magazines try to summarize the events of a week. In this article, Germany’s three biggest weekly magazines are analysed, showing how they reported the Euromaidan actions in Ukraine to find out which actions or politicians mattered in this revolution. How do these magazines explain to German readers what is going on in Ukraine? Who are the key politicians and what are the actions? The analysis will answer these questions.

Der Spiegel is Germany’s most popular weekly magazine. Every Monday, an edition of about 803,884 copies is published for a readership of 6.33 million (Schallmeyer, 2016). The Online Edition of der Spiegel is one of the most-visited online news pages in Germany (Statis, 2013).[2]

Der Stern is publishes about 750,000 copies every Thursday. It has about 7.6 million readers, which is more than that of Der Spiegel (Statis, 2013).

Der Focus, published every Monday, is a less-circulated German weekly magazine. Its weekly circulation is about 500,000 copies and is read by five million people (Statis, 2013).

1. How much space within the magazine is dedicated to Euromaidan?

The following table shows how many articles, interviews and reports have been written on the issue of Euromaidan. To track articles on Euromaidan, several keywords such as ‘Maidan’, ‘Euromaidan’, ‘Ukraine’ and ‘Russia’ were used. The first issue to deal with the topic was number 48/2013 of Der Spiegel, which was the first of the three magazines to report on Ukraine.

Table 1. Content analysis of Der Spiegel

Issue

SPIEGEL

STERN

FOCUS

48/2013 25.11.2013

3

-

-

49/2013

-

-

2

50/2013

10

7

-

51/2013

Title, 11

2

6

52/2013

1

2

2

1/2014 30.12.2013

-

11

2

2/2014

-

-

-

3/2014

-

-

-

4/2014

-

-

-

5/2014

2

2

4

6/2014

-

11

-

7/2014

3

2

-

8/2014

8

-

-

9/2014 24.02.2014

12

-

11

10/2014

4

12

6

11/2014

Title, 18

10

39

12/2014

14

16

5

13/2014

13

10

8

14/2014 31.03.2014

8

13

5

Total

109

98

90

Source: Der Spiegel issue 48/2013–14/2014.

2. How often is the Euromaidan the cover topic?

The Euromaidan has by itself never been the cover topic of the weekly magazines, although the Maidan and the protests have been shown in many of the numerous pictures published by them. That means, the Euromaidan and the situation in Ukraine were never shown on the first page with pictures and words. When the magazines dealt with the situation in Ukraine, mostly Russia was shown, for the state of Vladimir Putin appeared twice on the cover of Spiegel (# 51/2013 and # 11/2014). In 51/2013 the title is The rowdy Putin attacks democracy and the West (Neef, Schepp, 2013, p.1). In 11/2014, Putin was called The arsonist: who can stop Putin? (Blome, 2014a, p.1). Ukraine and the Maidan are never a cover topic. Media does not often discuss Ukraine, but does deal with Russia-EU relations and the consequences for German-Russian relations.

3. Which politicians do they talk about?

The analysis showed that Der Spiegel published over 100 pages on the Euromaidan. Now a content analysis should show what these pages were about. The following analysis looks at the topics and politicians mentioned in the articles.

Der Spiegel

Two tendencies are evident from the following table. Firstly, the Ukrainian politicians Der Spiegel reports on are Vitali Klitschko and Viktor Yanukovych. Secondly, the politicians most often mentioned are Angela Merkel and Vladimir Putin. Der Spiegel deals with the conflict from a German point of view and tries to show the consequences for Germany and the EU. German-Russian relations are also a hot topic.

Table 2. Politicians named in reports of Der Spiegel

Issue

Politician

Content

48/2013

Yanukovych, Putin

Association Agreement

50/2013

Merkel, Putin, Klitschko

Klitschko as the new man in Kiev

50/2013

Aleksander Kwaśniewski

Interview (2 pages)

51/2013

Putin

Motives of Putin

51/2013

Klitschko

Interview (3 pages)

52/2013

Putin, Merkel

‘Moscow‘s friends, Moscow‘s enemies’

5/2014

Yanukovych

Report about violence, new laws

7/2014

Putin, Yanukovych

Russia wants a violent solution in Kiev

7/2014

Akhmetov

Yanukovych has more money, Akhmetov could be a key figure, influence

8/2014

Klitschko

Brothers have a common project

9/2014

Yuri Blagodir (ex-Regioniv), Yanukovych, Achmetov, Firtash, Steinmeier

The power of the Billionaires, end of Yanukovych, protests in Lviv, Interview (3 pages)

10/2014

Yanukovych, new government

Mezhihirya documents, Simferopol

11/2014

Putin

Cover: Who can stop Putin? Protests in small cities in eastern Ukraine

11/2014

Radosław Sikorski

Interview (1 page) about relations between Europe and Russia

11/2014

Klitschko

Interview (2 pages)

12/2014

Merkel, Putin

Sanctions against Russia, Svoboda Party and German NPD, situation in East Ukraine and Crimea

12/2014

E.on-Chef Johannes Teyssen

German Economy and Russia

12/2014

Ihor Tenyukh

Conflict with Russia, Interview (1 page)

13/2014

Merkel, Putin

Sanctions, EU and Ukraine, EU and China,

14/2014

NATO

NATO troops in Eastern Europe, Bundeswehr,

‘Putin-Versteher’ – ‘Putin-understander’

14/2014

Olga Bogomolets

Candidate for Presidential elections

The following quote (#50/2013) describes the point of view of the German media very well.

The fight for Ukraine is a fight between the Russian President and the German Chancellor. The first round went to Putin. But Merkel and the Europeans see in boxer Vitali Klitschko a new strong man. (Blome, 2013, p. 22)

The numerous reports on and interviews with Klitschko are a result of inadequate knowledge of Ukrainian politics in Germany. The most well-known Ukrainian politician is Klitschko. He is a famous boxer in Germany and his boxing promotion is based in Hamburg. I would say that the brothers Klitschko are the most well-known Ukrainians in Germany. It is no wonder that German magazines report so much about them.

The next quote is very widespread in Germany (#50/2013):

Protest leader Klitschko in Kiev (Neef, 2013, p. 96)

This is factually wrong. Klitschko was the leader of the party, ‘Udar’, which was one of the three Parliamentary opposition parties (together with ‘Batkivshchyna’ and ‘Svoboda’). In nearly all German media, Klitschko appeared to be the protest leader.

As mentioned above, Putin was twice on the cover. That supports the thesis that the magazines are more concerned about Russia than Ukraine. The following quote (#11/2014) testifies to that.

Russia occupies Crimea and breaks international law, the government in Kiev reacts helplessly. Europe and USA argue whether diplomatic pressure or sanctions could be the right answer. But what does Putin want? (Blome, 2014b, p.78).

This quote again underscores the Russia-centric reports in Der Spiegel. Although the crisis is in Ukraine, Der Spiegel asks what Russia’s intentions are without mentioning Ukrainian’s interests. The analysed magazines report more about Russia-EU relations than about people in Ukraine, as the following quote (taken from issue #13/2014) shows.

To stop the expansion of the NATO and EU, he [Putin] will risk a war with his sister people. (Schepp, 2014, p. 78)

Besides reports and interviews, there were some ‘special’ articles by historians and political scientists. An article by Timothy Snyder on the history of Germany and Russia and the protest posters at the Maidan was published. Christopher Clark published his research about the similarities between the crisis now and the World War I in 1914 (#11/2014), and the 13/2014 issue had a report about Ukrainian writers and their opinions on the situation (among others Taras Prokhasko and Andrey Kurkov). German historian Frank Golczewski writes about history and the Crimean Crisis (#13/2014). These articles provide the necessary background to the conflict in Ukraine. For many Germans, Ukraine is an unknown country, and the little knowledge about the political situation and politicians in Ukraine could be one reason why the magazines report so much about Klitschko and Yulia Tymoshenko. Der Stern reports a lot about Tymoshenko, which will be shown in the next chapter.

Der Stern

Der Stern has a stronger tendency than Der Spiegel to write about individual politicians. It has reported almost all about Tymoshenko, Klitschko, Merkel, and Putin. The other politicians of the opposition parties were mentioned, but never interviewed or written about.

Table 3. Politicians named in reports in Der Stern

Issue

Politician

Content

50/2013

Klitschko vs. Yanukovych, Tymoshenko

Freedom for Tymoshenko,

‘fight without rules’

51/2013

Demonstrations at the Maidan (picture)

52/2013

Barricades at the Maidan (picture)

1/2014

Klitschko

‘The boxer turns into a national hero’

5/2014

Klitschko

Attack on Klitschko (picture)

6/2014

Klitschko

‘Against the wall’ people at the Maidan

7/2014

‘Like a turtle’ the Maidan shields (picture)

10/2014

Tymoshenko, Klitschko

‘The war of Kiev’, Tymoshenko’s first appearance, opinions of the Maidan protesters about Klitschko

11/2014

Tymoshenko

Interview (5 pages), two-hour interview, history of Crimea

12/2014

Putin, Hillary Clinton about Putin

Image of Putin after Crimea, reaction of the West, Russia Today.

13/2014

Merkel and Putin

‘Merkel and the Macho’, motifs and influence of both, gas and geo-strategy

14/2014

Putin

57% of Germans say ‘no’ to Ukraine in EU, ‘Ah, Russia’ admiration of the President

A two-hour interview with Tymoshenko, and such titles as ‘Merkel and the macho’ prove the above thesis: It is all about the two Ukrainian politicians Klitschko and Tymoshenko, reports about what will happen to Germany if Putin’s actions become more radical, and how concerned German journalists are about the political relations with Russia and the German economy.

A key quote from the Stern (# 6/2014) given below tries to explain why Klitschko is so supported by the Germans.

Vitali Klitschko is the most widely known opposition leader in Germany. Thanks to an almost daily column in ‘BILD’ the 42-year-old seems to be a resolute acting politician. (Sengling, 2014a, p.102)

Der Focus

Der Focus reaffirms the already proven thesis. All reports and interviews are about the well-known Ukrainians politicians Klitschko and Tymoshenko. The first article of Der Focus is an interview with Klitschko, where he calls his task at the Maidan his hardest fight (Zeslawski, 2013, p.46). Klitschko is also glorified here–he fights for his country and is shown at the Maidan (Zeslawski, 2013, p.46–47). But Der Focus also tries to show other important people at the Maidan, for example, the singer Ruslana or the key leader of the ‘Batkivshchyna’ party Arseniy.

Table 4. Politicians named in Der Focus

Issue

Politician

Content

49/2013

Klitschko

‘My hardest fight’ two-page interview

51/2013

Klitschko, Merkel and Klitschko, Tymoshenko in prison

‘Klitschko fights for his country’

52/2013

Klitschko

Klitschko at the Maidan

5/2014

Yanukovych vs. Klitschko, Ruslana

‘Fight of Kiev’, ‘Klitschko is the hope’ Ruslana at the Maidan, Interview with Klitschko (1p)

9/2014

Tymoshenko comeback, Opposition (Klitschko and Yatsenyuk)

‘Blood and peace’, fight at the Maidan

10/2014

Tymoshenko

Biographer of Tymoshenko explains her strategy

11/2014

Putin

‘Why does Putin behave like a tsar?’, Russian troops at Crimea, new cold war? West and Crimea Crisis

11/2014

Jaap de Hoop Schefer

Ex-NATO-Secretary-General

12/2014

Merkel and Putin, Yanukovych

Mediator against Merkel’s will, Merkel = ‘Putin Versteherin’, Donetsk = second Crimea

13/2014

Putin

Crimea Crisis, new cold war?

13/2014

Sergey Glazyev

1-page Interview

14/2014

NATO and Russia

Interview with NATO Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen

Der Focus calls Merkel a ‘Putin Versteher’, someone who understands Putin. Besides, in this magazine, the West-East dichotomy is shown very clearly with NATO and the EU on one side and Russia on the other. Ukraine, as a country in between, is the showplace of the crisis and its escalation, but a minor topic.

4. How do the magazines report the actions of 30 Nov/01 Dec 2013?

During the night of 30 November 2013, the Berkut beat up a group of peaceful students. Hundreds of protesters were staying the night at the Maidan, almost half of them asleep.[3] It was reported that the police special force, Berkut, cleared the Maidan, leaving hundreds of injured people.

As this is more a topic for the daily newspapers, the weekly magazines did not report on that much. Der Stern wrote (#50/2013):

At the weekend the conflict became worse, stones were thrown and the police beat with truncheons. At the weekend, police special forces beat down people at the Maidan who were protesting peacefully. Yanukovych said that he was scandalized by the violence of the police. The people became even more angry because of that. (Sengling, 2013, p.55).

A picture of a man standing in front of a row with Berkut police men illustrated those words. Der Stern shows more pictures of the protests in Kiev than the other magazines. Articles published in Der Stern are more visual and transport therefore their content also mainly with pictures.

5. How do the magazines report the actions of 18–22 February 2014?

The conflict turned violent at the end of February 2014. The metro in Kiev was closed for several days and the police tried to storm the Maidan to clear it. Almost 100 people died. On Saturday, 22 February, the President left the country and a new interim government was established. During the fights at the Maidan between police troops and protesters, the square was set on fire.

Der Spiegel #9/2014 publishes an interview with Frank-Walter Steinmeier, the German minister for foreign affairs, who was present during the violent actions in Kiev. The headline of the article was Everything can still fail (Neukirch, Hoffmann, 2014, p.36). He spoke about his experiences in Kiev: We sat together for more than 20 hours. When we arrived, there were already black clouds of smoke over the Maidan, you could hear the bullets (Neukirch, Hoffmann, 2014, p.37). Der Spiegel commented on the latest actions at the Maidan with the following words: The bloody fights in Kiev have led to a compromise between the government and the opposition. The winners are not the people at the Maidan, but two of the richest men in the country (Neef, 2014, 82), which is why the headline of the seven-page report reads The power of the billionaires (Neef, 2014, 82). The oligarchs Rinat Akhmetov and Dmytro Firtash are the focus of this report.

Der Stern #10/2014 called the actions a fight over Kiev (Sengling, 2014b, p. 93) and, in the 11-page report, author Bettina Sengling focused on Tymoshenko. She wrote about her unexpected release from prison and how Tymoshenko’s daughter cried on the stage. Der Spiegel characterized the Maidan as a parallel society with its own police force and medical service. In this article, the political potential of Klitschko was doubted, as gathered from the questioning of Ukrainians, who considered Klitschko too inexperienced to hold such a powerful political position as that of a president. Pictures of the destroyed Maidan were shown.

Der Focus #9/2014 headline was Blood and Peace (Bazdyrieva, 2014, p. 33): What a week, what a drama between civil war and the triumph of democracy: At the Maidan in Kiev dozens were killed, then the ruler Viktor Yanukovych gave up. Now, Ukraine is ordering itself new.(Bazdyrieva, 2014, p. 33). Der Focus showed the Maidan before (postcard view) and after (battlefield) and writes the pathetic line from the postcard view to the battlefield (Bazdyrieva, 2014, p. 34). The Tymoshenko release was also a topic, and she was called the people’s hope (Bazdyrieva, A., 2014, p. 38). Der Focus also mentioned the other opposition politicians, Yatsenyuk and Tyahnibok, and reported that the future of the opposition, united against Yanukovych, was unsure.

Conclusions

The German weekly magazines are very interested in the situation in Ukraine but always from a Russian-centric and geopolitical point of view. The reports are about the actions in Kiev, the political situation, and Ukraine’s future. But they are very one-sided, where the pro-Yanukovych forces are not mentioned. The focus is on politicians who are well known in Germany (like Klitschko and Tymoshenko), while other opposition party leaders are never interviewed or reported on more closely (Yatsenyuk for example or Tyahnibok). There is also a strong tendency to see the Ukrainian struggles through a German perspective: Merkel and Putin, Germany’s relation to Russia, and whether all Germans understand Putin. This is the main tendency, which seldom highlights Ukraine’s interests and its past. Der Spiegel published some reports about Ukraine’s past but the other magazines are confined to daily reports.

Anja Lange studied Western and Eastern Slavonic Studies in Leipzig and Kyiv. In 2013–2014 she worked as a DAAD (German Academic Exchange Service) language assistant at the Mohyla-Academy in Kyiv, since 2014 she is a DAAD lector at the Kyiv Polytechnical Institute and teaches German.

Afiliacja:

Anja Lange

National Technical University of Ukraine “Kyiv Polytechnic Institute”

Email: anja.dsc@gmail.com

References:

Bazdyrieva, A. (2014). Blut und Frieden. Der Focus. Nr. 9/2014, ss. 32–39.

Biagi, S. (2006). Media/impact: An introduction to mass media. Australia: Wadsworth Cengage Learning.

Blome, N. (2013). Ein Profi für Runde zwei. Der Spiegel. Nr. 50/2013, ss.22–26.

Blome, N. (2014a). Coverpage. Der Spiegel. Nr. 11/2014.

Blome, N. (2014b). Bis jenseits der Grenze. Der Spiegel. Nr. 11/2014, ss.78–87.

Nachrichten-Webseiten – Ranking in der Google-Suche | Statistik. (2013). Retrieved June 08, 2016, from http://de.statista.com/statistik/daten/studie/232217/umfrage/ranking-deutscher-nachrichten-webseiten-in-der-google-suche/

Neef, C., Schepp, M. (2013). Coverpage. Der Spiegel. Nr. 51/2013.

Neef, C. (2013). Die Machtprobe. Der Spiegel. Nr. 50/2013, ss.94–96.

Neef, C. (2014). Die macht der Milliardäre. Der Spiegel. Nr. 9/2014, ss.82–85.

Neukirch, R., Hoffmann, C. (2014) „Alles kann noch scheitern“. Interview mit Frank-Walter Steinmeier. Der Spiegel. Nr. 9/2014, ss. 36–38.

Schallmeyer, M. (2016). Werbeträgerdaten – Presseerzeugnisse. Retrieved June 08, 2016, Downloaded from http://daten.ivw.eu/index.php?menuid=1

Schepp, M. (2014). Von heiligen russischen Orten. Der Spiegel. Nr. 13/2014, ss. 78–81.

Sengling, B. (2013). Kampf ohne Regeln. Der Stern. Nr. 50/2013, ss. 54–60.

Sengling, B. (2014a). Gegen die Wand. Der Stern. Nr. 6/2014, ss. 92–102.

Sengling, B. (2014b). Der Kampf um Kiew. Der Stern. Nr. 10/2014, ss. 92–103.

Zeslawski, M. (2013). „Mein schwerster Kampf steht noch bevor“. Interview mit Vitali Klitschko. Der Focus. Nr. 49/2013, ss.46–47.

Euromajdan postrzegany z zagranicy – analiza trzech najważniejszych niemieckich tygodników: „Der Spiegel“, „Der Stern“ i „Focus“.

Streszczenie:

W artykule przedstawiono analizę sprawozdań nt. wydarzeń określanych mianem Euromajdanu, zaczerpniętych z trzech największych niemieckich tygodników. Analiza treści na podstawie określonych słów kluczowych pokazuje, jak niemieccy politycy i dziennikarze wydarzenia te rozumieją i interpretują. Czymś oczywistym jest obecność wywiadów z dobrze znanymi politykami ukraińskimi, takimi jak Witalij Kliczko czy Julia Tymoszenko. Inni politycy jednak, jak Arsenij Jaceniuk lub Ołeh Tiahnybok, ledwie pojawiają się w doniesienia tych tygodników. Brakuje zarówno wywiadów z nimi, jak i szczegółowych informacji na temat ich osób i działalności. Sporo uwagi niemieckich mediów koncentruje na sobie Witalij Kliczko, słynny w Niemczech bokser. Magazyny nazywają go „liderem opozycji” (co nie jest do końca zgodne z prawdą, bo był on tylko jednym z liderów), a także „następnym silnym człowiekiem w Kijowie”. Doniesienia skupiają się na Tymoszenko i Kliczce. Kolejny wniosek, jaki może być wyciągnięty z analizy dotyczy perspektywy dziennikarzy. Konflikt na Ukrainie pokazywany jest głównie na tle relacji niemiecko-rosyjskich i tylko jako marginalnie dotyczący samej Ukrainy. Często omawiane są kwestie istotne dla Niemiec i gospodarki europejskiej.

Słowa kluczowe:
Euromajdan, Ukraina, Niemcy, media, analiza.

1 The article was presented on the International Video Conference about Euromaidan on June 26, 2014, held by the Contemporary Ukraine Research Forum with centres in Edmonton (Canada), Kyiv (Ukraine) and Lviv (Ukraine) (Media and Communication – Cluster B).

2 According to the Statistische Bundesamt is spiegel.de the web page with the highest Google index (Statis, 2013)

3 https://web.archive.org/web/20131130061102/http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-25164990

“Together we are power!”: Identities and Values in Euromaidan Slogans

Nadiya Trach
National University of “Kyiv-Mohyla Academy”

Abstract:

This article examines the issues of identity and values in Euromaidan slogans. Different types of identities and the ways of their expression are highlighted: gender, national, regional, social, European and so on. A spectrum of values is portrayed – the values of love, friendship, mutual help, freedom, and dignity. Various linguistic representations of identities and values are examined by using the methodological tools of discourse-analysis on the data obtained from a field research and publications immediately appearing as a reaction to Maidan events.

Keywords:
identity, value, Euromaidan, revolutionary slogan, protest rhetoric.

Events in contemporary Ukraine have become the field for research for the experts from diverse realms. As Volodymyr Kulyk states, One of the most noteworthy consequences of the recent events in Ukraine is a dramatic change in Ukrainian national identity. In various media one can regularly encounter assertions of individuals’ increased self-identification as Ukrainian, greater pride in being a citizen of the Ukrainian state, stronger attachment to the symbols of nationhood, enhanced solidarity with compatriots, increased readiness to defend Ukraine or work for Ukraine, and increased confidence in the people’s power to change the country for the better (Kulyk, 2016, p. 588).

Therefore, identity issues are still in the main focus, since the Maidan revolution and the ongoing Russian-Ukrainian war have become the triggers to actively discuss the current social, political and cultural identities and values. The recent studies revealed that the main values of Euromaidan are the following: Actually, the above-mentioned dominant values of Maidan give an understanding of what a “Revolution of Dignity” means and consists of: 1) creativity, freedom, independence, self-esteem, curiosity – Self-direction; objectivity, integrity, compassion, loyalty, responsibility – Benevolence; 3) wisdom, social justice, equality, peace, beauty, tolerance, unity with nature, protecting the environment – Universalism (Sviatnenko Vynogradov, 2014, p. 49). Therefore, the goal of this article is to examine how identities are reflected in linguistic representations and how values are seen through linguistic lenses.

This article is a part of my bigger research on Euromaidan slogans that was published as a separate book in 2015 (see a review of this book made by Łukasz Kutyło in this volume). However, the book was published in Ukrainian, and this is my first article on the topic available in English. I do believe that the Euromaidan contexts are in general terms familiar to a Polish reader, therefore, I do not expose the revolution timeline, whereas in the abstracts that are dense with linguistic details I provide an extra explanations. The language of the majority of slogans I analyze below is Ukrainian, and for the reasons of text economy and cohesion I provide only their English translation. If the language of a concrete slogan or citation is not Ukrainian, I flag this fact.

I do believe that language is a fruitful field for a research on identities and values. As Deborah Schiffrin holds, (…) language always occurs in some kind of context, including cognitive contexts in which past experience and knowledge is stored and drawn upon, cultural contexts consisting of shared meanings and world views, and social contexts through which both self and others draw upon institutional and interactional orders to construct definitions of situation and action (Schiffrin, 1987, p. 4). Cognitive, cultural and social elements were crucial for identity construction during the Maidan events. And furthermore, (…) the act of narrating is considered an act of constructing identity (Taniguchi, 2010, p. 212).

A sociopolitical protest called Euromaidan has caused not only creation of a brand-new social discourse, but also renewing of political vocabulary and rhetoric. How have the protesters’ identities and values been mirrored in this rhetoric? As Yaroslav Hrytsak states, the identities and values are important factors due to which a society may foresee the further development of its history or even change it: During the last few years me and my colleagues have been saying that Ukraine has significantly more serious problems not with its identities, but with its values; because identities in Ukraine, no matter how, ensure its existence as a stable political community. However, a set of values which the majority of Ukrainian population shares – and it does not matter where, on the West or on the East – does not allow introduce any radical political and economic reforms in Ukraine. These are the values of a so called “closed society” where the feeling of fear and distrust are dominant, and the main wish of inhabitants is to find a safe place for themselves and their families (Hrytsak, 2014, p. 93).

However, as Yaroslav Hrytsak duly noted, in the last few years in Ukraine, along with domination of the values of “surviving”, the values of “self-expression” have increased their importance (that is seen not only in sociological data, but also in expression of creativity during Maidan). The society where the values of “self-expression” prevail is less disposed to authoritarian regime.

As a matter of fact, an average Euromaidaner, whether consciously or unconsciously, directly or indirectly, has become an author or a co-author of revolutionary slogans. The community of Maidaners has created numerous slogans that were represented: 1) in an oral form during the Sunday meetings (such gatherings were called viche as an allusion to the democratic order in the former Kyiv Rus) and on the blocking demonstrations close to the state institutions – the Parliament of Ukraine, the Cabinet of Ministers, the President’s Administration, the General Prosecutor’s Office, the Ministry of Interior Affairs, as well as at the protests close to Kyiv courthouses; 2) in a written form on the placards, streamers, posters and self-made decorations for the “Christmas tree” (in the Ukrainian language it sounds like jolka – it was one of the main symbols of Maidan, situated in its very center), during the protests in other cities in Ukraine and abroad that supported the protest, in the form of graffiti on the walls of the buildings on the Square of Independence in Kyiv where the main events of the protest occurred and in the nearby neighborhoods; 3) in a virtual form on the web pages of a Facebook social network, in blogs, memes etc.

Some of the slogans, of course, represented a certain political group or were over-imposed by politicians from the “stage”. For instance, a singer Ruslana Lyzhychko, who was a moderator for the students participating in Euromaidan, was addressing the protesters with the calls Peaceful protest!, Maidan is!, Sign! (a call addressed to Yanukovych to sign the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement). A young political party “Demaliance”, in the period of protests not represented in the public authorities structures, in particular, produced stickers with the slogans Yanukovych pidaresht (a wordplay is present; its meaning can be explained as a demand that Yanukovych should be arrested and at the same time as an affirmation that Yanukovych is a pederast, subtly referring to his criminal past), Territory free of berkutushki (another wordplay is detected; berkutushka is a diminutive form for a name of a riot militia formation “Berkut”), Only victory and others. Also, the members of a non-governmental organization “Common Case” was distributing stickers with the slogans I am here not for money; I will not leave Maidan till Yanukovych is resigned. Those stickers were massively pasted over the territory of Maidan, on the protesters’ clothes and on the entrances to the buildings in the living districts of Kyiv as a call for those citizens of the city who by that time had not joined the protest movements yet.

However, the majority of slogans appeared as a result of a ‘folk creativity’”. They were produced in a bottom-up manner by the protesters. Mainly, the names of their authors did not become known to public, first of all because of the Maidaners’ anonymity, except for the rare cases. For instance, the authors of the slogan I am a drop in the ocean that will change Ukraine were the community of creative artists and designers ‘Strike Placard’”. The idea appeared in a critical moment of the protest, right after the Berkut riot militia attacked and beat up students carrying a peaceful demonstration. The placard immediately was spread in the Internet, the slogan became extremely popular among the protesters and was transformed into a few other versions: We are the ocean, not a skating rink (a hint about the militia’s attack of students, as the official reason for “cleaning” the square was to prepare the area for installation of a Christmas tree (jolka) and a skating rink for kids); The ocean consists of drops; You cannot sprinkle the ocean (here is another wordplay present – in the Ukrainian language the verb зливати (to sprinkle) also has a slang meaning – to betray, to share secret information). Some of the slogans’ transformations resembled the pieces of poetry: I am the ocean. You are still the drop. Where is your bottom? Where are your banks? Absorb in desert thirsty time-sand or die. The leaders of the creative community “Strike Placard” explain the metaphor, put into the slogan: At some point you realize: There is no weakness in being a drop, even vice versa – you are starting to be proud of that. Yes, I am not strong or brave, I am not a superhero, I am just a small drop, but I can contribute to a struggle with injustice, and I want to do it. It is important. Here I am, without any weapon, without any power, I am standing here and I have a right to demand from authorities that they care about people. For public authorities the greatest fear is common people that are united for a concrete goal (Desiateryk, 2014). A significant detail about the above cited interview is the fact that the designers did not allow to mention their names, even though it was after Maidan and Yanukovych’s escape from the country. In any case, authorship or copyright during the events of Maidan was not a key moment, and production of slogans was treated as a “folk creativity” – more common was becoming a slogan, less authorial it was turning to be and, consequently, more popular and better-targeted.

Revolutionary slogans became the markers of different types of identities: European, gender, regional, social, and national. For instance, the European identity was transmitted through slogans Ukraine is Europe; Europe is high moral standards; gender – Ukrainian women are against slave future, Free hugs!, regional – Kolomyia is Europe!, social – Scientists are against violence, national civic, political – Ukraine is united, Ukrainians are power!; Ukrainians have no fear; We have one Ukraine.

In particular, the regional identity also was represented through flags with the city names on them. This rhetoric device that was also used in the Orange Revolution in 2004, on the one hand, gave a possibility to underline the presence of representatives from different regions on Maidan and by this to transmit the important message both to Ukrainian society and international community: Here, the whole Ukraine is represented; it is not a protest of Kyiv citizens or Western Ukrainians; we all are united by a common idea; on the other hand, it facilitated coordination within the community, gave a possibility to easily find compatriots. During Euromaidan the city names were also printed on the protesters’ tents and the “Christmas tree”; toponyms became parts of the Self-defense units names; on the Instytutska street the protesters organized a construction made of the small wooden bars with the written names of the cities, towns and villages of the protesters’ origin. The journalists of the Television News Service (one of the most popular in Ukraine TV-channel 1+1) named this construction a “wailing and fighting wall”. The emphasis on a regional identity was also a tool of mobilization, attraction of the new protesters. As is was mentioned by Mykhailo Havryliuk, a kozak who was abused by Berkut riot militia during the revolutionary events and later became a member of the Parliament of Ukraine, there was a Chernivtsi tent on Maidan, opposite to the House of the Trade Unions, and we went to the protest every day, carrying flags. It was written “Chernivtsi” on our flag, and we stood close to the stage with it and tried to get closer to the TV-cameras to show to our people in Chernivtsi that Chernivtsi are on Maidan and to motivate them to join us (Havryliuk, 2014, p. 40).

Special attention must be paid to a gender, and a female identity in particular. Women were an active part of the protest. They performed different volunteers’ tasks – culinary, health care, information distribution etc. Women also formed parts of the Self-defense units, and later a separate women’s unit was established. According to the sociological data, namely a survey conducted by the Ilko Kucheriv foundation “Democratic Initiatives”, has shown that in December 2013 the female part of the protesters constituted 44%. Especially when the protest turned into a combat phase, women in every way tried to express their support to combaters and often called themselves as a peaceful part of a radical protest. This support is reflected in the slogans – On Hrushevskogo street not radicals, but normal men are fighting (Hrushevskoho street is a place close to the Independence Square where the peaceful protest turned into a combat phase in January 2014); I will marry my hero; I will marry a Berkut policeman who will turn to the people’s side. During Euromaidan there were actions that were clearly feminine-colored. For example, women brought stuffed animals for the Berkut militia and representatives of the interior army forces, the slogan of this action was Ukrainian women are against a slave future. Olexandra Hryn, a participant of the protest, initiated an action Free hugs, giving to all needed people her friendly support and warmth. Mothers of the soldiers that formed Internal Troops were coming to the barricades of Hrushevskoho street, calling the authorities to not to start a fire targeting their sons, and inviting other women to join the protest – Mothers, join us! One of the popular Maidan anecdotes had a female sounding. It was about the fact that a Ukrainian man needs three weeks to install a shelf in a bathroom, and only three hours to build a barricade on Maidan. From their side, men expressed their gratitude in a slogan Bow to the girls and women of Maidan.

During the military conflict the emphasis on a female identity did not disappear, but on the contrary strengthened. Certain traditional images of woman-keeper – a caring mother, a gentle sister, a tender daughter, a loyal wife – were actualized, in particular in the series of placards – Brother, I am praying for you; Father, come back alive; Honey, I am with you. These placards with the images of women wearing classical Ukrainian vyshyvankas (embroidered blouses) appeal to traditional family values of love, trust, support and care. Concurrently, the series of erotic-camouflage posters (the author is Sviatoslav Paschuk) gained popularity among the soldiers of anti-terrorist operation; these posters were united by slogan that was a parody to a traditional commercial cliché – Separatism is harmful for your health. Beautiful seductive women are depicted on these posters, each of them symbolizing a certain division of Ukrainian military forces. The pictures are accompanied with the humorous slogans, such as – The Ukrainian Special Force: Fatal dating; The Ukrainian Air Forces: Hot nose-diving; The Border Guard Service of Ukraine: Hunter’s instinct; The Voluntary Battalion “Aidar”: Our happiness; The National Guard of Ukraine: Gentle ukrainization; The Volunteer Battalion “Donbas”: Gifts for criminals; The Rocket Forces and Artillery of the Ukraine: The last lullaby.

Therefore, in the rhetoric of the Ukrainian resistance both traditional and modern female identities are actualized. So far, the expression of identity is possible thanks to language. As Olena Matuzkova noticed, Identity is an extremely complicated and a multi-angled phenomenon that integrates cultural, mental, social, communicative and lingual aspects. All the existing definitions of identity allow us conclude that the identity of an individual or a group is formed by a language they use, a culture they belong to, a society they live in, within their intellectual and communicative activities. Language in its nature performs three roles in uniting communicative actors with each other and their culture, namely: 1) a symbol of social identity; 2) a mean of social communication, and 3) a storage of cultural knowledge (Matuzkova, 2014, p. 15).

Besides, various slogans were representing different groups within the Maidan community. For example, a kozak group created a slogan – Feel the kozak’s spirit of Maidan – come to a night shift guarding! The Automaidan movement (representatives of a Ukrainian middle class who on their cars were driving to the residences of the major politicians to claim the protesters’ demands), that in the beginning was supporting only the peaceful means of resistance, introduced a slogan No violence (which was formulated in Russian language). The motto of Ultras football fans who also played an important role in the protest was From Luhansk to Carpathians fan for fan is a friend and a brother! Slogans, typical for the representatives of the right radical parties, were Ukraine above all!; Glory to nation! – Death to enemies! On the contrary, liberals, criticizing those slogans, proposed to substitute them by the alternative ones – Human being above all; Human rights above all; Human life above all!; Life to friends (as an antithesis to the above-mentioned Death to enemies). The slogan Ukraine above all! was criticized, in particular, because it was calqued from a German motto of the Nazi period. Artists also held different opinions when evaluating this slogan. Thus, Olexandr Roitburd negatively responded to this slogan: (…) ‘Ukraine above all’. Even if we disregard the fact that this is a clear calque, the slogan about giving the priority to the national and state interests nowadays is by nature the most anti-European motto; I prefer Europe because human personality is the highest value there, not Ukraine, Romania or the Principality of Liechtenstein (original text in Russian, Roitburd, 2014, p. 245).

Distinctively, Ivan Semesiuk interpreted the slogan in a different way, outside the context of prioritizing the state interest versus human rights, but in the stream of state-building and civic society formation: Think about it, do you really understand the slogan “Ukraine above all” in a correct way? Ukraine, my dears, is our home. We experience some problems at home – sewerage is leaking and ceiling is collapsing, and till we fix it, yes, our home is above all! We’ll make repairs and think where to put a coffee table, what color the wallpaper should be, and if our flat mates are not disturbed by a location of our refrigerator. We’ll do it for sure, but later (Semesiuk, 2014, p. 254).

These different interpretations, apparently, are related to the different understandings of a concept of Ukraine (as a state, country, citizens, people etc). The fame of this slogan among the Maidaners can also be explained by the fact that at that time there was already a real, even though hidden, threat to the territorial integrity of Ukraine that later led to annexation of Crimea and a hybrid war in Donbas. The slogan remains acute nowadays, as it is used in the Ukrainian army and at the meetings to commemorate the fallen victims.

Journalists’ publications also proved an observation that the right-wing slogans were more popular on Maidan than the left-wing ones: Almost two months before the militia buses and the barricades made of automobile tires burst in flames, one undistinguished event happened on the Independence Square in the first day of a Vilnius summit in 27 November 2013. A silent demonstration of one of the students’ trade union ended up with misunderstanding and distress. Self-made placards of young people who lined up at the stairs of the Independence Square disturbed the crowd of protesters and caused vivid discussions that turned into an indignant choir of voices. Later, in the news, the placards were called “too intelligent”: “Organize a trade union, do not pray on Europe”, “Solidarity with europeople, fight with eurobosses”, “To be afraid of gender – not to go to Europe”. One of the placards contained an inscription colored like a rainbow – “Glory to enemies”. Left-wing slogans by their content proved to be alien to Euromaidan. (…) The action ended up with lowering the placards to the ground. Those people who brought the placards were surrounded by a tight circle of young men who called the action a “provocation”. Only then the action ceased to be silent, as the participants started chanting a slogan that was not written on their placards – “Go to Europe without violence! (Bludsha, 2014).

Such processes revealed the fact that despite of a social and ideological diversity the new type of civic identity was formed on Maidan, a civic identity for which some ideas were more or less acceptable, whereas some were condemned to a strong criticism.

On the other hand, student-protesters were calling to a general student strike using a citation from Serhiy Zhadan, a contemporary Ukrainian writer: Learn history! Prepare revolution! Leave the classroom! Go to the street! The popular slogan that helped Maidaners to stay warm in a cold season – Who is not jumping is Moskal (an offensive word to mark Russians, hence in its origin it was a stylistically neutral way to call soldiers in a former Russian Empire) – has become popular already during the students’ strike. The motto was criticized in the social networks by the Russian-speaking participants of the protest and gradually transformed into a slogan Who is not jumping is sovok (a slang word with a negative connotation to call people with the soviet mentality, a wordplay – this word also has a meaning scoop) or Who is not jumping is Azirov (a slang word to call a Ukrainian ex-PM who was on duty during the regime of Yanukovych, Mykola Azarov, who was famous for mispronouncing Ukrainian words in a Russian manner and vice versa). The free encyclopedia Wikipedia defined the slogan Who is not jumping is… as a popular mem, chant, and action. It is widely spread in many countries and used for grouping, isolation of the opposing side in the conflicts with public authorities or police… (Wikipedia).

This is an international slogan with a variety of possible terminations. Its forms are known in such countries as Bulgaria, Bosnia, Denmark, Canada, Germany, Portugal, Russia, France, Chile. In particular, Russians during the protest on the Bolotna square in 2011–2012 were jumping with chants Who is not jumping is a hach (an offensive word to call people of a Caucasian origin), in a Danish version it literally sounds as Who is not jumping is loving Putin. Certainly, there was no clear-cut differentiation of the Euromaidan protesters by slogans, since each of them carried several identities at the same time (e.g., gender and national, or European and regional), therefore the groups were freely borrowing the slogans or were chanting them together in a crowd of one million people.

Notwithstanding, slogans were creating a new identity – a Maidan identity, a strong feeling of belonging to the community that had its own life values, worldview and a way of thinking. Their slogans also created the image of Maidaners in the Ukrainian and world media. According to the sociological survey held by the Ilko Kucheriv foundation “Democratic Initiatives” in December 2013, the motives of joining to the protest (and respectively the values orientations) were divided in such a way: Among the motives that induced people go to Maidan three proved to be the most prevailing: a violent beating of demonstrators on Maidan in the night of November 30 and repressions (70%), Victor Yanukovych’s refusal to sign the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement (53,5%), and a desire to change life in the country (50%). Intentions to change public authorities in Ukraine were also rather strong (39%). Calls of the opposition were a stimulus for 5%, and the same percentage of people claimed to join Maidan to take revenge of authorities for their actions (Maidan 2013).

The values of Maidan, naturally, were reflected in its numerous mottos. Using analogy to the well-known inscriptions on the chewing gum wrappers Love is.., Euromaidaners tried to explain what Euromaidan was, to define it in their own words by combining these definitions with the funny images. Those posters were located on Internet and distributed on Maidan as a stylized wrapper-sticker, and the protesters could gather a collection of those wrappers, exchanging them with the other protesters, give it as a gift to a friend, glue it to a smartphone or a notebook. With the help of those definitions, Maidaners were trying to explain the values that united them and share this knowledge with a broader community. Those tendencies were a feature of a peaceful phase of the protest.

These posters conveyed the value of love – Euromaidan is when she is worried, but also is proud of you, peace – Euromaidan is when a live Berkut policemen are the decorations for your photos, freedom – Euromaidan is when you say “no” to repressions, personal responsibility and development – Euromaidan is when it is you who changes the world, unity of the state – Euromaidan is when you see Ukraine united, intelligence – Euromaidan is when you recognize provocateurs, hope – Euromaidan is when you hope, self-expression – Euromaidan is to make your own strike placard, kindness – Euromaidan is to treat titushka with tea and cookies, national pride – Euromaidan is when the most beautiful Christmas tree stands in your country, friendship – Euromaidan is when a million of people are at your birthday party; Euromaidan is when a million of people stands for one who is hurt; Euromaidan is when you have a million of friends, and not in Facebook; abundance – Euromaidan is when you run away from people who chase you with sandwiches, mutual help – Euromaidan is when strangers care about you. In one of the definitions the values of truth and clean environment were combined – Euromaidan is when you separate a truth and a lie, and a glass from plastic. Some post-soviet values, for instance, a desire to get everything for free, also received a humorous expression – Euromaidan is when you live for free in the center of Kyiv for weeks.

At the later, final combat phase of the protest, the values of love and mutual help did not disappear. On the contrary, they remained to be the core ones. It is clearly shown in the series of valentine cards made by the Civic Sector of Euromaidan. Their visual part and short inscriptions-poems, stylized as confessions of love, were full of pacifistic calls – leave your silly grenades, leave your shields for a scrap metal recycling, go and surrender to love. According to those valentine cards, the ingredients of combat cocktails were human emotions – Maidan is to make a cocktail adding freedom dignity again honor the truth and force courage love. Along with the value of love, the importance of gratitude was highlighted in numerous slogans: Thank you for a usage of protection; Thank you, the citizens of Kyiv, for a sincere support. Maidaners; Thank you for everything! You are our heroes!; Thank you for freedom!; Thank you, Ukrainian army, for liberation of Kramatorsk (inscription found on the billboard in a liberated Kramatorsk, a city in Donbas, the original text is in Russian); Ukraine thanks you (gratitude expressed to Americans for adoption of the Act for support of Ukraine’s freedom, the original text is in English) and in an ironic call to public authorities – Thank you, we are fed up. The information awareness, the importance of truthful information about events also could be considered as the Maidan values that were reflected in many mottos: Your instrument is a cold mind, steel nerves and a hot heart!; Information is our protection; Our weapon is publicity!, and safety – both physical, as well as emotional, psychological – Protection of free hearts; We’ll protect our kids; Protect your people and so on.

The series of stickers were introduced on which the Maidan values were emphasizing concrete social changes, such as law obedience, self-development, clean and aesthetic environment – Maidan is honestly to pass exam to obtain a driving license; Maidan is to plant flowers at your porch; Maidan is to travel more within your country; Maidan is to treat your neighbor with something tasty; Maidan is to put an empty bottle into a garbage lot; Maidan is to park a car according to the rules, even if it is inconvenient; Maidan is to install licensed programs on your computer; Maidan is to clean after your dog on the street.

One of the Automaidan leader Dmytro Bulatov recalls the values of Maidan like this: I also came to Euromaidan. Because the European values are very important to me, because there the human being is in the center of these values. His or her life, health, rights and care about people close to you, mutual help – these are the highest values, and all this is not in words, but in deeds – the original text is in Russian (Bulatov, 2014, p. 35).

However, the question what the European values are – nowadays remains open and to some extent rhetorical. In this context, correlation of the Maidan values with the European ones is questionable, because political, and especially geographical, Europe unites people with the different historical and cultural backgrounds, mentality and, respectively, values. Therefore, it is relevant to analyze the Maidan values in the context of the universal humanistic values. As Andriy Portnov rightly notes, Regarding the pro-European rhetoric of Maidan, it is typologically similar to the vision of Europe as a space of supremacy of law, the social justice, and the freedom of movement and expression (Portnov, 2014, p. 116).

Conventionality of such a rhetoric was demonstrated by poster that appeared in the period when Ukrainians were waiting for implementation of sanctions – the world community was constantly expressing its “deep concern” but was not in a hurry to take real measures. On the one hand, the poster, stylized as a letter, was an irony about the Europeanism of Ukraine – Dear European Union and the United States of America! We no longer need your moral support. Act or fuck off. With Eurolove from EuroUkraine (the original text is in English). On the other hand, that irony was bitter, as a signature With Eurolove from EuroUkraine point to the unfulfilled at that moment expectations of the European help and some disappointment – by this they say that they expressed their desire of European integration, but Europe does not support it. Hence, Maidaners started to realize the importance of a personal responsibility and efforts-making to achieve a better European level of life and political freedoms, which was revealed in a humorous motto – You want to Europe – lift up your ass. Pro-European rhetoric ironically was played in kolomyjka (short humorous poem) by Irena Karpa – I was on maidan with euroflags, I vote for Europe by my hands and legs.

In a special way a Maidan identity was created, and its values were crystallizing in a constant opposition to the purposes of participants on the other side of barricades – public authorities, Berkut riot militia, titushkas, and antimaidaners. Which were the mottos on the opposite side of the barricades? Contrary to the individualized creativity of the Maidan slogans, they were more typical and isolated. To give some examples, many participants of Antimaidan were holding the same printed placard Stop Maidan of the same format; whereas among the Maidan slogans were those that were more and less popular, some used by individuals and some by groups. With that in mind, the community called “Strike Placard” uploaded to the Internet a device which enables to download and print out a poster, but it was also possible and desirable that the users add their own words to a poster. For example, various beginnings of a phrase were suggested – I go for those who…; I go to…; I go because…, and the protesters were finishing the phrases by themselves, printing placards and coming with them to the protest – I go to get a sweet life outside Mezhyhirja (Yanukovych’s residence, nowadays a so called “museum of corruption”); I go because freedom is above all!; I go because we worth it; I go because I hate regionals (representatives of the political Party of Regions). I would like to shoot them!; I go for the future of my future kids!; I go for those who are already not with us and for those who will be born later. In such a way a common idea received an individual expression that underlined the main values of the community – freedom and dignity.

Contrary to that, the rhetoric of Antimaidan often implied copying or copying via antithesis. For instance, after Yanukovych refused to sign the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement and the very first protests against his foreign policy were set in motion on the Independence Square in Kyiv, a similar demonstration was launched on the neighboring European square. The “pro-European demonstration-clone” was gathered by the Party of Regions, using the same symbolic attributes of the national blue and yellow and the European flags; a manipulative message of that meeting was the idea that Yanukovych indeed supports the pro-European vector in his foreign policy, but it is too early for us to go to Europe, Ukraine is not ready for this. A “cloning” feature of this rhetoric is clearly revealed in the following nominations: maidan, Euromaidan – antimaidan; Maidaner, Euromaidaner – Antimaidaner; automaidan – antiautomaidan; automaidaner – antiautomaidaner. It clearly indicates that Antimaidan in general was not offering any of its proper views on the situation, but was only denying the Maidan ideas and ideals through contradiction. In the slogans Euro = homo; No to eurohomointegration and in a lexeme Gayrope, widely used by a Russian media and the Ukrainian sympathizers of Antimaidan, a manipulative pressure on the traditional values of the Ukrainian society was laid. Later on, the Antimaidaners were also copying a number of non-rhetoric revolutionary strategies for proclaiming the Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics, such as in capturing the buildings of state administration and local public authorities.

Some signs of creativity did appear also inside the special division of Berkut militia. To illustrate this point, some berkuters decorated their shields with an inscription Go to work! (the original text is in Russian) or an ironic, borrowed from a mass culture slogan – Here could be your advertisement! (the original text is in Russian). Later, in a similar manner, the Maidan activists played with the second slogan within the rhetoric of Ukrainian resistance, applying it in a campaign that demanded the closing-up of a television channel “Inter” because of their New Year programme broadcast featuring the Russian pop-stars who supported military aggression in Ukraine. On a poster, a headstone was depicted with an inscription Inter. 1996–2015. Here could be your advertisement.

In the post-maidan period, in the times of Crimea annexation, the values of a united state gained a special meaning. It was revealed in the distribution of a slogan United country (the original text is both in Ukrainian and Russian languages); it was located practically on every Ukrainian TV-channel. This slogan can be observed in the context of a thesis about existence of the “Two Ukraines”, a civilizational and a mental split between the West and the East, expressed by some of the Ukrainian intellectuals, in particular by Mykola Riabchuk. Therefore, in the times of a war tension in the state, a real threat to its independence and territorial integrity, the society was experiencing the great need of consensus, of finding the common, not divergent, points. In this light, the journalists also created a video in which they supported the idea of a united Ukraine.

In that period, the anti-Russian rhetoric was also developing. This rhetoric was partially manifested already during Euromaidan in the slogans Russia is for sad people (the original text is in Russian); I was sucked by a dangerous Russia and my life is a never-ending pipe (the original text is in Russian). However, this rhetoric was naturally intensified after Crimea annexation and the war that was started in Donbas – Putler (which is a wordplay, a mixture of Putin and Hitler), Stop lying and killing! Death to Russian occupants! (the original text is in Russian); Close the boarders with Russia immediately!; Stop Russian terrorism! During Crimea annexation, the placard with the image of matryoshkas, stylized as Russian soldiers, appeared with the inscription – Go home! (the original text is in English). Anti-Russian slogans are directed against the lie of Russian propaganda and the Russian aggression in Ukraine, therefore, the concept of Russia in it refers to the Putin’s regime, the state system, not to the Russian people in general. These slogans are mainly formulated in English to attract attention of the global community – Mariupol still says “no” to Russian occupation; Russia makes war, not peace. The Russian invasion of Ukraine 2014–2015; Russia, wake up, you’re drunk; Stop Russian occupation. On the other hand, on the pro-Russian meetings in Crimea, as well as in Donbas, the call Russia! was sounding.

In the post-maidan period, in the times of reforms, a clean-up of authorities became another important value that was conveyed in the slogans – Nation for lustration!; Yes to lustration, no to imitation; Such a situation that we need lustration!; We demand lustration!; Lustration or castration!; New faces to authorities!; Stop betraying Ukraine! Demonstration calling for a clean-up of public authorities were accompanied by the actions of a “public lustration” when activists themselves were catching parliamentary members and leaving them inside the garbage lots. Aforementioned symbolic acts and expressions were aimed at showing that due to Maidan the public mechanisms of authorities control started developing. Critical thinking was represented as a particular value, along with a critical attitude towards the public authorities (and in particular, towards the activities of the current President Petro Poroshenko) and a special control over its representatives that reveals itself in demands to resign those who do not cope with their duties.

During the military conflict in Donbas, the value of a human life was also revived in the rhetoric of Ukrainian resistance, for instance in a slogan Come back alive! which was addressed to the soldiers of the anti-terrorist operation, as well as in the various actions of volunteers, the children’s drawings for combaters. Also, the songs with a title Come back alive appeared (lyrics by Iryna Tsilyk, performance by “Telniuk Sisters” and “Kozak System” and another one – lyrics by Svitlana Tarabarova). In the Iryna Tsilyk’s song the value of life is underlined not only in the context of soldiers’ lives, but also the lives of the next generations: Most importantly, come back and stay forever, and give life, plant, and build, and in your snub-nosed kid the new true joy will blossom. In the song written by Svitlana Tarabarova, a pride for the Ukrainian soldiers is emphasized: I am proud of you as proud is mother! I bow and silently pray: come back alive! Come back, soldier! I beg you, come back alive!

Thus, the protest slogans reflected the identity of euromaidaners in the first place, and later of those people who supported the anti-terrorist operation, as well as their life orientations and values. The matter of the shift of values, obviously, falls into the scope of sociology more, nevertheless, a linguistic analysis also provides a possibility to see its dynamics. The creativity on Maidan, especially a lingual one, during the protest events proves that the values of self-expression were dominant for maidaners. Finally, not only their slogans, but also a mutual help has shown that in the center of their values was an ordinary person, his or her life, rights and freedoms.

Nadiya Trach is an Associate Professor at the Department of Ukrainian Language, the Faculty of Humanities of the National University of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy. In 2009 she received a Ph.D degree in Philology from the Yuriy Fedkovych Chernivtsi National University for the dissertation entitled “Ukrainian Legal Terminology in the XX century”. In 2015 she published the book Together we are power!: Rhetoric of Ukrainian resistance. Sociolinguistic essays. – Kyiv: Klio, 144 p. Her main interests are sociolinguistics, discourse-analysis, identity issues and language policy. She is currently working on the issues of socio-cultural and lingual identities and language policies during Euromaidan and the ongoing Russian-Ukrainian war.

Afiliacja:

Nadiya Trach

Department of Ukrainian Language

Faculty of Humanities

National University of “Kyiv-Mohyla Academy”

Email: krasiya@yahoo.com

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„Razem jesteśmy siłą!”. Tożsamości i wartości w sloganach Euromajdanu

Streszczenie:

W artykule przedmiotem badania uczyniono zagadnienia związane z tożsamością i wartościami obecnymi na sloganach w czasie Euromajdanu. Wyodrębnione zostały różne typy tożsamości, a także sposoby, za pomocą których były one wyrażanie, w tym tożsamość: płciowa, narodowa, regionalna, społeczna, europejska, itd. Zaprezentowano także spektrum wartości ważnych dla uczestników tych wydarzeń, w tym wartości miłości, przyjaźni, wzajemnej pomocy, wolności i godności. Różne, wyrażane za pomocą języka, reprezentacje tych tożsamości i wartości zostały przeanalizowane za pomocą narzędzi badawczych typowych dla jakościowej analizy dyskursu. Za materiał badawczy posłużyły slogany towarzyszące wydarzeniom, jakie miały wówczas miejsce na Majdanie.

Słowa kluczowe:
tożsamość, wartości, Euromajdan, slogany rewolucyjne, retoryka protestu.

Конструирование национальной идентичности в медиа: украино-российские взаимные образы сейчас и 15 лет назад

Гнит Юлия
Киевский национальный университет имени Тараса Шевченко

Людмила Малес
Киевский национальный университет имени Тараса Шевченко

Богдан Мотузенко
Исследовательская и консалтинговая компания «Project Bureau»

Виктор Рымжа
Исследовательская и консалтинговая компания «Project Bureau»

Наталия Фреик
Киевский национальный университет имени Тараса Шевченко

Aннотация:

Тщательное изучение взаимных этнических представлений украинцев и россиян чрезвычайно актуально в связи с начавшимся военным конфликтом, затрагивающим, прежде всего, вопросы этничности, национальности идентичности.

В данной статье содержится анализ разнообразных характеристик и составных элементов взаимных этнических образов украинцев и россиян в печатных СМИ.

Сравнение персонажей фигурирующих в российских и украинских изданиях по результатам двух замеров с разницей в 15 лет показывает, как проявились латентные стратегии имперскости в российских изданиях, как однозначно образ брата сменился образом врага – в украинских.

В 2001 году российские СМИ часто писали о том, что делалось на украинской территории. Замер 2015 года, в сравнении с предыдущим, отчетливо демонстрирует, как образ украинской нации выходит из имперского дискурса. Причем данная тенденция проявляется как в российских так и в украинских СМИ. В российских медиа прослеживается снижения восприятия Украины и украинцев как составляющей части империи (несмотря на наличие агрессивных претензий) и вынужденное отношении к ней как к самостоятельному политическому субъекту. В украинском дискурсе прослеживается резкое снижении внимания к бывшей «метрополии» как центру политической, экономической, культурной жизни.

Ключевые слова:
взаимные этнонациональные образы, образ врага, имперский дискурс, украино-российские отношения, медиа, контент-анализ.

Первоначальная актуальность исследования взаимных этнических и, шире, этнонациональных образов украинцев и россиян определена длительной историей имперско-колониальных отношений Украины и России и относительно небольшим опытом существования соседних независимых государств, по-прежнему связанных культурными, экономическими и политическими отношениями, трактующимися, как выяснилось по-разному. Сегодня эту актуальность обостряет российская военная агрессия на почве развития имперских настроений в РФ, включая аннексию Крыма. Попытка реставрации Россией имперского влияния как внутри государства, так и вовне, во много основана на этнических и национальных идеологемах «русского мира» по отношению к бывшим колониям и к западной цивилизации в целом (Дондурей, 2016).

Исследование взаимных этнонациональных образов на фоне российско-украинского военного конфликта тем более актуально, что он сопровождается архаизацией массовых представлений россиян о других народах и о самих себе, а с другой стороны, образ другого является элементом проходящих на востоке Украины военных действий как информационная и идеологическая составляющая гибридной войны (Магда, 2015). Тем более что информационная война России против Украины и подготовка общественного мнения россиян началась задолго до Евромайдана, а, по некоторым оценкам, с кассетного скандала и акции «Украина без Кучмы» конца 2000 – начала 2001 года (Романенко, 2015).

После распада Советского Союза информационное пространство двух стран находилось под дискурсозадающим влиянием России, что значительно усложнило формирование украинской идентичности.

Не только зависимость и ориентация на другие народы и страны, конфликты, но даже в условиях добрососедских отношений международная диспозиция важны для любой нации. Так что представлений о соседях, будь то этносы, нации или государства, является на сегодняшний день неотъемлемой частью формирования реальных идентичностей определяющих социальное поведение и отношения, в том числе и на геополитическом уровне.

В сопоставлении результатов социологических опросов за последние 15–20 лет об отношениях украинцев к россиянам и наоборот в каждом случае четко прослеживается разная динамика смены дружелюбия на вражду. За истекший период, несмотря на различные геополитические события, украинцы продолжали относиться гораздо более к россиянам, в то время как для российского общественного мнения была характерна существенная негативизация образа украинцев (Пясковская, 2016).

Этим настроениям и общественному мнению предшествует смена образа брата на врага, зафиксированная в политических и экспертных обобщениях информационной войны ведущейся преимущественно с помощью СМИ. Но возникает вопрос научного исследования и фиксации этой смены образов и их особенностей.

В статье анализируется опыт контент-анализа 2002 и 2016 годов с целью выработки методологии исследования взаимных образов, выяснения их структуры и содержания. Особенно важным является определение путей формирования смещений в восприятии одной нацией другой.

Разрабатываемый инструментарий основывался на попытке совместить количественную методологию с качественным подходом в интерпретации содержания этнонационального образа и его оценки в масс-медиа.

В 2002 году анализировались материалы за первое полугодие 2001 года журналов “ПіК” (Украина) и “Коммерсант-Власть[1]” (Россия) как наиболее близких по стилистике общественно-политических еженедельных аналитических изданий, а также газет “Факты и комментарии” (Украина), “Независимая газета” (Россия) как пример относительно массовой ежедневной периодики. В 2016 году мы старались сохранить общие параметры анализируемого информационного поля. Так же отбирались материалы за первое полугодие 2015 года в том же журнале “Власть” (Россия), а прекративший свое существование украиноязычный “ПіК” был заменен наиболее близким по содержанию журналом “Країна”, появившемся во втором десятилетии 2000-х. Несмотря на то, что в 2016 году отбирались все источники, но анализировались только журналы, собранный массив публикаций вполне сопоставим по объему с «пилотом» 2001 года (2001г. – N=153; 2015г. – N=113).

Поскольку в исследовании соединялись количественный и качественный подход, носителем этнонационального образа выступал собирательный «герой» – «Актор», действующее лицо, носитель характеристик, приписываемых украинцу в российских СМИ и наоборот. Для анализа содержательных особенностей формируемых в СМИ образов, категориальная шкала имеет категории для раскрытия общего контекста жанровых и стилистических рамок изданий, а также более узкого контекста характера событий, в которых появляется этот «герой». Эти два контекста задают наиболее общие, так сказать, внешние для образа героя черты отношения к противоположной нации.

Методологически мы исходили из того, что этнические черты действующего лица сопровождаются и дополняются более широкими национальными чертами, присущими нации уже в ее современном политическом понимании. При этом из отбора сознательно исключили характеристики, приписываемые абстрактной стране или государству – «Украине» или «России», сосредоточившись на упоминаниях групповых и персонализированных субъектов «украинки/ца» в российских изданиях и «россиянки/на» в украинских, а также на соответствующих этнонациональных прилагательных[2].

Полученные результаты также группируются в разноуровневые контексты, активности, ментальные характеристики. Первый из упомянутых контекстов можно раскрыть через сопоставление насыщенности, равномерности частоты упоминаний в них противоположных героев, локализацию событий, выявление, кто в данном случае выступает источником информации и оценок, а также определение тематического спектра, представленного в массиве по разным изданиям.

Безусловно, частота упоминаний и насыщенность упоминаний противоположных героев существенно возросла как в российских, так и в украинских СМИ. Весь массив данных за первую половину 2001 года (включая газеты и журналы) по объему сопоставим с массивом только лишь журналов за первую половину 2015 года. Безусловно, увеличение частоты и количества оценок вызвано аннексией Крыма, войной, общим противостоянием, интенсификацией пропагандистских усилий.

Характеристика событий, легших в основу медийных текстов с упоминанием противоположного героя, предусматривают анализ таких категорий как общая оценка, деструктивность, сенсационность, напряжение, перспектива освещаемых тем. Будучи невозможными для появления в научном дискурсе, они являются неотъемлемой частью понятий «новости» и «события», их свежести и интереса для читателя, поэтому при любой возможности подчеркиваются журналистами. Кратко отметим, что оба журналы, имея промежуточный между научным и популярным статус аналитических, ориентированы больше на специалистов и интеллектуальную часть читателей, поэтому, как увидим, сдержаннее газет в представлении медийного образа противоположного героя.

Поскольку анализировались все-таки массовые, а не научные издания по международным отношениям, сама тематика их статей редко сосредоточена на межнациональных или этнических проблемах. Поэтому, в выборку попадали самые различные сообщения, с упоминанием противоположной нации. Упоминания в большинстве статей достаточно эпизодичны, далеко не всегда дополняются развернутой характеристикой героя, тем более связанной с какими-то этническими атрибутами. Такие «вкрапления» в общий медийный текст, с одной стороны, создают слабо наполненный по большинству переменных массив, что усложняет его обработку, с другой стороны – сами по себе они свидетельствуют о широкой включенности представителей соседней нации в ежедневную жизнь страны и народа, демонстрируя, что появление украинцев для россиян и россиян для украинцев не исчерпывается этнонациональной тематикой.

При этом участие представителей одной нации в жизни и информационном поле другой далеко не симметрично. Так, в 2002 году общее количество отобранных статей было почти одинаково при небольшом преобладании российских сообщений, эта соразмерность наблюдается и по типам украинских и российских изданий (газет и журналов) между собой. А вот в 2016 году насыщенность сильно различалась: в украинских изданиях россияне фигурировали чаще, чем в русских украинцы в 2–6 раз.

Поскольку в сложившимся стандарте СМИ, когда стилистические и лексические возможности выражения межнациональных отношений существенно скромнее чем в бытовой речи, то гораздо большее значение приобретают, пусть единичные, нарушения такого стандарта газетой или журналом, как «прорыв» бытующих отношений на полосы печатного органа, или же как существенные акценты его конструирования.

Как и следовало ожидать от печатных изданий, при этнической идентификации героя в подавляющем большинстве используется официальный этноним. Такой этноним в среднем появляется 1–3 раза на статью неспециальной тематики как в 2001 году, так и в 2015. Но встречаются ориентированные на этнонациональную проблематику материалы, их немного, насчитывается до 10% от всех, их текст содержит до десятка, а то и более этнонимов. Именно среди последних можно встретить и упоминания неофициальных этнонимов (москаль, кацап, малоросс, хохол и т.д.). В 2001 году неофициальные этнонимы по 1–2 раз встречались во всех изданиях, в замере 2016 года этнонимические вольности сосредоточены в материалах журнала “Країна”, в журнале “Власть” не было.

В 2002 году мы говорили о большей строгости журнального стиля, который обуславливает появление национальной специфики только в нюансах, этим же объясняли и склонность давать в равной степени позитивные, нейтральные и слабонегативные (ироничные) общие оценки событий, а также акцентировать внимание на позитивной перспективе события (в каждом втором случае) для обеих стран. Это выделялось на фоне газетного более эпатажного стиля, с использованием почти всего спектра тем и оценок. Сегодня же любым позитивным оценкам двусторонних отношений, даже в общественно-политических журналах, пришел конец.

Но даже в 2001 году ещё «крепкой дружбы» двух стран события, в которых встречался противоположный герой, российскими изданиями оценивались как более негативные, чем украинскими. То же касается и определения перспективности события, а также оценки ее деструктивности: российские издания чаще оценивают события как деструктивные и в общем чаще используют этот вид оценки. Российские издания описывают поданные ими события как напряженные почти вдвое чаще, чем украинские издания (в 2015 будет наоборот). Ничего хорошего из Украины не выйдет, так или иначе намекает нам пресса РФ.

В то же время, более характерным для дискурса украинских изданий 2001 года (в основном газета «Факты и комментарии») является акцент на сенсационности размещенных в ней событий, что связанно со стилистикой этой газеты в целом. В отличие от российских изданий, тут мы не встречаем ни одной негативной оценки событий из сферы политики, экономики и спорта. Ироничная оценка присутствует только для политических событий.

А в 2015 году этот медийный настрой изменился очень резко: украинские сняли розовые очки во взгляде на противоположного героя, а российские – пытаются максимально «нейтрализироваться».

В российских материалах “Власти” оценка событий с участием украинского героя предельно формализована. Создается впечатление, что редакционная политика намеренно сформирована так, чтобы не допускать упоминаний украинцев в неформальном, бытовом, эмоционально и стереотипно окрашенном залоге. В этом смысле редакционная риторика больше напоминает дипломатическую, основными свойствами которой являются нейтральность и отстраненность. Пилотное исследование определило нейтральную оценку событийного пространства в изданиях “Власти” в большинстве случаев, значительно меньше положительную и негативную.

“Країна” также чаще всего выступает с нейтральной позиции (почти половина всех оценок), но почти столько же негативных оценок, меньше ироничной оценки противоположного героя, и совсем мало положительной. Этот журнал в большинстве случаев упоминает российского героя, когда пишет о напряженных, деструктивных, экстраординарных, зрелищных событиях. Журнал “Власть” и тут пытается сохранить баланс, упоминая поровну о деструктивных и конструктивных, как заурядных, так и неординарных, напряженных и не очень событиях. При этом, конечно же, значительная часть сенсационности и новостийности, даже в аналитике, связана с экстремальностью самих событий, как для российского, так и для украинского читателя, например, в зоне АТО.

Подытоживая частотность внимания к противоположному герою и общую оценку событий можно предположить, что если для украинских медиа война с участием их страны это событие эктраординарное, то для российских – скорее незаметное. О последнем свидетельствуют два показателя: сравнительно меньшее упоминание противоположного героя и большая нейтральность его оценок. Первый из показателей видимо отображает желание российских изданий сделать участие своей страны в войне не заметным. А второй показатель скорее намекает на то, что участие своей страны в войне для российских СМИ – дело не такое уж экстраординарное. Качественный анализ подтверждает общий количественный вывод: в целом для российских СМИ война является более обыденным явлением, в то время как для украинских – травмой.

На этом уровне мы уже можем говорить о первых четких межнациональных отличиях. Далее, учитывая выделенные выше особенности контекста, которые задаются спецификой самих изданий, попробуем уточнить, в каких именно событиях фигурируют противоположные герои и их эталоны со стороны собственной и третьей нации[3].

Место действия и интерес к стране являются симптомами процессов, как экспансии, так и независимости, активизировавшихся после распада СССР. Наблюдаются отличия и в «локализации события». Анализ текстовых материалов в 2001 г. выявляет склонность российских авторов к описанию события именно на территории украинского героя (около половины случаев), при этом почти не размещая его в мировом контексте (на территории третьих стран – меньше 10% случаев). Соответственно у украинских авторов наблюдалась тенденция значительно реже описывать события, локализованные на территории российского героя (четвертая часть случаев), а больше замечать активность героя в отношениях с третьими странами (каждая третья публикация). Упоминаемость противоположного героя на территории страны издания была одинаковой – треть случаев.

Для российских изданий в 2001 году свойственно было освещать политические события в подавляющем большинстве случаев на территории противоположной страны. Также заметно пристальное внимание российских авторов к религиозной ситуации на территории Украины (визит Папы римского, сосуществование конфессий).

Если в 2001 г. украинские издание изображали российского героя в событиях разных локализаций равномерно, то интерес российских медиа к событиям на территории соседней державы булл значительно больше обычного любопытства международной ситуацией. Сейчас же локализация событий изменяется под влиянием войны между странами. Так около 50% событий в украинском издании прошлого года происходили на собственной территории, но изменилось их содержание – это, прежде всего, темы культуры, межнациональных отношений, войны. Достаточно много третьих стран как арен разворачивания событий, прежде всего исторической тематики. А вот действия российского героя в его же стране происходят в лишь в каждом десятом случае. Близкое соотношение локусов у российского издания, хотя тематический спектр иной (политико-правовой), но, опять-таки, украинцами в мире российские СМИ почти не интересуются – события в третьих странах очень редки.

В 2015 году в половине случаев оба издания упоминают противоположного героя в статьях о своей стране. Для украинского издания это важное деколлонизирующее изменение (сравнительно с четвертой их частью в 2001г.), хоть и трагическими событиями порождаемое. Зато в каждом четвертом случае “Країна” имеет материалы о взаимоотношениях Украины и России, а “Власть” – об Украине и третьих странах, вменяя ей новые зависимости, теперь уже от Запада.

Очевидно, что социокультурные ситуации исследований 2002 и 2016 годов значительно отличаются, что формирует не только резкую смену розовых очков во взгляде на противоположного героя, но и определяет репертуар тем с его участием.

Сразу заметим, что украинские издания в обоих срезах затрагивают более широкий спектр тем, присутствие российских героев освещается СМИ почти во всех сферах.

Однако основные контексты, в которых фигурируют этнические маркеры, аналогичны российским: война в некоторых районах Донецкой и Луганской областей, аннексия Крыма – именно эти темы являются дискурсозадающими.

По результатам отбора материалов, как журнала “Власть”, так и газеты “Независимая газета” – украинские герои практически отсутствуют в темах, затрагивающих такие аспекты, как культура, наука, искусство, интересные и положительные события и т.д.

Основной темой, в которой зафиксировано наибольшее количество упоминаний украинских героев в российских материалах, является тема Крыма и событий, которые произошли на полуострове после аннексии. Собственно, редакция “Власти” уделяет внимание Крыму как своей территории, описывая так называемые «переходные трудности», которые сопутствуют адаптации в первую очередь крымской экономики и системы управления к новым политическим условиям. (…) Летом Киев принял закон о свободной экономической зоне в Крыму… нам еще тогда украинские бизнесмены говорили: вы только со своей стороны забор не ставьте, а мы тут дырочку найдем. И точно – закон вышел без экономической части… Летний сезон показал, что при замещении украинских туристов российскими произошел существенный сдвиг в сторону более дорогого сегмента (“Власть”, 09.03.2015). Примечательно, что в данном примере украинский герой не темообразующий, а скорее контекстуальный.

Действительно, российские издании используют стратегию утверждения собственной исключительности, правоты во всем, они используют противоположного героя, чтобы укрепить свою позицию, которая, безусловно и бесспорно, есть самой объективной, гуманной, компетентной. Для них, по сути, противоположный герой, в нашем случае образ украинской нации, играет второстепенною роль, помогающую раскрыть суть своего героя. (…) Главного следственного управления СК РФ по Москве Александра Дрыманова…Летом 2014-го занял пост исполняющего обязанности начальника управления по расследованию преступлений, связанных с применением запрещенных средств и методов ведения войны Следственного комитета РФ. В частности, он занимался делом украинской летчицы Надежды Савченко. (“Власть”, 16.02.2015).

Украинские СМИ используют другую стратегию, которая предусматривает видение противоположного русского героя как субъекта, но в тоже время агрессивного обидчика, который уменьшает шансы развитию собственного героя, последний в свою очередь пытается противостоять этому влиянию и возможно победит. (…) наш военно-промышленный комплекс. Это лакомый кусок, а в некоторых случаях – жизненно необходимый для россиян элемент их безопасности: кораблестроительных заводов, ракетная промышленность… Очевидно, что западные санкции для Москвы – болезненны. За год они могут заставить россиян отступить (“Країна”, 16.12.2014)

Второй важной темой для журнала “Власть” является тема Донбасса, военных действий и всего, что с этим связано в контексте проблем для самой России. Здесь уделяется внимание, например, политической активности Украины на международной арене, проблемам социализации российских «добровольцев», вернувшихся из Донбасса, политико-экономическому состояния России и ее активности в этом направлении. (…) Однако наступление украинских военных, которым, по некоторым данным, была поставлена задача ко Дню независимости Украины, отмечаемому 24 августа, освободить либо Донецк, либо Луганск, именно в эти дни захлебнулось. А непосредственно накануне праздника руководители самопровозглашенных республик заявили о том, что все же переходят в контрнаступление…»иловайский котел» стало синонимом разгрома и больших потерь для украинских военных (“Власть”, 02.03.2015).

Спектр тем в украинских изданиях того же 2015 года значительно шире. Конечно, основной акцент все-таки приходится на военные действия на востоке Украины, событиям в АР Крым. Но внимание уделяется и другим событиям: в культурной сфере, событиям внутри России, историческим экскурсам, русским гражданам, преследующихся русской властью.

Сложный термин «герой» (см. примечание выше) в исследовании распространялся на всех субъектов, фигурирующих в сообщении. Сегодня, фактически сложилась обратная ситуация. Более насыщены противоположными героями украинские материалы. Как уже было сказано выше, украинцев в условиях войны российские СМИ стараются реже упоминать, ведь такое замечание ныне влечет за собой необходимость заметить участие своих в войне в Украине. Наоборот, украинские издания последние годы активизировали свое внимание к русскому герою, утратившему почти все положительные черты, ставшим преимущественно отрицательным.

Социально-демографические характеристики героя, как правило, остаются практически не прописанными. Чаще всего (не в последнюю очередь благодаря грамматике языков) можно зафиксировать половую принадлежность. В изданиях 2015 года “Країна” и “Власть” – пол героев или неопределен, или доминирует мужской. В 2001 году в журналах также практически полностью преобладали мужчины, а все упоминания женщин как противоположных героинь (13%) относились к украинской и русской газетам в соотношении 80:20 соответственно.

Масштаб выделения героя «градуировался» на выдающуюся персону, отдельные группы и сборный образ нации. В результате анализа массива оказалось, что две трети героев соответствуют одной персоне. Большое значение имеет изображение в СМИ выдающихся персон обеих стран, образы которых в большей мере могут определять общее отношение к своей и противоположной нации. Восприятие той или иной персоны как выдающейся, приписывание ее характеру выдающихся черт, отличающих ее от обычных людей – является социокультурным феноменом. В большинстве случаев социальное положение героя не упоминается, но из явных указаний на социальное положение в каждом 3–4 случае – это элита, что ещё раз подкрепляет выводы относительно категории выдающихся персон.

Масштаб распространения оценок противоположного героя в основном созвучен масштабу героя, и в случаях их несовпадения мы наблюдаем преимущественное распространение характеристик выдающейся персоны на нескольких человек (уровень малой массовости). Поскольку эта характеристика непосредственно демонстрирует потенциал репрезентации разных героев, мы делаем хотя и тривиальный, но важный вывод о том, что именно выдающаяся персона обладает большими шансами быть репрезентантом нации.

Имперская культурная политика СССР, а также длительный период сосуществования, когда Россия выступала в роли «старшего брата», а Украина признавалась стратегически важной, но все-таки провинцией, оставил отпечаток в культурном поле обеих стран. Это видно, в частности, по большей насыщенности в 2001г. информационного поля в отношении российских/русских выдающихся персон и по интересу России к некоторым характеристикам украинских выдающихся личностей. Сегодня же в украинских изданиях изменился баланс интереса к выдающимся персонам в пользу своих.

Кроме того, сформированный массив содержит данные не только о центральном/первом герое, но и о втором, третьем и так далее в порядке выделения, если они действуют и оцениваются отдельно. Учитывая это, следует отметить, что больше насыщенностью и разнообразием по признаку противоположного героя отмечаются российские издания за 2001 год (при этом полигеройными в 80% случаев является «политические» статьи).

Так, из обобщения материалов российских изданий гораздо сложнее составить полноценный этнонациональный образ украинца, нежели из обобщения украинских изданий – этнонациональный образ русского/россиянина. Естественно, частично образ украинского героя реконструируется через второстепенные упоминания и контексты. Это возможно даже в нейтральном описании событий, в которых фигурируют украинцы, их действий, а также реакции на них третьих субъектов. И здесь все-таки вырисовываются некоторые качества украинского героя (например, неконфликтность, склонность к миграции и т.д.) (…) 225 тыс. граждан Украины из 250 тыс. обратившихся получили временное убежище в России, заявил глава ФМС Константин Ромодановский. Россия выделила на решение проблемы украинских беженцев 6,5 млрд руб. (“Власть”, 15.12.2014).

Иначе с описанием российских героев в украинских изданиях. Основной характер российского героя можно назвать нейтрально-негативным. Одни авторы стараются придерживаться нейтральной позиции в описании событий и героев, и это отражается на наборе характеристик героев, другие, так сказать, не стесняются в дословном цитировании своих персонажей. Причем даже в случае, когда описываются некие самостоятельно положительные герои (например, Борис Немцов, Андрей Пионтковский), все равно присутствует фоновое контекстуальное противопоставление их другим соотечественникам, а из речи часто извлекаются критические оценки собственной этничности.

Следующим шагом анализа будет рассмотрение «деятельностной ситуации», то есть зафиксированной вербально и оцененной деятельности героя.

В целом в кодировочной шкале исследования в 2002 г. было представлено двенадцать основных видов активностей и пункт, который включал другие виды (в результате, он полностью ассоциировался со спортивной активностью). Поэтому в инструментарий 2016 г. последняя была добавлена к активностям. Измерение активности проводилось по интенсивности, успешности и распространению этих оценок относительно масштаба выделения противоположного героя.

Описания сфер активности противоположной нации отличается в исследованиях 2002 и 2016 годах. В 2001 г. чаще всего противоположный герой проявляется через политическую (на нее ссылаются больше трети сообщений, преимущественно в российских изданиях), трудовую и спортивную активность. В 2015г. модальная (наиболее частая) стала военная активность (высокая и очень высокая), близки к ней политическая, религиозная, экономическая, и другая (прежде всего миграционная активность). Вполне ожидаемо, что военную активность замечает “Країна”, что ещё раз подтверждает выявленные особенности представления противоположного героя. Также украинское издание замечает интеллектуальную активность российского героя. А “Власть” больше акцентирует политико-правовую и миграционную активность в отношению к противоположному герою.

В русском журнале “Власть” активность украинского героя минимальная, за исключением информации о военных событиях на Донбассе, где активность украинской стороны оценивается как неуспешная и низкая. В других случаях активность украинского героя в русском издании было очень сложно определить, так как сам герой появлялся как быстрое упоминание, не несущее самостоятельной информации в отличии от своего героя. Украинский герой появляется только в тех случаях, когда необходимо утвердить позиции русского героя как основного субъекта.

Это далеко не первое замечание неактивности украинского героя свидетельствует об инструментальности его использовании в российских СМИ – он не важен сам по себе, как действующее лицо (что еще больше сужает возможности его понимания), он нужен только для оправдания автостереотипов или интерпретации ситуации с т.з. российской стороны.

Относительно украинского журнала “Країна” спектр активностей русского героя намного шире. Это, конечно, миллитарная деятельность, где русский герой в большинстве случаев наделяется высокой и успешной активностью, но в тоже время подчеркивается ее временный характер. Фиксировались еще активности на уровне известных личностей в сфере науки и культуры, которые или россияне, или имеют русские корни, такие упоминания не несли существенного информационного сообщения, но сам факт что они присутствуют, свидетельствуют о признании известных личностей, не только своей, но и других культур.

Большая часть упоминаний противоположных героев не получила дополнительной оценки ментальных характеристик, в каждом третьем случае выделялась одна, значительно реже больше ментальных характеристик.

В изданиях 2001г. с равной частотой упоминается только о целеустремленности противоположного героя. Все другие ментальные характеристики существенно отличаются. Так, для россиян в украинских изданиях характерны динамичность, везение и талант, обладание силой, в то же время малозначимыми являются весомость и чувственность. Для украинцев в российских изданиях, наоборот, характерны в значительной степени весомость и интеллектуальное развитие, которые отсутствуют у россиян.

В 2015г в обоих изданиях “Власть” и “Країна” оценки ментальных характеристик были преимущественно позитивные. В то же время в “Країне” достаточно часты и негативные оценки. К примеру, наиболее упоминаемые журналом “Країна” ментальная характеристика – склонность к применению силы, оценена в негативном и нейтральном залоге. (…) Это сделало Януковича легкой добычей для опытного российского президента…В части российской элиты – психология оскорбленной или обманутой ребенка. Они также в начале 1990-х хотели быть частью Европы, а их не взяли (“Країна”, 16.12.2014). (…) Из-за климата и исторического опыта украинцам свойственно делать значительные сбережения. Сначала речь шла о еде, со временем – о деньгах. Русские всегда были более склонны тратить их, покупать дорогие вещи, подтверждающие статус. (“Країна”, 03.03.2015).

В анализе материалов 2001 г. фиксировалась небольшая активность российских масс-медиа относительно использования этнических атрибутов и характеристик. По результатам 2016 г. атрибуты этничности появляются преимущественно в Країне (в каждом 2 случае описания героя), меньше Власть – каждом четвертом. Из оценок атрибутов этничности выделяются стремление распространить свою культуру (а именно – мессианство), отношение к территории (а именно – прирастить) и отношение к противоположной нации (враждебное). Эта более непосредственная этническая оценка встречается в 6–12 случаев и все они относятся к публикациям “Країна” (где составляют 16% случаев рассмотрения героев) и получают преимущественно негативную оценку. (…) Киевское начальство не давало крымским частям приказа обороняться. Россияне делали попытки нападения и раньше, например, захватывали маяки. Путин как кедебист пробует – а центральная власть мигает (“Країна”, 23.12.2014). (…) Проще говоря, «украинец – это русский, укушенный поляком»… Если украинская нация все же существовала в веках, выживая под имперским гнетом, проводившим волны русификации и советизации, то являются ли участниками украинской нации русскокультурные русскоязычные люди, живущие в юго-восточных регионах и ориентирующиеся больше на Москву, чем на Киев, пусть и имеющие синие паспорта? (“Власть”, 16.02.2015). Как следует из сказаного выше, тема российской этничности для украинских изданий актуальнее, чем тема украинской этничности в российских. Но эта актуальность в большинстве случаев обусловлена военными действиями на востоке Украины, потребностью «знать врага в лицо», формируется образ врага в лице России и россиян как захватчиков территорий Украины. Следующий пример с издания «Власть” показывает иную тенденцию, атрибуты этничности противоположного героя встречаются редко, но при их упоминании происходит утверждение неполноценности украинской нации в сравнение с великой русской культурой.

Таким образом, можем подвести некоторые итоги. Анализ материалов показал, что украинским и российским печатным изданиям свойственны разные логики изображения противоположного героя: российские используют стратегию утверждения собственной исключительности, где украинский герой появляется как беглое вспоминание с целью раскрыть героя, исполняющего главную роль; украинские издания используют стратегию обоснование действий страны (замер 2001 г.) или ее проблем (2016 г.) через систему взаимоотношений с противоположным героем, который исполняет роль активного субъекта. Российские тексты скорее постулируют» украинского героя «таким как нужно», в то время как российский герой «познается» в тексте через события.

В российских источниках 2015г. спектр событий, связанный с украинцами, заметно уже, чем в украинских, связанных с россиянами. Однако основные контексты, в которых фигурируют этнические маркеры, аналогичны: война в Донецкой и Луганской областях, аннексия Крыма – именно эти темы являются дискурсозадающими. То есть в отличие от 2001 г., когда противоположный герой чаще всего проявлялся через политическую, трудовую и спортивную активность, сейчас модальной стала военная активность, фиксирующаяся как успешная-неуспешная, так высокая-низкая изданиями обеих стран. Российский герой более многообразен украинского, сведение же украинского героя к нескольким темам навязывают российскому читателю всего несколько интерпретаций.

Украинским изданиям характерна высокая частота упоминаний атрибутов этничности, но она обусловлена военными действиями, и в основном выражается как желание прирастить территории; российским изданиям свойственна низкая частота упоминаний атрибутов этничности, но она выражается через сравнение высокой российской и неполноценной украинской культур.

По сравнению с публичным дискурсом русских и украинских печатных средств массовой информации за 2001 год, в 2015 году, хоть и сократился позитив, преобладает нейтральная оценка противоположного героя, что опровергает исследовательскую гипотезу о тотальности негативной оценки. И это притом, что в украинских СМИ в большинстве случаев вспоминается российский герой, когда пишется о напряженных, деструктивных, экстраординарных, зрелищных событиях.

Современная социально-политическая ситуация породила и большую насыщенность противоположными героями украинских материалов. В русских изданиях украинцев же в условиях войны стараются реже упоминать, ведь такое замечание ныне влечет за собой необходимость заметить участие своих в войне в Украине.

Примечательным является отсутствие дополнительной оценочной нагрузки ментальных характеристик противоположного героя, это подтверждается фактом, что в каждом третьем случае выделялась одна, значительно реже больше ментальных характеристик. Они преимущественно позитивные в российских изданиях и с достаточным присутствием негативной оценки в украинских. Русские/россияне в украинских материалах фоново представлены как агрессивные, опасные, недоброжелательные, что, собственно, проистекает из общего дискурса российской агрессии в Украине.

Подобное исследование открывает возможности для изучения целого спектра процессов, связанных с формированием постимперской национальной идентичности и общественного сознания при всем многообразии внутренних и внешних факторов влияния.

Данная методология и метод могут лечь в основу обоснования медийных факторов, формирования этнических, национальных и других идентичностей в современном глобальном мире. Результаты полученного пилотного исследования могут стать основой для разработки тех же тем другими методами социологических исследований. Так, в 2004 году авторы принимали участие в исследовании этногендерных стереотипов и идентичностей, разработанном по сходной методике для случая вербальной коммуникации (метод фокус-групп и глубинных интервью) (Малес, 2006).

Гнит Юлия – в 2013 году получила степень бакалавра социологии в Черновицком национальном университете им. Юрия Федьковича; в 2015 году получила степень магистра социологии со специализации «Современная социологическая теория» в Киевском Национальном университете им. Тараса Шевченко. В настоящее время являюсь аспиранткой в Киевском Национальном университете им. Тараса Шевченко. В сферу научных интересов входит изучение социокультурной идентичности в период общественных изменений.

Людмила Малес – в 1999 году окончила магистратуру социологии в Киевском Национальном университете им. Тараса Шевченко; в 2003 году получила степень доктора философии социологии по специальности «Отраслевые социологии», а в 2013 – степень доктора хабилитованого социологии по специальности «Теория и история социологии». С 1999 года и по сей день преподаю в Киевском Национальном университете им. Тараса Шевченко на факультете социологии. В сферу научных интересов входят социокультурный анализ, проблематика идентичности, гендерный анализ, социально-демографические процессы

Богдан Мотузенко – в 1999 году окончил магистратуру социологии в Киевском Национальном университете им. Тараса Шевченко; в 2004 году получил степень доктора философии социологии по специальности «Отраслевые социологии»; с 1999 года – опыт работы в области рекламы, разработки избирательных кампаний и политического консультирования. С 2002 года преподавал «Социологический анализ документов», в КНУ имени Тараса Шевченко, социологию массовых коммуникаций, качественные методики в социологии в других ВУЗах Украины. с 2004 года – информационное и аналитическое обеспечение корпоративного сектора. Сейчас – основатель исследовательской и консалтинговой компании «Проектное бюро». В круг научных интересов входит: социология коммуникаций, социальное проектирование, медиавистика, методология социального анализа проблематика влияний в социологии, социологические методы анализа документов, качественные методы в социологии.

Рымжа Виктор – социальный аналитик с 2002 года опыт работы в исследовательских структурах и НГО, организации мониторинговых подразделений. С 2005 года, координатор отдела мониторинга СМИ в Фонде Поддержки Прогрессивных Реформ; с 2007 года – начальник мониторинговой службы департамента Аналитического обеспечения консорциума «Индустриальная группа»; с 2003 –проведении социологических исследований в области медиа, анализа текстов, качественных методов, экспертных исследований. Профессиональные интересы сосредоточены на: методиках экспертных опросов, исследованиях протестных настроений и гражданской активности, методиках и технологиях мониторингов общественных процессов, и социального моделирования, социальном прогнозировании.

Фреик Наталия – в 2015 году получила степень магистра по специализации современные социологические теории в Киевском национальном университете имени Тараса Шевченко. В сферу научных интересов входят рефлексивные процессы в социологической теории, проблематика идентичности. На данный момент пишу диссертацию по проблематике рефлексивных процессов в социологии.

Afiliacje:

Гнит Юлия

Кафедра истории и теории социологии

Факультета социологии

Киевский национальный университет имени Тараса Шевченко

Email: ylgnit@gmail.com

Людмила Малес

Кафедра истории и теории социологии

Факультета социологии

Киевский национальный университет имени Тараса Шевченко

Email: lyudmylamales@gmail.com

Богдан Мотузенко

Исследовательская и консалтинговая компания «Project Bureau»

Email: bmotuzenko@gmail.com

Виктор Рымжа

Исследовательская и консалтинговая компания «Project Bureau»

Email: v.rymzha@gmail.com

Наталия Фреик

Кафедра истории и теории социологии

Факультета социологии

Киевский национальный университет имени Тараса Шевченко

Email: freik.natalia@gmail.com

Библиография:

Дондурей Д. (2016). Российская смысловая матрица, Downloaded from: http://www.vedomosti.ru/opinion/articles/2016/06/01/643174-rossiiskaya-smislovaya-matritsa

Магда Є. (2015). Гібридна війна: питання і відповіді, Downloaded from: http://osvita.mediasapiens.ua/trends/1411978127/gibridna_viyna_pitannya_i_vidpovidi/

Малес Л. (2006). Ґендер і етнічність. Україна перед Європейським вибором. ПРООН. Downloaded from: http://www.moippo.mk.ua/attachments/article/317/gender_i_etnichnist.pdf

Пясковская Т. (2016). Как изменилось отношение населения Украины к России и населения России к Украине. Пресс-релиз, Downloaded from: http://kiis.com.ua/?lang=rus&cat=reports&id=608&t=10&page=1

Романенко Ю., Климовский С. (2015). Первая гибридная. Когда Россия начала войну против Украины? Downloaded from: http://hvylya.net/analytics/politics/pervaya-gibridnaya-kogda-rossiya-nachala-voynu-protiv-ukrainyi.html

Konstruowanie tożsamości narodowych przez media: wzajemne, ukraińsko-rosyjskie postrzeganie siebie teraz i 15 lat temu.

Streszczenie:
Staranne badanie wzajemnych, etnicznych percepcji Ukraińców i Rosjan, wydaje się dziś szczególnie aktualne w związku z rozgrywającym się konfliktem wojennym i ideologicznym między dwoma krajami, dotykającym w szczególności zagadnień odnoszących się do etniczności, czy tożsamości narodowej. Niniejszy artykuł zawiera analizę różnych charakterystyk oraz elementów, składających się ze wzajemnych reprezentacji etnicznych Ukraińców i Rosjan, obecnych w prasie drukowanej. Analiza porównawcza tych pojawiających się w rosyjskiej i ukraińskiej publicystyce reprezentacji, oparta na dwóch pomiarach zrealizowanych w ciągu 15 lat, pokazuje, że w mediach rosyjskich widoczna jest ukryta strategia imperialna, w ukraińskich zaś obraz Rosjan-braci zastąpiony został obrazem Rosjan-wrogów. W 2001 roku rosyjskie media często pisały o tym, co dzieje się na Ukrainie. W 2015 zaś – jak pokazuje to zrealizowane przez autorów badanie – istotnie dominuje w nich obraz Ukraińców ukształtowany przez dyskurs imperialny. Co więcej retoryka obecna w rosyjskich mediach pozostaje wroga Ukrainie jako niepodległemu państwu, a sam kraj i jego mieszkańcy dalej traktowani są jako część imperium. Z kolei w mediach ukraińskich daje się zaobserwować wyraźny spadek zainteresowania dawną metropolią. Rosja przestała być w nich prezentowana jako centrum życia politycznego, ekonomicznego oraz kulturalnego.

Słowa kluczowe:
reprezentacje etniczne, obraz wroga, dyskurs imperialny, stosunki ukraińsko-rosyjskie, analiza zawartości.

1 Далее это издание будет сокращенно называться «Власть».

2 Дальнейшее усовершенствование инструментария будет предусматривать исследование разницы формирования персонализированного, коллективного и организационного этнонационального действия в информационном пространстве.

3 Дальнейшее усовершенствование инструментария будет предусматривать исследование разницы формирования персонализированного, коллективного и организационного этнонационального действия в информационном пространстве.

Координата «национальная идентичность» в современной украинской публицистике: дискурсные кластеры

Юлия Вышницкая
Киевский университет имени Бориса Гринченко

Aннотация:

Статья представляет собой фрагмент диссертации о мифосценарииях в современном публицистическом дискурсе. Автор анализирует сценарии противостояния с использованием кластерного анализа. Национальная идентичность рассматривается как одна из доминант публицистического текста и исследуется с помощью мифологических координат «враг», «жертва», «Другой».

Ключевые слова:
Другой, дискурсивный кластер, идентичность, мифологический сценарий, публицистический дискурс.

Введение

Сценарий противостояння реализуется в колониальном/постколониальном, геокультурологическом кластерах публицистического дискурса с помощью мифологических координат Другого, Врага, Жертвы и т.п. Ключевые мифологемы раскрываются сквозь призму концептов памяти/забвения, языка, само – и национальной идентичности. Александр Богомолов и Игорь Семиволос объясняют преимущества дискурсивного анализа тем, что он позволяет отыскать ключевые идеи (концепты, схемы) и ключевые темы, вокруг которых разворачивается общественная дискуссия, и которые по мере накопления складываются в целостное ментальное пространство (Богомолов, Семиволос, 2010a, с. 12).

Опишем дискурсные кластеры сценария противостояння в публицистических текстах журнала «Критика», выделив субфреймы ядерных образов-мифологем оппозитивной модели.

Тема национального и этнического самоопределения систематически поднимается авторами на страницах журнала «Критика».

Кластер геокультурологического дискурса

Определение идентичности посредством «мы – они» стоит, пишут авторы статьи «Falter ego империи: воображаемая цивилизация славянского Крыма» Александр Богомолов и Игорь Семиволос, в центре цивилизационного дискурса. Исследуя крымскотатарскую идентичность, ученые сосредотачиваются на концептах земли (символического утверждения этноса крымских татар, материализованной исторической памяти, «ментального символа групповой идентичности» (Там же, с. 12). Земля становится символической доминантой сценария преступления «детерриториализованной идентичности крымских татар» (Там же, с. 3) и искажения лица Крыма «разрушением символических для этнической идентичности объектов» (Там же, с. 13); крови/родословной (как маркера «своих», гомогенного этничечкого сообщества); языка (как элемента «сферы мирового движения», «инструмента в символическом освоении (возвращении себе) земли» (Там же, с. 13)). Сюжет/концепт/тема преступления, говорят авторы публикации, «представляет наимощнейшую глубинную схему, встроенную в национальное мировосприятие, которая подчиняет себе другие ключевые концепты и является основой для интерпретации современной политической реальности» (Там же, с. 14). Фабула преступления (собственно сценарий преступления) – разрушение крымскотатарской этнической идентичности – имеет прерванную, незаконченную структуру, поскольку «наказание преступника и возмещение жертве» не состоялись, и это постулирует травматическую ситуацию и разрушительную силу длительного, беспрерывного безнаказанного преступления. Правильным завершением сценария преступления является снятие травмы – возвращение домой и «отплата за обесславленное достоинство» (Там же, с. 14). Политологи замечают: отношения между «мы» (русскоговорящим населением Крыма) и «они» (крымскими татарами, украинцами) подаются в публицистическом дискурсе Крыма «не как отношения между этническими группами, которые живут рядом в регионе, а сквозь призму их связи с какой-то сущностью высшего порядка» (Богомолов, Семиволос, 2008, с. 8). «Мы» – российские националисты, – идентифицирует себя выше других, ставит украинцев на «иєрархически низший уровень» (Там же, с. 8). Так, утверждают исследователи, дискурс российских националистов – дискурс «мы», представленный кореферентными номинациями «восточнославянская цивилизация», «восточно-православная цивилизация», «русский мир», «Россия» и т.п. – превращается в «дискурс доминирования» (Там же, с. 8). Понятной в этом контексте является «теория заговора как модель интерпретации политического поведения», которую авторы статьи раскрывают в зеркале реализации позитивного сценария, согласно которому «светлые», «свои», «активные» силы, пребывая в оборонной позиции по отношению к «темным», «чужим», «пассивным» силам (имеется в виду «действующий центр сопротивления» «Русского мира» «радикальному исламу» (в образе крымских татар)), стремятся сберечь определенный status quo. Игровая «исламская карта», по убеждению востоковедов, приобретает ценность в зависимости от того, в чьих руках оказывается – «своих» или «чужих». Она может быть то козырем, то «разменной картой» (Там же, с. 10). Отождествление в крымской пророссийской прессе крымских татар с исламистами смещает межэтнические, межнациональные противостояния в межрелигиозный вектор. Метафора карты выстраивает оппозицию «свой – чужой»: «Интересно сопоставить, – пишут в исследовании “Крымскотатарский газетный дискурс: представления о других” Александр Богомолов и Игорь Семиволос, – образ “козырной карты” – как самооопределения – с метафорой “исламской карты” в крымском российском националистическом дискурсе: общим моментом является обозначение общества как объекта манипулирования, отличительной чертой которого считается скрытая позитивная самооценка (“козырная”, контрастирующая с коннотацией “угрозы” в словоупотреблении “исламская карта”; отличительным является также четко определенный субъект и сфера манипуляции (Украина в “игре” с Россией) на фоне большого, фактически открытого списка (внешние силы, Запад, Украина, Турция) – в российском дискурсе)» (Богомолов, Семиволос, 2010b, с. 19).

В образовательно-научном дискурсе оппозиция своего-чужого эксплицирует идеологически обусловленное противостояние «нашего»/советского «гнилому Западу», «буржуазной науке». Анализируя status quo современной украинской науки и образования, Григорий Грабович в статье, опубликованной в январско-февральском номере «Критики» за 2005 год, «Перед Европой: возможна ли реформа в науке и образовании?», констатирует «имплицитное противопоставление украинского образования и науки внешнему миру», которое в постсоветский, постколониальный период не исчезло, а лишь спряталось, замаскировалось (по большей части, уточняет гарвардский профессор) под «патриотизм») (Грабович, 2005, с. 24). Анализируя контент учебников по истории для средней школы, Вильфрид Йильге красноречиво называет его «соревнованием жертв»: переоценка мифов, связанных с историей, собственно демифологизация определенных исторических явлений – создают векторы другой стереотипизации, подчиненные уже украинскому националистическому образу истории, например: образ «своего» посредством переоценки истории ОУН и УПА, образ-симулякр «Другого» как результат исключения «инаковости» в контексте национальной истории и Холокоста, а также конструирование украинского Холокоста сквозь призму образа жертвы. Иллюстрируя первый вектор, немецкий историк отмечает, что «в целом, учебники структурованы на основе скорее автостереотипа “своего”, нежели гетеростереотипа “другого”» (Їльґе, 2006, с. 15). Украинские национальные стереотипы, смоделированные под углом «соревнования жертв», по мнению автора исследования, выполняют очистительную функцию: очищают «свою» нацию от фальши и лжи «чужого» – советского, однако только воля признать «иного» и, таким образом, «плюрализм культур памяти» скорректирует правдивый образ истории (Там же, с. 17).

Как одну из парадоксальных черт большинства национальных культур рассматривает историк Вадим Ададулов создание своего на обломках чужого. Автор статьи «Чужие среди своего», говоря о «польских шляхетских поместьях» (Ададуров, 2010, с. 27) – замках, дворцах, крепостях и пр., – с печалью констатирует: «Каждая ли культура, чтобы придать камням своей идентичности, обязана сначала выковырять их из стен чужаков, которые когда-то господствовали на ее современной территории?» (Там же, с. 26). Эссеист отмечает еще более радикальный сценарий национального самоутверждения: уничтожение чужого на своей территории: «его <украинского общества – Ю. В.> причастность к этим <инокультурным – Ю. В.> объектам в большей степени сказывалась в осадах и попытках уничтожить символы “чужого” на землях, которые она считала своими» (Там же, с. 27). Историк резюмирует: для утверждения полиэтнического и мультикультурного государства, а также создания собственной национальной идентичности (которую «мы творим сами, в своем сознании, организовывая систему граничних обозначений так, что “своё”, если не хает, то умалчивает “чужое”, если только оно не является фоном, на котором выгоднее подчеркнуть уникальность нашего собственного “я”» [Там же, с. 27]) важно пропагандировать и поддерживать одновременное существование «своего» и «чужого» (Там же, с. 27). О подобном формировании модерных идентичностей как «пространства взаимных травм, обид и все большего непонимания» (Стриєк, 2010, с. 27) идет речь в статье – рефлексии на монографию Дануты Сосновской «Иная Галичина». Томаш Стрыек пропускает смысловые интенции книги через развернутую метафору-лейтмотив прикосновения: образы озера, ладоней и др.), которая является ключевой в украинско-польско-чешских взаимоотношениях в 19 веке. Томаш Стрыек раскрывает «реконцептуализированное» понятие идентичности, которое автор книги о другой Галичине заменяет «понятием идентичностного процесса» (Там же, с. 30), в свете чего «идентификация является не только выбором, но и взаимоотношениями между личностью и другим, своеобразной игрой двух сторон, в которой стабилизация недостижима» (Там же, с. 30).

Колониальный/постколониальный кластер

Виталий Нахманович в статье – реплике на концептуальные подходы историков (например, Снайдера, Химки, Когута) относительно украинского националистического движения настаивает на постколониальном заимствовании Украиной пантеона врагов (а статья вышла в сентябрьско-октябрьском номере «Критики» за 2010 год): Мазепы, Петлюры, Бандеры. Позаимствовав, говорит исследователь, мы «не желаем добавлять к нему <пантеону врагов – Ю. В.> ни одной новой фигуры, чтоб, упаси Господи, не выйти из удобной (глубоко советской на самом деле) парадигмы: было черное – стало белым» (Нахманович, 2010, с. 10). В координате не-памяти сталкиваются две концептуальные точки: враг и жертва. Последняя актуализируется в экзистенциональной плоскости выбора: память/воспоминание/напоминание прямопропорциональны пережитому жертвами и вере в свидетельства жертв, которые раскрывали «невероятный характер и неправдоподобный масштаб советских преступлений» (Толчик, 2010, с. 10). Однако, отмечает Дарюш Толчик, «масштаб злодеяний советских коммунистов вышел за любые рамки вероятности <…>» (Там же, с. 12). Поэтому нелегко было поверить в самые преступления. Автор ессе делает вывод относительно последствий непризнания зла или закрывания глаз на тоталитарное советское зло: его «сооружение» (олицетворнением чего, напоминает историк, является «Аврора») стоит, точнее, «все еще стоят ее руины, часто заслоняя и нарушая панораму двадцатого столетия. Нужно что-то с этим делать. Особенно потому, что в России уже начали видеть в них ностальгическую красоту. И уже превращают их в театральные декорации. А на Западе тоже хватает любителей эффектных спектаклей и живописних руин» (Там же, с. 14).

Антитеза «своих» и «врагов» появляется в польском политическом контексте в статье Марцина Куля «”Солидарность” как модель демократии», где «неудовлетворенным людям»-полякам противопоставляются «притеснители – враги Польши» (Кульа, 2010, с. 8). Неожиданной для традиционного разделения бинарности «свой – чужой» является сконцентрована семантика двуликости лидера польской «Солидарности» Леха Валенсы, о котором говорится в статье Иренеуша Кшеминского «Валенса и польская традиция»: «Леха Валенсу как символ и свого рода репрезентант возрожденной после коммунизма Польши для всего мира часть поляков ненавидит больше, чем ненавистного “чужого”» (Кшемінський, 2010, с. 9). Другой польский социолог Павел Спевак раскрывает в «Идеологических спорах и разговорах о памяти» тезис об особенностях оппозиции «свой – чужой»: её сущность можно «описать в масштабе своё – универсальное / европейское» (Спевак, 2010, с. 12). Профессор Варшавского университета отмечает, что «перспектива “мы” и “они” сохраняется, независимо от декларирования представителей всех наций», даже если это касается проблемы жертв Холокоста. Рассматривая мифы на тему Холокоста, автор статьи обращается к очерку Здислава Краснодембского «Возобновление памяти», в котором тот «разделяет оправданное для многих поляков убеждение, что “их” история и “их” жертвы не могут затмить “наши” жертвы <…>, оправдывая мимолетно перспективу соперничества между жертвами и избегая при этом проблем исключительности немецкого преступления против евреев» (Там же, с. 16). Проблема разъединения, которая усиливает пропасть между “мы” и “они”, поднята в статье Мирослава Мариновича «Польша и Украина после медового месяца» сквозь мифологическую призму: миф о Сизифе, суть которого в проекции польско-украинских отношений и состоит в том, что «каждая достигнутая духовная вершина словно предрекает, что следующее движение будет означать новое снижение духа» (Маринович, 2010, с. 28). Увеличение противоречий между государствами относительно исторической памяти, по мнению публициста, влечет более быстрое падение камня Сизифа вниз. «В этой ситуации, – предлагает свой рецепт писатель, – каждый осторожный голос становится благодатным деревом, которое пускай даже и не остановит камень, но сможет удержать его падение» (Маринович, 2006, с. 29). По Владимиру Фадееву, коллективная (национальная) историческая память – это «референтная рамка и ориентир социальной группы» (Фадеев, 2004, с. 24). В статье «Украинские интеллектуалы: в режиме вытеснения» философ останавливается на механизмах «кадровки коллективной памяти», а также на «трех ценностно-смысловых перспективах в толковании украинской идентичности» (Там же, с. 25).

Боґуслав Бакула в эссе «Невыносимая легкость бремени» в контексте выхода польской культуры «из состояния аутизма, к которому ее привели коммунистические репрессии» (Бакула, 2010, с. 36) отмечает, что «вражеские миры автохтонов и переселенцев взаимопроникали и рождался особенный палимпсест <…>» (Там же, с. 36). Однако, замечает литературовед, иногда такое «созвучие своего и чужого» было очень драматичным (Там же, с. 36). Профессор университета имени Адама Мицкевича в Познани говорит о палимпсестном соединении, наслоении своего и чужого, что, в конце концов, выстраивает определенное «мультикультурное пространство воспоминаний» (Там же, с. 37). Подобное наблюдаем, говорит исследователь, в произведении Павла Гиле «Мерседес Бенц»: «Миры, которые до сих пор казались друг другу чужими и непримиримыми, в романе становятся литературным и идейным единством» (Там же, с. 37). В этом контексте автор эссе объясняет природу пограничья: его нельзя ни в коем случае воспринимать как «буферную зону, пространство внешнего контекста» – пограничье является «чем-то на подобие внутреннего явления, своеобразной формой граничной ситуации, которая может появиться всюду» (Там же, с. 37).

На поле битвы за коллективную память разворачивается «война мифов» о Второй мировой войне: советский – о Великой Отечественной и украинский национальный – о борьбе за свободу и независимость во главе с ОУН-УПА. В контексте состязания – мифологического поединка – проектируется вопрос, озвученный Александром Зайцевым, – «имеет ли право считать себя нацией общество, которое культивирует взаємоисключающие исторические мифы?» (Зайцев, 2010, с. 16). Так, в советском мифе о Великой Отечественной войне мифосценарий противостояния реализуется в традиционной мифопарадигме противоборства добра со злом, где олицетворением первого является СССР, а воплощением абсолютного зла – фашизм (Там же, с. 16). Проект формирования исторической памяти в Украине потерпел поражение, говорит автор статьи в мартовско-апрельском номере «Критики» за 2010 год, потому что в нем соединяются «принципиально несовместимые мифы» (Там же, с. 17). Выход из такой ситуации историк видит в демифологизации, десакрализации, дегероизации, рационализации истории войны, «многовекторном представлении спорных событий и явлений, без умолчаний, приукрашиваний, поспешной героизации одних и демонизации других» (Там же, с. 17).

Еще одно составляющее коллективной памяти – память о Чорнобыльской зоне, о приобретенных в ней носителями этой исторической памяти уникальных знаний, впечатлений, навыков (Мирний, 2010, с. 20). Аномальность этой личностной и коллективной памяти состоит в неосознанности пережитого, а отсюда – усиление психотравмы, связанной с патогенным мифом Чернобыля («опосредованно, – уточняет Сергей Мирный, автор статьи «Чорнобыль как инфо-травма», – через их <чернобыльцев – Ю. В.> социальную стигматизацию и виктимизацию» (Там же, с. 21). Негативный образ Чернобыля выстраивает, считает исследователь, два противоположных типа идентификации: негативный и позитивный.

Всеволод Исаев, исследуя «альтернативы диаспорной идентичности» (одноименная статья в январско-февральском номере «Критики» за 2002 год), отмечает, что частью идентичности в диаспоре стал идеализированный образ независимой Украины, однако столкновение этого образа с реальностью приводит, считает автор публикации, к сдвигу и корректировке идентичности (Ісаїв, 2002, с. 3). Всеволод Исаев видит несколько альтернативных путей идентичности украинской диаспоры: национальная самоидентичность 1) = идеализированная Украина; ≠ Украина сегодня; 2) = Украина реальная; 3) = ассимилированая идентичность: компонент «идентичности общества, в котором живет личность»; 4) нахождение, открытие своей идентичности (Там же, с. 3). Все четыре альтернативы, отмечает исследователь, «перекрещиваются и существуют в комбинациях» (Там же, с. 4). Владимир Диброва в размышлениях о национальной идентичности современной украинской интеллигенции (эссе «Луис и Карлос. Из “Преданий”») подчеркивает отличное от великодержавного имперского российского «укоренения» и поиска «сермяжной правды» движение от земли вверх (Діброва, 2007, с. 33).

Михаил Минаков в статье «Бром и вина» предостерегает от того, что, закрывая глаза на свое прошлое, то есть не признавая своей причастноти к советскому прошлому, нация отрабатывает «механизм самосохранения ростков тоталитарной логики» (Минаков, 2005, с. 13). Вытеснение из памяти прошлого – это лишь «создание иллюзии, что тоталитарное прошлое – на самом деле в прошлом» (выделено автором: Минаков, 2005, с. 13). Философ настаивает на крайне важных для будущего страны контроверзах «между национальной идентичностью и модерной моральностью» (Там же, с. 13) , поскольку «противоречие между реальностью морали и национальной идентичностью в нашей ситуации <…> будет определять украинскую современность и будущее через личностное измерение. Именно здесь происходит борьба проектов. Именно здесь принимаются решения касательно ориентиров поступков» (Там же, с. 14).

Эндрю Вилсон в книге «Украинцы: неожиданная нация» моделирует альтернативные идентичности украинского народа, не использованные по каким-то причинам или не развитые полностью, например, идентичность тех, кто, не присоединившись к украинской национальной традиции, исповедует советскую. Франк Сысин в статье – рецепции монографии отмечает, что автор «прекрасно исследует размытые границы украинской, советской, российской и славянской идентичности в советской Украине в сталинские и послесталинские времена» (Сисин, 2002, с. 20).

Жанна Ковба в рамках дискуссии об этноидентичности спрашивает: «если этническое самоопределение – это осознание своей независимости по отношению к определенному обществу как к чему-то отличному от других сообществ и содержит противопоставление другим сообществам (мы – они, свои – чужие) какое-то представление об основе своей идентичности, то можно ли говорить о наличии украинского этноцентризма?» (Ковба, 2005, с. 19). Исследуя украинско-европейские взаимоотношения времен Второй мировой войны в Галичине (в которых укоренен поиск врага, традиционное противопоставление своих – чужих, города – села, влияния советской / немецкой / польской пропаганды и т.п.), историк пытается понять, «является ли ксенофобия как враждебное отношение к другому, чужому составляющим этнического сознания, идентичности?» (Там же, с. 19): фобия, размышляет Жанна Ковба, связана с «эмоциональным пограничным состоянием оценки чужого, отличного от своего, защитная реакция от чужих ”мы” и “они”» (Там же, с. 19). Толерантность и ксенофобия являются коммуникативными практиками современного мира (разновидностями и антиподами ксенофобии считаются «рассизм, шовинизм, марксизм, интернационализм, юдофильство, антисемитизм» (Там же, с. 19).

Таким образом, в геокультурном кластере мегамифосценарий оппозитивного типа – противостояния «мы – они» (этнично-родового «мы – вы») – реализуется в координате национальной идентичности через 1) мифологический образ земли как экспликатему концепта памяти (материализованная память рода/крови) и семантичекую доминанту микросценария преступления, а также оппозицию «мы – они», которая в крымском пророссийском националистическом дискурсе экстраполирует манипуляционные, идеологические векторы со смещенными центрами противостояния; 2) мифологему Другого (растерянного Иного как объекта раздвоенной цивилизации, варварского Другого как актанта сценария колонизации; Другого-чужака, Другого-гостя – в зеркале постмодернистских риторических стратегий и стереотипов); 3) мифологему врага (эксплицированного «системой», «стихией», «мировым заговором» и пр.; в парадигме ментально травмированной советской системы координат: «мы – они» с метонимическим образом врага – «гнилого Запада/буржуа» (путинская Россия), германо – и польскофобского образа врага (лукашенковская Беларусь), которым противодействует сакрализованный, мифологизованный образ России – воплощение мирового добра); 4) концепт жертвы (сценарий «состязания жертв» как проявление авто – и гетеростереотипизации, как отображение собственной идентичности в Другом). Міфосценарий противостояния характеризуется как продуцированием микросценариев, так и нивелированием, опровержением, снятием оппозиций, отождествлением членов оппозиции с угасанием напряжения между силовыми полями (это свойственно травестийной, постмодерной культуре, в которой реальность и виртуальность, настоящее и симулятивное смещаются, миксируются, смыкаются). Национальная идентичность проектуется микросценариями а) сотворения своего на обломках чужого, б) радикального самоутверждения (уничтожения чужого на своей территории), в) сосуществования своего и чужого как отражения модерных тактик национальной/этнической самоидентификации, коммуникативного практикума «Я – Другой».

В колониальном/постколониальном кластере сценарий противостояния «мы – они» разворачивается посредством 1) образа Иного (Другого) – своеобразного барометра самоидентификации; 2) образа врага (внешнего и внутреннего) как реинкарнация в тоталитарной системе идеологии противостояния «Большого Брата» и «Империи Зла» (вариант «империя свободы» (Запад, Америка) и «империя коммунизма» (Россия, Восточная Европа) как противостояние личностной идентичности деспотизму, регресии, угнетения, как результат стереотипизации и ментального картографирования мира) и культурно-антропологического типа «советского человека» как реализация – через концепт власти – мифосценариев доминирования и освобождения от давления, как проигрывание «кремлевской матрицы» продуцирования врагов). Такие коммуникативные практики, как ксенофобия (Другой = враг) и толерантность (Другой ≠ враг) являются компонентами национальной/этнической идентичности; 3) концепта памяти/забвения/принудительной амнезии (в которых сталкиваются оппозитивные образы врага и жертвы, аксиологические и онтологические факторы верификации сценария преступления / вины; память антропологизируется через образы иных/других/отличных; сценарий вины как наглядная, вербализированная демифологизация; патогенный миф о Чернобыле как неосознанная усиленная психотравма и проектирование позитивного и негативного типов идентификации; Голодомор как фактор этнической самоидентификации украинцев, как экспликация сценария искупления, как проявление осознанной амнезии и манипулирование в парадигме советской/тоталитарной/имперской подмены понятий; 4) концепта экзистенционального выбора: уподобиться «им» или остаться собой; 5) образа жертвы (в парадигме комплементарного заимствованного мифа о Сизифе: увеличение межгосударственных противоречий относительно исторической памяти равносильно более резкому падению вниз Сизифового камня; в утопическом дискурсе с обязательным членом «Другой» (непременно несчастный, тот, который нуждается в помощи); 6) понятия палимпсеста (накладывания, наслоения своего и чужого как проекция мультикультурного пространства памяти); 7) мифосценария поединка добра и зла в «войне мифов» о Второй мировой и Великой Отечественной войне (выход – в дегероизации, демифологизации, десакрализации и многовекторности осмысления истории); 8) идеализированного образа Украины (в контексте комбинированной, перекрестной диаспорной идентичности: идеализированной, реальной, ассимилированной, открытой); 11) концепта идентичности: личностной, национальной, этнической; перевернутая языковая самоидентификация, псевдоидентификация – осознание своей национальной идентичности через чужой язык; 12) концепта языка (двуязычие как экспликация отношений между старшим и млдшим братами сквозь призму великодержавного и дискриминированного языка.

Юлия Вышницкая – кандидат филологических наук, доцент, доцент кафедры мировой литературы Института филологии Киевского университета имени Бориса Гринченко. Закончила филологический факультет Киевского национального университета имени Тараса Шевченко (1996 год) и аспирантуру Института языковедения им. А. Потебни НАН Украины. Кандидатскую диссертацию на тему «Мифологемы Александра Блока в русском этнокультурном пространстве» защитила в 2003 году. С 2013 г. – докторант Киевского университета имени Бориса Гринченко. Тема докторской – «Мифологические сценарии в современном художественном и публицистическом дискурсах».

Afiliacja:

Юлия Вышницкая

Кафедра мировой литературы

Институт филологии

Киевский университет имени Бориса Гринченко

Email: julia_vishnya@ukr.net

Литература:

Ададуров, В. (210). Чужі серед свого / Вадим Ададуров // Критика: часопис. Рецензії, есеї, огляди. – Рік XI, число 11–12 (157–158), листопад-грудень 2010. – К. : ЗАТ «ВІПОЛ» – 48 с. – С. 26–27.

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Koordytana „tożsamości narodowej” we współczesnej publicystyce ukraińskiej: klastry dyskursywne

Streszczenie:

Artykuł stanowi fragment pracy doktorskiej na temat skryptów mitologicznych we współczesnym dyskursie publicystycznym. Autorka bada przeciwstawne sobie skrypty, używając do tego analizy klastrów. Tożsamość narodową rozpatruje jako jedną z koordynat tekstu publicystycznego, składającą się z dialektycznych (dominujących – opozycyjnych) obrazów, tj. „wróg”, „ofiara”, „Inny”.

Słowa kluczowe:
Inny, tożsamość, klaster dyskursywny, skrypt mitologiczny, dyskurs publicystyczny, dialektyka Swój/Obcy.

Вербализация новой украинской идентичности в блогосфере

Татьяна Монахова
Черноморский национальный университет имени Петра Могилы

Aннотация:

В статье изложены особенности вербализации новой украинской идентичности в блогосфере, рассматриваемые с точки зрения концепции стратегий текстообразования. Исследуется функционирование народнической, модернистской и постмодернистской стратегий текстообразования украинского сегмента социальных сетей и авторских блогов. Новейший Интернет-дискурс представлен тактиками народнической стратегии текстообразования, включающими в себя модернистские и постмодернистские маркеры.

Ключевые слова:
идентичность, народническая стратегия текстообразования, модернистская стратегия текстообразования, постмодернистская стратегия текстообразования.

Украинская блогосфера последних трёх лет отражает все политические, культурные и ментальные перемены, произошедшие с украинским обществом после событий на Майдане Независимости 2013 – 2014 гг. Общественные настроения, страхи, оптимистические ожидания, отношение к геополитическим соседям и оппонентам, равно как и национальные рефлексии, заполняют социальные сети и личные блоги пользователей.

Вслед за Еленой Матузковой, определяем понятие идентичность как сложный и многогранный феномен, интегрирующий в единое целое культурный, ментальный, социальный, коммуникативный и языковой аспекты. Все её многочисленные и сегодня уже трудно охватываемые определения так или иначе сходятся на том, что идентичность индивида либо группы создаётся обществом, в котором они проживают, культурой, к которой они принадлежат, языком, которым они пользуются во время своей познавательной, общественно-производственной и коммуникативной деятельности (Матузкова, 2014, с. 2).

Постулируя утверждение о том, что в современном украинском текстообразовании функционируют, прежде всего, три ключевые стратегии (народническая, модернистская и постмодернистская), анализируем постмайданный Интернет-дискурс в контексте концепции стратегий текстообразования (Монахова, 2015). Термины народничество, модернизм и постмодернизм были ретерминологизированы в лингвистику из литературоведения, в частности, наша авторская концепция опирается на исследование Соломии Павличко Дискурс модернизма в украинской литературе (Павличко, 1999) и вписывает вышеуказанные понятия в научную парадигму языкознания.

Понимая стратегию текстообразования как явление одновременно экстра – и интралингвистическое, то есть как способ организации сообщений, зависящий от культурно-ментальных установок и интенций говорящего, имеющий чёткий план выражения, представленный определёнными тактиками и приёмами образования текста, обусловленный законами развития языка, отображающий сознательное отношение говорящего к положению, статусу и эволюции украинского языка, традиционной украинской концептосферы, языковых и культурных табу, как способ позиционирования себя, внешнюю самопрезентацию через язык, показатель включенности говорящего в социально-культурный и политический контексты либо его отчуждение от них, − определяем ключевые тактики каждой из трёх стратегий текстообразования таким образом:

- ▶ народническая стратегия текстообразования характеризуется украиноцентричностью, выражающейся в реанимации исконно украинской лексики, отстаивании традиционных языковых стандартов, закрытостью к заимствованиям и интерференции, развитием концептосферы «Украина – язык – патриотизм», отличается языковым пуризмом и постколониальным комплексом;

- ▶ модернистская стратегия текстообразования определяется большим количеством заимствованной лексики, детабуированием темы телесности и введением в актив языка грубой и ругательной лексики, европоцентричностью – увеличением количества лексем, обозначающих явления и процессы, связанные с Европой; основной интенцией адресантов-модернистов является стремление к языковому авангарду и включению украинского языка в мировые тенденции;

- ▶ постмодернистская стратегия текстообразования основывается, прежде всего, на принципе языковой игры, прибегает к вербальному эпатажу и грубости, использует некодифицированные формы украинского языка со стилистической целью, развивает новые форматы функционирования государственного языка и Интернета-дискурса.

Если рассматривать эволюцию стратегий текстообразования в языке, то хронологически первой является народническая, за ней появляется модернистская, а постмодернистская стратегия текстообразования замыкает эту диахроническую цепь.

В постмайданном украинском Интернет-дискурсе, в частности в украинской блогосфере и украинском сегменте социальных сетей, наблюдаем, напротив, парадоксальное движение от постмодернистской стратегии текстообразования образца 2012 года (Рис. 1), характеризующейся специфической иронией по отношению к сакральным украинским культурным кодам, некоторой эпатажностью и низвержением культурно-моральных авторитетов и традиций, к абсолютно народническим постам, превалирующим в Интернет-дискурсе последние три года.

Так, новая украинская идентичность оформляется, исходя из стремления к созданию сильной и независимой нации. Наблюдается всплеск народнических эпитетов, употребляемых со словом країна (страна): велика, вільна, добродушна, єдина, красива, мила, могутня, наша, непереможна, прекрасна, рідна, свята, сильна, славна, чесна, чудова, щедра и под.

Синонимический ряд образуют названия внутри концепта УКРАИНА: Батьківщина, Вітчизна, рідний край, волі й сонця святая земля, квітучий край на берегах Дніпра, колиска наша, матір, найкраща країна світу, ненька, рідна земля и под. Классичность подобных определений и клише возвращает современные Интернет-тексты к исконным, иногда почти фольклорным, речевым традициям.

Народнические самоопределения к существительному українці (народ): вірні сини, відважний, вільні, гідний, єдиний, завзятий, захисники-переможці, мудрі, незламний, патріоти землі, сильні, талановиті так же, как и народнические определения к понятию мова (благородна, магічна, прекрасна, рідна, страждальна, солов’їна, чарівна и под.), отражают довольно высокий уровень национальной самооценки. При этом, национальная самоирония – маркер постмодернистской стратегии текстообразования – также реализуется в украинском Интернет-пространстве последних трёх лет (Рис. 2).

Народничество на лексико-грамматическом уровне проявляется в вербализации национальной консолидации посредством местоимений «мы», «наш» и т. д., напр.: нам не байдужа доля держави; нам буде важко! ми всі це знаєм, бо ми є сила; нас дуже багато; ми ніколи не станем на коліна; ми сильні, мудрі, талановиті люди; життя положим ми; ми воюємо, і будуть в мирі жити наші діти; волю ми любим, ми ж покажем свій характер й землю не загубим; нас морили голодом, та це, не тільки не поставило нас на коліна, це підняло визвольний рух; поки ми єдині, поки ми разом; ми не здамось; нас не зламають сили злі! и под.

Местоимения ти, ви используются для обращений к стране, народу, имеющих форму обобщений, и вербализируют классический народнический пафос, создавая колорит торжественности и сакральности: Україно, Ти належиш мені!; Ти живеш на рідній землі; Ви не здали землі святої, свій рідний, батьківський поріг и проч.

Обширное употребление обращений в адрес абстрактных адресатов – Родины, соотечественников, незнакомых людей в социальных сетях – также указывает на развитие народнической стратегии текстообразования: вставай, Країно! Прокиньтесь, люди!; вставай, країно рідная; станем, бряття, в бій кривавий; на добраніч, народ мій завзятий; низький уклін, брати-герої; свято вірте, українці; солдате український, я за тебе щодня благаю Бога. Не менее распространёнными являются вокативы, обращённые к Богу, Богородице, святым, употребляемые в текстах формата молитвы, благодарности Всевышнему, напр.: Ми знов себе заповажали, слава Богу; Господи, дай сили моєму народу, Боже, збережи Україну!; Молюся я за тебе й за мир, який настане завтра; …помоліться на небі за нас; Дуже прошу тебе, Боже; хай теплом усіх Божая мати обдарує із щедрих долонь; А Бога Матері Покрова хай вбереже від ворогів; Ми з Богом в серці будемо стоять!; Богородице, захисти Україну! и под.

Амбициозность и оптимизм патриотического Интернет-дискурса проявляются в употреблении форм степеней сравнения прилагательных и наречий в сочетании с личными местоимениями первого лица: ми можем більше; ми краще знаємо; адже сильніші ми за всіх и т. д.

Апогей патриотического чувства находит свое отображение в восклицательных предложениях, которыми изобилуют народнические тексты в сети Интернет: Україно, Ти належиш мені!; І буде жити вільна Україна!; Слава Україні, та її синам!; Вічна Слава!; Україна єдина! Ми одна родина!; Тут Україна!; Україна понад усе!; Все здолаєм! Переможем! и т. д.

Одной из синтаксических особенностей народнического Интернет-дискурса является употребление предложений типа N – (cop) N; Pron – (cop) N; N – (cop) Adj, с помощью которых вербализируется региональная идентичность пишущего (Маріуполь – це Україна; Знає навіть Антарктида, що Луганськ – це Україна!; Я Українка; Крим – це Україна; Ми – українці!), а также национально-политическая идентичность: Україна – укропів земля; Україна єдина! Ми одна родина!; Українець – це стан душі; Ми нація захисників-переможців; Я – патріот!; Україна – земля неймовірних людей!; Я – Кіборг; Україна – це ми! и т. д.

Модернистская стратегия текстообразования, реализующаяся в сложном синтаксисе, обилии заимствованных лексем, чаще всего англицизмов, в критическом отношении к происходящему в стране и вокруг неё, функционирует в блогосфере преимущественно как совокупность числа идиолектов адресантов-модернистов, авторов, для которых модернистский способ организации текстов является непосредственным идиостилистическим условием (Рис. 3).

Носители модернистской стратегии текстообразования зачастую делают записи не только на украинском, но и на английском языках, тем самым сознательно развивая в Сети европейский вектор украинских устремлений. Нередко происходит дублирование на английский язык сообщений, написанных на государственном языке. Так, Президент Украины Петр Порошенко и другие представители украинского политикума на своих страницах в Facebook публикуют подобные «двойные» статусы и посты. Выбор языкового кода говорящими, позиционирующими себя как украинские патриоты, − тема для отдельного исследования. Значительная часть личных страниц в Facebook, Twitter и т. д. ведётся на русском языке, который порою даже противоречит самому наполнению контента: пользователи отстаивают проукраинскую, патриотическую или даже националистическую гражданскую позицию, при этом используют русский язык вместо государственного.

Постмодернистская стратегия текстообразования обширно представлена в блогах и обсуждениях своими тактиками употребления ненормативной лексики, выражающей крайне негативную оценку предмета беседы говорящим: Путін, звичайно, Х…Ло. А коли почнемо змінювати Україну?; Невже ми дійсно те нікчемне бидло, спроможне тільки колупатися в землі? Чи жерти сало з горілякою до здуру?; Слава Нації – пиздець Російській Федерації!; Якби не ці чоловіки та хлопчаки, ми б були зараз в рабстві хуйла и т. д. Бранная лексика, описывающая отношение говорящего к украино-российской ситуации последних трёх лет и лично к президенту РФ, перестала восприниматься как частный эпатаж, вышла за пределы отдельных случаев употребления и распространилась на всё диглоссийное поле, включая дипломатические высказывания конкретных политиков.

Постмодернистские тексты в украиноязычном сегменте Интернета отличаются высокой степенью иронии, наличием стёба, употреблением русско-украинского суржика как средства создания всего вышеперечисленного. Напр., запись в Facebook на странице Михайла Бриниха, известного украинского писателя и общественного деятеля, от 13 марта 2016 г.: «Київ, на районі, парк партизанської слави. Палатка з бухлом (вже згортається). В асортименті – пивна дрянь і загадкова бутилка вина торгової марки “Кошер”. У палатці тусується рій веселих продавчинь. Питаю женщин, шо за вино, бо назва наравицця, але ніколи такого не бачив. Одна з них – знудьговано, як чайка, – відповіда: – Хароше вино, нам спеціально з Криму возять. Я питаюсь воспітать женщину, мовляв, зачєм тада ви це продаєте, як не стидно. На шо продавчиня, подивившись на мене уставшими й виповненими гідності очима, відповідає:

– Крим – це Україна».

В приведённом примере, невзирая на использованные постмодернистские тактики, реализуется совершенно народническая интенция пишущего, которая вписывает данный текст в общий патриотический украинский Интернет-дискурс.

Отдельный вектор изучения реализаций стратегий текстообразования в украинском сегменте Интернета могут представлять исследования, посвященные вербализации оценочных суждений. Аксиология, лингвистическое осмысление философской категории «оценка», чаще происходит в одном из двух направлений: прагмастилистическая ориентация оценочных структур в художественных текстах либо типология языковых средств реализации оценки.

Мы же попробуем рассмотреть аксиологический инструментарий согласно функционированию в украинском языке народничества, модернизма и постмодернизма.

Народническая аксиология характеризуется традиционной шкалой ценностей, в основе которой лежат ключевые для украинского этноса концепты – УКРАИНА, УКРАИНСКИЙ ЯЗЫК, ВОЛЯ и т. д. Обладатели народнической ментальности даже в Интернет-общении в момент раздражения не позволяют себе опускаться до инвективов и оскорблений собеседника. Как позитивные, так и негативные оценки народников характеризуются определенной степенью фольклорности и традиционности. Употребление классических метафор и эпитетов, языковых клише, стремление к поддержанию языковых стандартов – всё это свидетельствует о действии народнической стратегии текстообразования.

Приведём пример отрицательной народнической оценки, высказанной в комментариях к статусу в Facebook: «Всі мовні проблеми − влада і чиновники на місцях чхали і чхають на українську державну мову. І чинуші в адміністрації президента, Верховній Зраді, Кабміні теж спілкуються російською за винятком одиниць. Бардак в державі − бардак у головах, а значить і у мові» (пунктуация и орфография сохранены). Как видим, лексемы «чинуші» и «бардак» вполне традиционны, фразеологическая единица «чхати на…» также имеет долгую историю пребывания в активе украинского языка. Досада пользователя социальной сети словесно оформлена вполне цензурными выражениями.

Народническая ирония строится на классических тропах и стилистических принципах. Например, заголовок публикации в Интернет-издании с последующим репостом и обсуждением в Facebook «Важко розмовляти з людьми, для яких Бандерас, Бендер і Бандера – одна й та сама особа…» основывается на игре с паронимами, опирается на классическую трисоставную ритмизацию прозаического высказывания.

Определяющее для языкового народничества негативное отношение к злоупотреблению заимствованной лексики находит в социальных сетях и прикладное значение – пользователи задают практические вопросы об условиях эффективной коммуникации, например: «Друзі. Як краще написати на афіші, яка має розповсюджуватися у великих і малих містах Сходу України: воркшоп, майстерня чи практичний семінар? (Скільки відсотків людей знають слово «воркшоп»?)». В ответ на этот вопросительный статус в Facebook читаем комментарии: «А слово «майстер» споконвічно українське! :) Від нас його німці й запозичили»; «Якщо хочете писати українською, то слово «воркшоп» не підійде»; «Пишіть українською, без запозичених слів, що мені, наприклад, просто муляють вухо» и т. д. Как видим, единомышленники-народники объединяются в своём стремлении бороться за чистоту украинского языка на современном этапе его развития.

Создание колоритных и весёлых народнических оценок также основывается на традиционных средствах комического, пример из комментариев в Facebook: «Господе вишній, чи я в тебе лишній? Чи горілку не п»ю, чи я жінки не б»ю, чи я коршму минаю, що я щастя не маю? Так молився мій прадід, як із шинку готовий приходив» (пунктуация и орфография сохранены). Фольклорность, ритмизация, коломыйковость прибауток создают народнический окрас высказывания.

Модернистские оценки всегда оснащены большим количеством реминисценций и аллюзий, поскольку принцип интертекстуальности лежит в основе модернизма как такового. На лексическом уровне модернистские тексты оформлены с помощью заимствований и калек; на орфографическом – соблюдения норм старых вариантов правописания (в украинистике до сих пор продолжается правописная дискуссия, и модернисты отстаивают возвращение к нормам 1930-х годов). Так, пост Оксаны Забужко в сети Facebook наглядно иллюстрирует модернистскую стратегию текстообразования в аксиологической системе: «КАРАБАХ 2.0. «Доба секонд-хенд», як точно обізвала її Світлана Алексієвич, – це не тільки коли дожовуються запліснявілі ідеї третьої свіжости, а ще й розконсервовуються поржавілі бомби, закладені покоління тому…

У 1988 р., коли Москва грала «за Баку» й Ґорбачов починав гарячково стуляти імперію докупи танками й каральними загонами, це все вражало ще «по живому» – підлість і цинізм Кремля, його гендлювання («шинкування», за ТГШ!) людською кров’ю, горе простих людей, що мусили втікати з рідних осель у чім стояли, – і мені писалось таке:

Ах, Карабах!..

Звук – кинджалом вихопивсь,

Брязком об ребра – і охнуло в тілі…

Якого треба сплатити викупу,

Щоб чистим зостатись в брудному ділі?..

Так мустанґери коней укоськують:

За першим разом – звір іще дибиться,

За другим – ногами, наче по ковзькому,

Пряде і, басуючи, чорно дивиться,

За третім – йде клусом…

Та втретє, і внадцяте

Зблиском білка синювато-придимленим

Спахає Вірменія – загнуздана нація,

Що все іще гідна свойого імені».

Совмещение прозы и стихов, старых и новых орфографических норм, собственно украинской и заимствованной лексики, эмоциональных оценок, ярких семантических коннотаций вместе с чёткой патриотической интенцией – именно так выглядит типичный модернистский статус в социальной сети.

Другие примеры модернистских оценочных высказываний: «да-да, «мова – душа народу» – гасло всіх часів. Вічноживий радянський пафос, постійне систематичне його вживання «к мєсту і нє совсєм», шкодить не менше, ніж невживання української»; «у вас не лише декомунізація вулиць, а й земля під ногами (у прямому розумінні цього слова) валиться, бо багато парашні там скупчилося. Очищуйтеся швидше − вся Україна вам допоможе!» и т. д. Модернистские высказывания являются промежуточными, сочетающими как народнический пафос и патриотические интенции, так и постмодернистские способы создания иронии – грубую лексику, лексическое калькирование, суржиковые элементы и т. д.

Постмодернистские оценки часто отличаются эпатажностью, отсутствием табу, саркастичностью и реализацией языковой игры. Например, позитивная оценка: «Ілларіон Павлюк покалічив мене цим відкриттям: я переслухав все, що є від цих пацанів на тубі, вони геніальні» − это заголовок к музыкальной ссылке в Facebook, которая приятно впечатлила пользователя. Медицинские и околомедицинские термины («покалічила»), употребление жаргонных слов («пацани»), небрежность в употреблении имён собственных («ютуб») – всё это определяет постмодернистский характер оценки. Постмодернистская стратегия текстообразования наиболее широко использует терминологию не в научно-отраслевых контекстах. Медицинские, компьютерные, филологические, культурологические и проч. термины употребляются для создания оценочных высказываний, для выражения отрицательного или положительного отношения говорящего к предмету разговора, вербализируют эмоции пишущего.

Короткий статус «Христос Воскрес! Були нині на селі. За фотозвіт про нашестя наше велике данкешон Віталій Стах» содержит ироничный перефраз «нашестя наше», варваризм «данкешон» и выражает позитивную оценку и благодарность автора.

Сочетая в себе все возможные варианты языковой нормы украинского языка, весь спектр лексики (от пассива до актива языка), традиционные стилистические приёмы и новейшие принципы интертекстуальности, Иинтернет-дискурс (шире – медиа-дискурс) отображает не только современную языковую картину украинцев, но и ментальные поиски собственной новой идентичности, вписанной в европейский контекст.

Таким образом, можно сделать вывод о том, что в современной украинской блогосфере превалирует неонародничество как стратегия текстообразования, которое вербализирует новую украинскую идентичность, обогащается модернистскими интенциями и языковыми тактиками постмодернистской иронии (Рис. 4) и воплощает все рефлексии украинцев, их гражданскую и политическую позиции.

Татьяна Монахова, кандидат филологических наук, доцент, заведующая кафедрой журналистики Черноморского национального университета имени Петра Могилы. В 2008 году защитила кандидатскую диссертацию по теме: «Язык Валерия Шевчука: корпус, ключевые концепты, тезаурус» в Институте украинского языка Национальной академии наук Украины. С 2011 – по 2014 являлась докторантом кафедры украинского языка Национального университета «Киево-Могилянская академия». В 2016 году защитила докторскую диссертацию по теме: «Современные стратегии текстообразования в украинском языке» в Одесском национальном университете им. И. И. Мечникова. Круг научных интересов: лингвистика текста, социальные коммуникации, неориторика, когнитивная и коммуникативная лингвистики.

Afiliacja:

Татьяна Монахова

Кафедра журналистики

Черноморский национальный

университет имени Петра Могилы

Email: tvamon@gmail.com

Литература:

Матузкова О. П. (2014). Англійська ідентичність як лінгвокультурний феномен: когнітивно-дискурсивний аспект. Автореферат дисертації. Одеса: Видавництво «Одеський національний університет».

Монахова Т. В. (2015). Народництво, модернізм і постмодернізм у лінгвістиці. Миколаїв: Видавництво ЧДУ ім. П. Могили.

Павличко С. Д. (1999). Дискурс модернізму в українській літературі. Київ: Либідь.

Werbalizacja nowej tożsamości ukraińskiej w blogosferze

Streszczenie:
Artykuł poświęcony jest fenomenom, za pomocą których dokonuje się werbalizacja nowej tożsamości ukraińskiej w blogosferze. Fenomeny te rozpatrywane są przez pryzmat strategii tworzenia tekstu. Przedmiotem badania objęto strategie nacjonalistyczne, modernistyczne i postmodernistyczne, obecne w ukraińskich sieciach społecznościowych i blogach autorskich. W analizowanym przez autorkę dyskursie internetowym dominuje pierwsza z taktyk, wzbogacona elementami strategii modernistycznej oraz postmodernistycznej.

Słowa kluczowe:
tożsamość, nacjonalistyczna strategia tworzenia tekstu, modernistyczna strategia tworzenia tekstu, postmodernistyczna strategia tworzenia tekstu.

Проявление национальной идентичности украинцев посредством актуализации лексики

Ольга Тулузакова
Черноморский государственный университет имени Петра Могилы

Aннотация:

Статья посвящена проблеме определения идентичности украинцев на материале современных текстов. На лексическом уровне языка понятие идентичности можно проследить на основе актуализации лексики. Актуализация – это процесс возвращения лексики с периферии к центру лексической системы. Цель статьи – определить социально-политические изменение в стране, которые способствовали актуализации лексики, а также установить группы актуализированной лексики.

Ключевые слова:
идентичность, актуализация лексики, активная лексика, пассивная лексика, языковая политика, ремарка, лексика западноукраинского узуса.

С утверждением независимости Украины каждый украинец переживает ряд событий, которые оказывают то или иное влияние на мировоззрение человека. В числе таких событий прежде всего необходимо назвать развал Советского Союза, утверждение Независимости Украины, Оранжевую революцию, Майдан, военные действия в зоне АТО (антитеррористической операции). Безусловно, эти масштабные и в большинстве своем трагические события, предопределяют национальную идентичность украинцев. Украинцы уже не безликие граждане огромного многонационального государства – Советский Союз, теперь украинцы – творцы своего государства, своей судьбы.

Национальная идентичность – одна из основных составляющих идентичности человека в период перемен в жизни нации. О национальной идентичности человека можно судить не только по его действиям, но и по речи. Язык – тот определяющий фактор, по которому можно наблюдать изменения в жизни как конкретного человека, так и страны, нации в целом.

Во время активного становления украинской государственности все сферы деятельности человека заполняет речь, которая до недавнего времени была неактуальна. Активнее всего на социально-политические изменения реагирует лексика. Лексический фонд принимает все новые и новые слова, словообразования для того, чтобы соответствовать новым условиям жизни украинцев. Лексические инновации охватывают новообразования, которые возникли на основе украинского языка; заимствования как с близкородственных, так и западноевропейских языков; лексемы, которые претерпевают процессы семантической переориентации; лексические единицы, которые мигрируют в рамках лексической системы от центра и назад (процессы актуализации и пассивизации).

На наш взгляд, именно актуализированная лексика является показателем национальной идентичности украинцев. Актуализированная лексика – это исконная лексика или давние заимствования, которые мигрируют с периферии к центру лексической системы. Актуализация – совершенно закономерное явление, поскольку возрождение общества способствует расширению сферы употребления языка и, соответственно, предопределяет необходимость новых лексических средств, а также переоценки функционально-стилистического статуса уже существующих в языке слов.

Актуализация – прямое следствие той целенаправленной пассивизации, которой подвергалась лексика (равно как и другие уровни языка) при языковой политике 30–80-х гг. ХХ в. Лексика, которая подчеркивала самобытность украинского языка, имела отличное графическое и фонетическое оформление с соответствующими словами русского языка, выводилась из активного употребления. Пассивизация происходила посредством сознательного ограничения употребления определенных слов через ремарки в словарях (устаревшее, диалектное, редко и др.), фиксация в словарях по модели «тоже, что…», отсылая тем самым к «более употребляемому» слову. Такие слова (со стилистическим ограничением в словарях или без него) трактовались как искусственные, ориентированные на польский язык, не присущие речи масс. Пассивизация происходила также под воздействием общей тенденции избегать характерных для украинского языка слов в официальных текстах. Кроме того, в языке тоталитарного общества преобладала письменная форма речи, поскольку она могла обезопасить автора от возможных ошибок сказать «что-то не то», что в условиях тоталитарного общества вполне оправдано.

Причины актуализации лексики состоят прежде всего в социально-политических изменениях в обществе. Демократизация и либерализация общества, переосмысление канонов жизни являются главными причинами актуализации лексики. Украинский язык значительно расширил сферы употребления, активизировалась устная речь. На фоне отмены запретов и ограничений в политической и социальной жизни, происходит активизация определенных речевых жанров, предполагающих спонтанность речи и относительно свободное речевое поведение, как, например, жанры радио – и телеинтервью, разнообразные ток-шоу, телевизионные игры с большим количеством участников.

Вместе с тем происходит перераспределение лексики от нейтральной до просторечия и наоборот – от узкоспециализированной до общеупотребительной. Демократизация общества стала причиной демократизации языковых норм. Также четко прослеживаются пуристические тенденции как стремление устранить последствия политики русификации и обогатить лексический фонд исконными лексическими единицами или давно освоенными заимствованиями.

Эстетические предпочтения, мода на «новые» слова (как причина актуализации) тоже является свидетельством национальной идентичности украинца: люди все активнее употребляют такие слова в речи, а значит, эти слова постепенно войдут в активный запас и перестанут быть «модными», то есть утратят коннотацию и приобретут нейтральную семантику.

Процесс актуализации лексики можно наблюдать как в «живых», неподготовленных текстах, так и в текстах заранее обдуманных и отредактированных. Материалом для анализа могут служить общение в различных Интернет-сообществах, форумах, язык СМИ (показательным в этом плане является телевизионный канал СТБ), тексты книг украинских писателей и проч.

Например, Максим Дудик, исследовавший актуализированную лексику на материале языка СМИ, отмечает, что употребление журналистами актуализированной лексики является признаком зрелого национально-патриотического кредо автора. Неслучайно в СМИ левого направления, а иногда и в некоторых государственных СМИ актуализированная лексика встречается редко (Дудик, 2003, с. 49). Еще в конце 80-х – в начале 90-х гг. ХХ в., по наблюдениям Дудика, актуализированные лексемы в текстах украинских журналистов встречались достаточно редко. Но переосмысление функционального статуса лексики и сознание того, что западноукраинский узус сохранил наибольшее количество лексики, утраченной в советское время, способствует тому, что журналисты все чаще обращаются к актуализированной лексике. Использование актуализированных слов становится признаком «хорошего тона», разговорной эрудиции (Дудик, 2003, с. 49). В числе актуализированной лексики Дудик называет такие единицы: витоки, достойник, затінок, книгозбірня, мапа, наклад, розвій, розпука, чин, шпальта, шпиталь, метикуватий, волати, чимчикувати, достоту и другие.

Все сферы деятельности человека насыщены актуализированной лексикой. Это свидетельствует о том, что украинцы позитивно восприняли утверждение независимости Украины и стараются подчеркнуть свою национальную идентичность, особенности украинского языка.

Подробнее проанализируем актуализированную лексику на материале постмодернистских текстов, поскольку именно постмодернизм, направленный на нивеляцию прошлых ценностей, лучше всего демонстрирует отношение к периоду Советского Союза и к независимой Украине. Для исследования были выбраны тексты Юрия Андруховича, Юрия Издрыка и Юрия Винничука, представителей Западной Украины и, соответственно, носителей западноукраинского языкового узуса: романы Юрия Андруховича «Рекреації» (1992), «Московіада» (1993) та «Перверзія» (1996), «Дванадцять обручів» (2003), «Таємниця» (2007), Юрия Издрыка «Воццек» (1996, 1997), «Подвійний Леон» (2000) и Юрия Винничука «Мальва Ланда» (2000), «Весняні ігри в осінніх садах» (2005). Принимая во внимая временные рамки написания и публикации книг (с 1992 по 2007 гг.), можем отследить актуализацию лексики с развала СССР и в период активного становления Украины как независимого государства.

Необходимость заполнить языковые лакуны, которые образовались в период языковой политики Советского Союза, предусматривает актуализацию как функционально обусловленных групп слов (лексики литературного языка), так и социально обусловленных (диалектной, жаргонной, просторечной лексики).

Актуализация лексики западноукраинского языкового узуса (галлицизмов) наиболее четко отражает стремление украинцев к национальной идентичности, к возможности подчеркнуть свою национальную специфику. Такие слова имеют совершенно отличное и графическое, и фонетическое оформление с соответствующими словами русского языка, что подчеркивает отличие названных языков.

Лексика западноукраинского узуса на сегодня включает в себя три группы слов: 1) слова, которые принадлежали западноукраинскому языково-литературному варианту (был оформлен в конце ХIХ – начале ХХ в. из-за длительного территориального размежевания Украины между двумя государствами – Польши и Австро-Венгрии со стороны Западной Украины и России со стороны Восточной Украины); 2) слова, которые исторически принадлежали восточноукраинскому языково-литературному варианту, но в связи с языковой политикой 30–80-х гг. ХХ в. практически на употреблялись на большей части Украины. Они остались в речи людей западной части Украины, поскольку именно Западная Украина оказывала наибольшее сопротивление языковой политике Советского Союза. Такие слова сейчас воспринимаются как «западные»; 3) диалектизмы.

Необходимо отметить, что большое количество галлицизмов даже не были зафиксированы в наибольшем 12-томном толковом словаре украинского языка. На сегодня же эти слова актуализируются: аграфа (застежка), андрути (вафли), апель (аппеляция), атентат (покушение на жизнь), гумаки (резиновые сапоги), ґуст (вкус, стиль), екзистенція (существование), жовтець (майонез), інвазія (вторжение), канапка, накладанець (бутерброд), колєґа, колєжка (друг, товарищ, приятель), колєжанка, колежанка (подруга, приятельница), лазничка (ванная комната), мальовило, мальовидло (настенные рисунки), маринарка (пиджак), наплічник, наплечник (рюкзак), піґулка (таблетка), прецель (крендель, бублик), таксівка (такси), тертюхи (драники), торба, торбина, торбега, торбеґа (торба, сумка), фіпштик (выскочка), цікавський (слишком любопытный человек), число (количество; номер дома, газеты, журнала), шильда (вивеска), виповісти (сообщить, предупредить), безвислідово (безрезультатно), врозтіч (в разные стороны), ніц, нич (ничего).

Младшее и в некоторых случаях среднее поколение воспринимает актуализированную лексику как языковые инновации, несмотря на то, что такие слова были сохранены в западноукраинском языковом узусе. Такое восприятие галлицизмов является закономерным следствием упрощения лексикона в период внешнего вмешательства в развитие и нормирование украинского языка. Часто в Интернет-форумах во время обсуждения основных тем участники параллельно объясняют значение непонятных слов. Обычно такими словами выступают именно галлицизмы. Темами для дискуссий являются язык СМИ (как устная, так и письменная формы) язык современных украинских писателей, история Украины, в частности западных областей и др.

Зная о том, что значение некоторых галлицизмов может быть не ясно потенциальному читателю, авторы прибегают к комментариям, проявляя тем самым некую социальная солидарность. Например: Не проси всього і не проси нічого. Крім вищевказаного. Пам’ятай, що війна триває все. (Галицизм. Означає – „завжди”, „постійно”) (Издрык, 2002, с. 66).

Актуализация слов, характерных для устной речи объясняется тем, что в Советском Союзе украинский чаще всего использовали в письменной речи, заранее подготовленной. Это был не просто вынужденный шаг, а стиль жизни. Вспомним, к примеру, многочисленные анекдоты советского времени про Генерального Секретаря ЦК КПСС Леонида Брежнева с его бесконечными текстами, которые он с трудом произносил. Сегодня же основное внимание в постмодернистских текстах сосредоточено именно на устной речи.

В числе функционально обусловленной лексики прежде всего необходимо назвать стилистически маркированную лексику. Она представлена как собственно разговорными единицами, так и такими, которые утратили колорит разговорности и приобретают статус нейтральных единиц. Например: грибарка (собирательница грибов), зеленярка (продавщица овощей), зайда (не местный человек), кримінальник (уголовный преступник), кацапура (презрительное наименование россиянина), дзиґлик (стульчик), розкладачка (раскладушка), слухавка (телефонная трубка), хідник (тротуар), оборудка (сомнительная сделка), походеньки (длительная прогулка), кермувати (править), попровадити (провести кого-нибудь), вигинистий (гибкий), знаменитий (необычайный), зужитий (использованный), кебетний (смекалистый).

В числе слов, которые не имеют коннотации и выполняют прежде всего номинативную функцию, наибольшее количество составляют галлицизмы. Это обусловлено тем, что в рамках западноукраинского языково-литературного варианта конца ХІХ – начала ХХ в. были основаны официально-деловой, научный и публицистический стили украинского литературного языка.

Галлицизмы в основном имели синонимы, которые были распространены в восточноукраинском языково-литературном варианте, например, студії – дослідження, баняк – каструля и др., что в период 30–80-х гг. ХХ в. давало возможность отодвинуть галлицизмы на периферию лексической системы. Актуализация возвращает галлицизмы в активный запас. Теперь галлицизмы приходят на смену синонимам восточноукраинского языково-литературного варианта.

Актуализированными галлицизмами являются такие единицы: коц (плед), стрій (одежда), зимний (холодный), знаменитий (прекрасный), помаранч (апельсин), кпини (насмешка), встидатися (стесняться), адепт (последователь), гостина (пребывание в гостях), кавалок (кусок), оглядини (осмотр), поліціянт (полицейский), речник (оратор), сервілізм (служение), студії (обучение), помічний (вспомогательный), роз’юшений (разгневанный), вступатися (отступаться), обсервувати (обследовать), розважувати (обдумывать), все (постоянно), баняк (кастрюля), штукар (деятель искусства).

Активность употребления лексики, характерной для разговорной речи, лингвисты отмечают и в языке СМИ. Так, Александр Стишов называет такие актуализированные единицы, как оруда (руководство), ошукати (обманывать), гостина (пребывание в гостях), підсоння (климат), рура (труба) и другие (Стишов, 2003, с. 88, 93, 106). Актуалізацію слова речник підтверджує також його активне функціонування у мові ЗМІ у сполученні речник Президента, который замещает заимствование прес-секретар.

Говоря о лексике, характерной для устной речи, необходимо отдельно остановиться на жаргонизмах. Актуализация жаргонизмов – отражает отношение украинца к новым условиям жизни, к новому и старому государствам. Это закономерный процесс после длительного неполноценного существования украинского языка. Актуализация и развитие жаргонной лексики – важный фактор существования и дальнейшего развития украинского языка в целом.

Активное употребление жаргонизмов в письменной речи наблюдается прежде всего в языке СМИ и художественной литературы. Леся Ставицкая, которая подробно изучала жаргонную лексику, отмечает, что языковая поколения обуславливает, в свою очередь, литературную моду, а писатель выступает своеобразным медиатором между живой языковой практикой жаргоноупотребления своего поколения и литературно обработанным словесно-художественным массивом, выступая продуцентом жаргонного словаря и не только за письменным столом” (Ставицкая, 2001, с. 57).

В постмодернистских текстах очень много жаргонной лексики, что объясняется прежде всего спецификой самого постмодернистского направления. Характерным признаком литературы этого направления является эпатаж, который чаще всего проявляется в использовании ненормативной лексики. Примерами жаргонизмов могут служить: батярина (мужчина, парень), беля (пьяница), бухло (спиртные напитки), водяра (водка), галайстра (сволочь), ґешефт (выгодное дело), комсюк (комсомолец), крейзі (сумасшедший), крутелик (успешный бизнесмен, который отличается дерзким, агрессивным поведением), лох (жертва преступления; растяпа), мажор (материально обеспеченный молодой человек, который подчеркивает свое превосходство), мудрагель (про хитрого человека), наркоша (наркоман), старий, чувак (приятель, друг), цимес (суть), шлюс (конец) и другие.

Все слова, связанные с советской государственной системой, имеют в текстах или презрительную характеристику, или ироничную, что ясно свидетельствует об отношении авторов текстов к системе СССР. Например, советская власть, советская государственная система: совдеп, совдепія, совок, советский – совдепівський, совковий, совокупность негативных явлений, присущих советским людям, советскому образу жизни – совковість, украинец как этническая разновидность совка – совоукр, президент СССР Михаил Горбачев – Горбі. Це вам на Заході могло віритися, що Горбі ґарантує незаламування рук і ледь гумористичний перебіг прощання з минулим (Андрухович, 2007, с. 296). Ну так, у цьому й полягав сенс тодішньої Совдепії – максимально звузити можливість твого вибору (Андрухович, 2007, с. 39). Усе це разом становило найпаскуднішу зі знаних мені видозмін совка – совоукр (Андрухович, 2007, с. 83).

Отметим, что процессы перераспределения активного и пассивного состава лексики лингвисты наблюдают во всех постколониальных языках. Так, в таджикском языке значительное количество интернационализмов заменено собственно таджикскими словами или персизмами или арабизмами: университет – донитгоќ, космос – кайќон, депутат – намоянда, эра – давр, ресторан – тарабхона, студент – донишxу (Собиров, 2007, с. 150). В Эстонии как актуализированные отмечают такие лексические единицы: полиция (вместо милиция), комиссар, констебль, канцлер и другие (Дуличенко, 2001).

Тенденции к актуализации также отмечают и в немецком языке. Так, Алла Капуш выделяет в составе восточнонемецкой лексики группу слов, которые в свое время, прежде всего в первые годы существования НДР, перешли в пассивный состав словаря. В новых исторически-социальных условиях такая лексика актуализировалась: das Arbeitsamt – біржа праці; der Beamte – чиновник, государственный служащий; die Oppositionspartei – оппозиционная партия и т.д. (Капуш, 2000, с. 9).

Таким образом, можем констатировать, что культурная идентификация украинцев, переориентация их системы ценностей проявляется в языковой солидарности, в актуализации лексики, которая под воздействием неблагоприятных факторов до недавнего времени была на периферии лексической системы. Актуализация продолжается и сегодня, что может свидетельствовать о том, что украинцы не перестали стремиться подчеркнуть национальную особенность, самобытность украинского языка, а усилили это стремление. А такие события как Майдан, Оранжевая революция еще раз подтверждают это.

Ольга Тулузакова – кандидат филологических наук, доцент. Работает в Черноморском национальном университете им. Петра Могилы с 2003 года. В 2011 году защитила диссертацию на соискание научной степени кандидата филологических наук на тему: „Лексика украинской постмодернистской прозы на фоне общелитературной нормы 30–80-х гг. ХХ в.”. Сфера научных интересов: социолингвистика, психолингвистика, стилистика, лексикология.

Afiliacja:

Ольга Тулузакова

Черноморский государственный университет имени Петра Могилы

Email: ola8118@gmail.com

Литература:

Андрухович, Ю. (2007). Таємниця. Харків: Фоліо.

Дудик, М. (2008). Від лексики пасивної до активної в публіцистичному мовленні. Українська мова і література в школі: Науково-методичний журнал, № 1, с. 48–50.

Дуличенко, А. (2001). Русский язык „после Союза”: взгляд издалека. I Международный конгресс исследователей русского языка „Русский язык: исторические судьбы и современность”, Сборник тезисов. Москва.

Іздрик, Ю. (2002). Воццек. Львів: Кальварія.

Капуш, А. (2000). Еволюційні процеси в німецькій лексиці суспільно-політичного змісту (на матеріалі періодичних видань кінця 80-х – 90-х років). Автореф. дис. на здобуття наук. ступеня канд. філол. наук: спец. 10.02.04 „Германські мови”. Київ.

Собиров, Э. (2007). Судьбы русизмов в таджикском языке постсоветского периода. III Международный конгресс исследователей русского языка „Русский язык: исторические судьбы и современность”. Москва.

Ставицька, Л. (2001). Проблеми вивчення жаргонної лексики. Соціолінгвістичний аспект. Українська мова, № 1. Київ.

Стишов, О. (2003). Українська лексика кінця ХХ століття (на матеріалі мови засобів масової інформації). Київ: Видавничий центр КНЛУ.

Manifestacja tożsamości narodowej Ukraińców przez aktualizację słownictwa

Streszczenie:

Przedmiotem podjętych w artykule rozważań stał się problem określenia własnej tożsamości przez Ukraińców. Refleksja została oparta na tekstach składających się na współczesną literaturę ukraińską. Na poziomie leksykalnym to, jak ta tożsamość jest rozumiana, można prześledzić w lingwistyce na podstawie aktualizacji słownictwa. Pod pojęciem tym należy rozumieć proces przemieszczenia się słownictwa z peryferii do rdzenia słownika. Głównym celem artykułu jest zidentyfikowanie słów poddanych aktualizacji, a także zdefiniowanie tych czynników społeczno-politycznych na Ukrainie, które temu procesowi sprzyjają.

Słowa kluczowe:

tożsamość, aktualizacja słownictwa, słownictwo czynne, słownictwo bierne, polityka językowa, słownictwo zachodnioukraińskiego uzusu językowego.

Marriage Announcements in Lviv during the Interwar Period: Ethnic and Gender Aspects

Liudmyla Pidkuimukha
National University of “Kyiv-Mohyla Academy”

Abstract:

The article dwells upon the marriage announcements in the Lviv periodicals during the interwar period. The author has analyzed men’s and women’s ads and has described the peculiarities of them. The author has defined the main character traits which the future wife or husband should have.

Keywords:
marriage announcements, gender, nationality, ethnicity, character, appearance.

In the time between the two world wars (1918–1939) Lviv belonged to the restored Rzeczpospolita. There was a large variety of the national and religious life in the city. Jerzy Habela and Zofia Kurzowa, who are the authors of the scientific research Songs of the Lviv’s streets, cabarets and outskirts by 1939 („Lwowskie piosenki uliczne, kabaretowe I okolicznościowe do 1939 roku”), write that Lviv repeatedly changed the political independence between 1250 (the foundation year) and 1939 (entry into the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic): the city was under Ruthenian, Lithuanian, Hungarian, Polish, Austrian, Russian, Ukrainian and again Polish rule. Of course, it affected the ethnic allocation of the area, language and culture(1989, p. 9). In 1921, compared with the Census 1910, the number of Poles increased by 6.06 p.p., Jews – by 33.92 p.p., while the number of Ukrainians decreased by 30.89 p.p. after the World War I (Isayevych, Lytvyn, Stebliy, 2007, p. 43). The number of Ukrainian population reduced more than 20 p.p. because of military casualties, political emigration, changes of religion and some other reasons. And the share of the Ukrainian citizens in Lviv became the same as in the 60th years of the XIXth century.

In the 20–30th years of the XXth century migration processes that were typical for the pre-war period in Galicia were renewed. In Lviv and other big cities the share of the Ukrainian population began to rise again. According to the results of the census, in 1926 in Lviv the number of Ukrainians by nationality criterion was 10.3% and 75.3% of Greek Catholics. Compared to the census in 1921, the number of Ukrainians by the nationality criterion increased by 18 p.p., and the number of Greek Catholics – by 14.2 p.p. (Lozynskyy, 2005, p. 173). During the interwar period three main criteria showed the ethnicity of Galicians. They were religion, language, and ethnic consciousness, which was expressed by a sense of belonging to a particular ethnic group. According to religion, Ukrainians were mainly Greek Catholics, Poles – Roman Catholics, and Jews profess Judaism. Most of Jews spoke Yiddish, and only a small share of Orthodox Jews knew Hebrew. A small percentage of the population were Germans who were Protestant and Roman Catholics by religion. Of course, there were cases when Jews were Roman Catholics, Ukrainians – Roman Catholics or Orthodox, and Polish – Greek Catholics (Chorniy). In the interwar Lviv, in this multicultural and multiethnic city, was seen a dichotomy “it/stranger” that was traced in daily communication, literature, media and so on.

The object of our research is marriage announcements that are multifaceted phenomenon of the social and linguistic reality. We have analyzed such newspapers as “Nedilya” and “Vpered”. Matrimonial ads were printed on the last page of the newspaper in the section „Small ads”, along with the messages about finding work, buying and selling things or private correspondence. In most cases addressers would like to find a person to start a family. That is why almost every announcement contained such words as for the matrimonial purposes, or verbs ozhenytsya, podruzhyt that mean ‘gets married’. But there were also some texts, in which the authors did not write anything about marriage, because they were looking for a soul mate, intellectual or spiritual support. For example, A cute 30-year-old man with a higher education, well-heeled would like to meet a young, highly cultured, educated woman who would make a light into my gray days… (Nedilya, 03.11.1929). In those messages the men paid more attention rather to the educational and cultural level of women than their looks or financial status.

An important quality in the future wife or husband was an ethnicity. Often in these ads people wrote that they are looking for Ukrainians or prefer Galicians etc. For example, The teacher will correspond with Ukrainian woman. The young, 22-year-old sergeant of the Ukrainian Army, who is in captivity now, is looking to meet a woman for the matrimonial purposes, Halychankas are preferred (Vpered, 13.11.1919). A woman in a rural area will marry a Ukrainian (Nedilya, 24.11.1929).

As Galicia during the interwar period was the territory where nationally conscious Ukrainian elite was formed, in the matrimonial ads among a number of traits and qualities it was also mentioned that wife or husband should be nationally conscious. For example, I am looking for lady 22–27 years old that was born 27/ХІІ, 11/І, religious, nationally conscious, good looking, who has good manners, has finished a gymnasium or a seminary, and thinks seriously about marriage… (Nedilya, 07.01.1932).

The religion was also stated in some messages. In this case it was actually equal to ethnicity (Greek-Catholic meant Ukrainian). For example, Greek-Catholic without property, labor and care (Nedilya, 22.06.1930). The wife with the same religion men were looking for. Moreover, people of the equal status, position and so on were named “akin”. One of the ads started with the slogan “Sister to brother!”. For example, “Sister to brother!”. Gymnasium teacher, 31 year old, it is said to be nice, gets acquainted with a cute young lady with perfect manners; preferable are teachers by 27 years (Nedilya, 17.11.1929).

Discourse of marriage announcements reflects a particular gender view. Those texts represent some gender stereotypes that existed in the society. Thus, our analysis shows that matrimonial ads were written mostly by men in Lviv during the interwar period. They were of all ages (from young to pensioners), positions (professors, officers), professions (doctors, teachers, military men, and technician-builders), financial status (rich and not so wealthy) and others. These data were presented in the first place in the marriage ads, because this information is going to influence the recipient, to make him acquainted, and to interest the potential readers.

At the ads titles an addresser firstly wrote his age that was marked by the adjective ‘young’ and nouns ‘molodets’ or ‘kavalyer’ which mean ‘a young man’. These characteristics also indicated a marital status. For example, such words as ‘molodets’, kavalyer’ meant single. Sometimes the authors did not use euphemisms and wrote simply self-alone. For example, Respectable and likable man, self-alone, average years… (Vpered, 24.12.1919). The widowers wrote the marriage announcements too. In this way they emphasized that they had the experience of married life and could build lasting family relationships.

Men also pointed out the specific features of their appearance. Such feature as strong figure dominated. This characteristic was described by such lexical units as tall, strong and so on. These words are consistent with the stereotype of the ideal male beauty. Such emotionally, positively stained epithets as intelligent, staid, cute, and self-reliant were often used in the marriage announcements.

In most cases, the authors noted their education, financial situation, etc. in the texts, trying to show that they are able to support a wife and a future family. For example, (…) the former Cossack officer, tall, and financially maintained wants to meet a woman to get married. Educated and cultured young man, whose field is 40 morgen and farm is developed, is looking for a woman who will agree to walk together through the pass of life (Vpered, 24.12.1919). Retirement official who is tall, good-looking, 54 years old, and prosperous…Respectable and likable man, self-alone, average years, intelligent and on a good position at work… (Vpered, 24.12.1919).

In this case, there is accordance between what the authors report about themselves (supply) and what the women would like to find (demand). Despite the fact that a number of women’s marriage announcements was smaller, the statement that a man should have a good financial status was written in almost every text. In some ads girls and women wrote preferred men’s age and the character qualities. According to women marriage announcements first of all man ought to be educated and cultured. We should mention that the men in their ads also wrote that they were cultured. In this situation, supply meets the demand. According to our research, in most of the cases teachers by profession were looking for their husbands. Here are some examples of their announcements: Because of the lack of dating a teacher wishes to correspond in matrimonial purposes with a male who is not older than 47 years and has good financial status. A teacher is looking for an educated man, who is not older than 36 years and has good financial status; I need a man for friendship, in the future marriage is possible. A young, good-looking teacher, who has a dowry, wants to find a man who has appropriate financial status. The main aim is getting married (Nedilya, 15.06.1930).

As we can see, the women wrote much less about themselves in contrast to men who used all possible means of verbal attractions.

Men, unlike women, had significantly more requirements to his future wife. First of all, they paid attention to the character qualities. For example, (…) get acquainted with a cute, young, and decent lady who has perfect manners (Vpered, 24.12.1919). (…) looking for intelligent, educated, and decent lady or a young widow (Vpered, 24.12.1919). (…) get acquainted with an honest, kindhearted, and placid girl (Vpered, 24.12.1919).

Besides the future wife’s age, the desirable height, hair color, figure etc, were also mentioned in some advertisements. For example,(…) get acquainted with an honest, kindhearted, and placid, brunette girl, who is in ideal height, not older than 25 years, and comes from a good family (Vpered, 24.12.1919). Retirement official (…) will get married with healthy, well built, cute blonde girl who is not older than 35 years (Vpered, 23.11.1919). Sometimes hair color was the only requirement, like in this message: A young, 28 years old, cute man, owner of the tailoring workshop is looking for wife who is good looking brunette girl (Vpered, 13.11.1919).

There are ads where not only general, but also specific requirements were written. For example, only certain date of birth is considered: I am looking for a lady 22–27 years old that was born 27/ХІІ, 11/І, religious, nationally conscious, good looking, who has good manners, has finished a gymnasium or a seminary, and seriously considers marriage… (Nedilya, 07.01.1932).

Some men were looking for a woman who can cook. It was the obligatory requirement. For example, the knowledge of French and dance art are not required, but cooking skills are necessary (Nedilya, 14.01.1932). In this case, gender stereotype is incorporated into marriage announcements. Women were considered to be the ones who should cook in a household.

We have roughly divided some of the men’s announcements into two groups: the messages in which future wife’s dowry is important for the authors and those announcements in which the dowry is not necessary. The first category includes such ads: A doctor in the province will marry a young placid girl who has an appropriate dowry. Doctor of medicine will start to correspondence with beautiful young girl to get married in the future. Appropriate dowry is necessary (Nedilya, 21.09.1930). Some guys were even ready to marry a widow if she had a dowry: A young 29 years old man, graduated from High School of Art, photo studio owner, will marry a girl or a widow who has a dowry. She may be from a peasant family (Vpered, 12.12.1919).

This group also contains the ads written by so called gigolos who needed financial support and did not conceal it. For example, The young guy, who because of the material and political reasons cannot study at the university, will correspond with the purpose of marriage to a young lady, 19 years old, who could temporarily financially secure him, would have a larger amount of money to found a commercial enterprise or produce to him a good paid position. I’ll get married to a wealthy woman who is not older than 40 years and could contribute $ 1,000 to my company (Nedilya, 21.09.1930).

The second group includes those marriage announcements in which men paid attention to girl’s look and character qualities. It this case dowry was not necessary. For example, A decent young man with secondary education degree wants to get acquainted with the moral, young, delicate and beautiful girl. The dowry is not necessary. I get married with a young, beautiful and painstaking girl. The dowry is not important (Nedilya, 07.01.1932).

Thus, in the marriage announcements published in the Lviv’s newspapers during the interwar period personal qualities and nationality took the most important place. At that time men had a chance to choose a partner. That is why a number of their adverts in the press prevailed.

Men were looking for attractive and careful women, and women wanted men to see their character, not only appearance. Like women, men first of all distinguished the positive psychosocial character qualities. However, the names of psycho-emotional characteristics and intellectual qualities were used in the men’s announcements more often.

The lexical units, which name specific appearance features and physical characteristics, were mostly used in the male marriage ads. In their texts names of professions which are relevant to the realities of the macrocosm and emphasize the high social status of the addressee dominated. We should mention that the range of men’s professions and jobs is much wider. This generally indicated high social status of the addresser. Thus, we note a greater impact of the factor profession in the male’s marriage announcements that confirms the higher status of the professional role in a set of men’s social features. This is indirectly evidenced by the fact that the woman’s social status was often identified by the social status of her husband or father.

Although the marriage announcements analysis allowed revealing some gender-specific features of the marriage ads, there is one common thing: both men and women aimed to find a reliable partner in life and create a family with their significant other.

Liudmyla Pidkuimukha is an Assistant Professor at the Ukrainian Language Department, Faculty of Humanities, the National University of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy (Kyiv, Ukraine). Liudmyla has completed her PhD thesis, entitled Lexical Characteristics of Western Region Variety of Standard Ukrainian Language (Based on Lviv Writers’ Texts 1-st Half of XXth Century),which is focused on language situation in Lviv during the interwar period and is rooted in both social sciences and humanities. The interwar Lviv is the central focus of this research because it is a case of great interest to compare ethnic situation with language situation during this period, to study state and status of the Ukrainian Language at that time Lviv. Liudmyla is particularly interested in the literary production of interwar period and in modern Ukrainian prose. Besides linguistics, Dr. Pidkuimukha is interested in cultural, historical and urban studies.

Afiliacja:

Liudmyla Pidkuimukha

Department of Ukrainian Language

Faculty of Humanities

National University of “Kyiv-Mohyla Academy”

Email: liudmyla.pidkuimukha@gmail.com

Bibliography:

Chorniy, P. Stavlennya zhyteliv Halychyny mizhvojennoho periodu (1919 – 1939 rr.) do tvorenoho nymy polietnichnoho ta multykulturnoho prostoru [The Attitude of the Galicia Residents to the Created Multi-ethnic and Multicultural Space during the Interwar Period (1919 – 1939)]. [Online] Available from http://historians.in.ua/index.php/en/doslidzhennya/601-petro-chorniy-stavlennia-zhyteliv-halychyny-mizhvoiennoho-periodu-19191939-rr-do-tvorenoho-nymy-polietnichnoho-ta-multykulturnoho-prostoru [Accessed: 12 April 2016].

Habela, J., Kurzowa, Z. (1989). Lwowskie piosenki uliczne, kabaretowe i okolicznościowe do 1939 roku. Kraków : Polskie Wydawnictwo Muzyczne.

Isayevych, J., Lytvyn, M. (ed.) (2007). Istorija Lvova: U 3 tomax [The History of Lviv: In 3 volumes]. Lviv :Thentr Evropy. – T. 3: November 1918 – beginning of the XXI century.

Legin, S. Jak znajomylysya nashi didusi abo shlubni oholoshennya lvivjan pochatku XX stolittya [How got acquainted our grandparents or marriage announcements Lviv citizens early XXth century]. [Online] Available from http://photo-lviv.in.ua/yak-znajomylys-nashi-didusi-abo-shlyubni-oholoshennya-lviv-yan-na-pochatku-hh-stolittya/ [Accessed: 10 March 2016].

Lozynskyy R. (2005). Etnichnyy sklad naselennya Lvova (u konteksti suspilnoho rozvytku Halychyny [Ethnic composition of Lviv (in the context of social development of Galicia)].Lviv : LNU.

Lwowskie ogłoszenia matrymonialne w okresie międzywojennym. Aspekty etniczne i płciowe

Streszczenie:

W artykule przedstawiono anonse matrymonialne obecne w czasopismach lwowskich w okresie międzywojennym. Autorka przeanalizowała męskie i damskie ogłoszenia, a także opisała ich specyfikę. Ponadto, na ich podstawie zidentyfikowała pożądane cechy, jakimi mieli charakteryzować się przyszła żona bądź też przyszły mąż.

Słowa kluczowe: ogłoszenia matrymonialne, gender, narodowość, etniczność, charakter, wygląd.

Kwestia tożsamości narodowo-kulturowej w radzieckim literaturoznawstwie ukraińskim w latach 20. XX wieku

Lesia Demska-Budzuliak
Instytut Literatury im. T. Szewczenki
PAN Ukrainy

Abstrakt:

W artykule podjęto próbę identyfikacji tożsamości inkluzyjnych oraz ekskluzyjnych poprzez analizę praktyk społeczno-kulturowych charakterystycznych dla radzieckiego literaturoznawstwa ukraińskiego. Ze względu na zachodzące w latach 20. XX wieku przemiany przedmiotem refleksji objęto kanony literackie propagowane przez czasopisma literaturoznawcze. Wyniki analizy wskazują na hybrydowy charakter ówczesnego literaturoznawstwa ukraińskiego, będący skutkiem radzieckiej polityki państwowej, a także relacji istniejących między ideologią i propagandą.

Słowa kluczowe:
tożsamość narodowa, tożsamość inkluzyjna, tożsamość ekskluzyjna, radzieckie literaturoznawstwo ukraińskie.

Zjawisko radzieckiego literaturoznawstwa ukraińskiego do dziś jest bardzo trudne do zdefiniowania. Jednocześnie jest ono częścią bardziej ogólnej dyscypliny – sowietologii. W tym wypadku oba terminy, radziecki i sowiecki, traktować należy jako synonimy. Najogólniej rzecz biorąc, pod wskazanym pojęciem rozumie się wiedzę o literaturze Ukraińskiej Socjalistycznej Republiki Radzieckiej (istniejącej w latach 1921–1991). Aby móc właściwie zrozumieć to zjawisko, w rozważaniach należy odwołać się do kształtującego je kontekstu historycznego. W roku 1932 wszystkie stowarzyszenia pisarzy zostały zlikwidowane dekretem Komitetu Centralnego WKP(b) (Wszechzwiązkowej Partii Komunistycznej – bolszewików), a na ich miejsce powstał jeden Związek Pisarzy ZSRR. Jedynym akceptowanym przez władze ruchem literackim był socrealizm, a jedyną dopuszczalną metodą studiowania literatury – marksizm. Taka sytuacja miała miejsce aż do rozpadu Związku Radzieckiego. W tym czasie, literatura i kultura, zgodnie z obowiązującym paradygmatem, zyskały właściwości klasowe. Nauka stała się częścią większego projektu ideologicznego.

Celem artykułu jest próba przedstawienia transformacji narodowego literaturoznawstwa ukraińskiego w literaturoznawstwo radzieckie za pomocą analizy zarówno praktyk społeczno-kulturowych, mających miejsce zwłaszcza w przestrzeni medialnej, jak i kanonu literackiego. Mówiąc o tożsamości narodowo-kulturowej literaturoznawstwa ukraińskiego chciałabym zwrócić uwagę na dwa stanowiska obecne w literaturze przedmiotu. Zgodnie z pierwszym, radzieckie literaturoznawstwo ukraińskie jest logicznym etapem rozwoju literaturoznawstwa narodowego, które w omawianym okresie było jeszcze młodą dyscypliną naukową. Rewolucja społeczna, jaka miała miejsce w Imperium Rosyjskim, spowodowała głębokie przeobrażenia na terenie Centralnej i Wschodniej Ukrainy, stała się też bodźcem do modernizacji wszystkich obszarów życia społecznego. Zgodnie z drugim stanowiskiem, radzieckie literaturoznawstwo ukraińskie nie powstaje w próżni, nie jest całkowitym zaprzeczeniem poprzedniej tradycji naukowej. Z jednej strony, odziedziczyło ono pewne cechy charakteryzujące etap wcześniejszy. Z drugiej zaś, właściwe mu praktyki społeczno-kulturowe wyrastały na glebie ideologii marksistowskiej.

Poszukiwania tożsamości narodowo-kulturowej radzieckiego literaturoznawstwa ukraińskiego warto prowadzić dwutorowo, przedmiotem zainteresowania obejmując tożsamość inkluzyjną oraz ekskluzyjną. O ile pierwsza oznacza, że przyjęcie pewnej roli społecznej i kształtowanie własnej tożsamości następuje poprzez przynależność do szerszego dyskursu kulturowego, w tym przypadku radzieckiego, a jej analiza skupia naszą uwagę na funkcjonowaniu radzieckich praktyk społeczno-kulturowych oraz na relacjach istniejących między ideologią i propagandą, nauką i władza, o tyle tożsamość ekskluzyjna podkreśla odmienność, oryginalność, a jej badanie wymaga uwzględnienia wcześniejszych etapów rozwoju literaturoznawstwa ukraińskiego oraz tych jego form i śladów, które przetrwały w literaturoznawstwie radzieckim. Innymi słowy, tożsamość inkluzyjna formuje się w wyniku celowej polityki państwowej, w tym przypadku przejawiającej się głównie w obszarze nauki i kultury narodowej, ekskluzyjna zaś jest pozostałością, skutkiem poprzedniego etapu rozwoju. Relacje pomiędzy nimi najlepiej demonstruje kanon literacki oraz określone praktyki społeczno-kulturowe.

Identyfikując i opisując siły, które charakteryzowały sytuację mającą miejsce na Ukrainie w przeddzień rewolucji październikowej, kanadyjski badacz M. Szkandrij użył trzech metafor: tożsamość Gogola (ambiwalentna wobec tożsamości rosyjskiej), tradycja Dragomanowa (poszukująca modus vivendi z postępową, liberalną kulturą rosyjską), a także nacjonalizm kulturowy, reprezentowany przez B. Hrinczenko oraz S. Jefremowa (dążący do całkowitej rezygnacji ze zwyczaju podporządkowywania Ukrainy Rosji) (Szkandrij, 2006, s. 23). W odniesieniu do tego ostatniego nurtu w pełni uzasadnione wydaje się użycie terminu – nacjonalizm obronny, zaproponowanego przez E. Tompson do opisu ruchów działających na rzecz obrony własnej tożsamości (Tompson, 2008, s. 32).

Te metafory możemy wykorzystać także do opisu ówczesnej tradycji literacko-naukowej. Pierwsza z nich, tożsamość Gogola odzwierciedla sytuację braku tożsamości narodowej, stanowi kontynuację dyskursu rosyjskiego w ukraińskim środowisku kulturalnym. Z czasem, gdy porządki radzieckie zyskiwały na sile, podejście to przekształciło się w dyskurs marksistowski. Drugi nurt kontynuował tradycje modernistyczne, w swych poszukiwaniach nowoczesnych form narodowych był wyraźnie zorientowany na Europę. Z kolei trzeci, reprezentowany przez nacjonalizm kulturowy, przejawiał się w kulturowo-historycznym podejściu do zjawisk literackich. Na gruncie ukraińskiego literaturoznawstwa stanowiska ta określane są kolejno jako nurt: marksistowski, neoklasyczny (lub też modernistyczny) i historyczny.

Gdy przedmiotem uwagi uczynimy drugą i trzecią dekadę XX wieku, to zaobserwujemy dominację w literaturoznawstwie ukraińskim nacjonalizmu kulturowego, którego przedstawiciele kierowali swe wysiłki przede wszystkim na przedruk i nowe odczytanie klasyki narodowej (co sprzyjało z kolei kształtowaniu się ukraińskiego mitu narodowego). Pozycja dyskursu historycznego została wzmocniona wraz z utworzeniem Narodowej Akademii Nauk Ukrainy w 1918 roku. Równolegle do tego podejścia rozwijał się nurt marksistowski, który przyjmując określone założenia ideologiczne rozpatrywał zjawiska literackie w perspektywie klasowej. Alternatywę dla obu tych stanowisk stanowiły badania zorientowane na studiowanie estetycznej i formalnej strony tekstu literackiego. Od strony założeń, które leżały u podstaw tego nurtu, zbliżał się on do nacjonalizmu kulturowego. Jeśli chodzi jednak o analizę zjawisk literackich, to podejście to ukierunkowane było na te ruchy kulturalno-estetyczne i metody badawcze, które w tym okresie rozwijały się w zachodnim językoznawstwie. Każdy z tych dyskursów miał własną wizję ewolucji literatury, kultury, czy tożsamości narodowej. O ile jednak nurty nacjonalistyczny i modernistyczny były zainteresowane reformą kultury z perspektywy narodowej, o tyle podejście marksistowskie wyjątkowo brało pod uwagę stanowisko klasowe.

Przemieszczenie się centrum życia kulturalnego Ukrainy z Kijowa do Charkowa, które nastąpiło w 1919 roku, stało się momentem zwrotnym dla dalszego rozwoju literaturoznawstwa ukraińskiego. W odróżnieniu od Kijowa, Charków bardzo szybko stał się miastem radzieckim. Pierwszy numer pisma „Szlachy mystectwa” („Drogi Sztuki”), wydany tam w 1921 roku, wyraźnie dowiódł, iż następuje ekspansja dyskursu marksistowskiego z właściwą mu retoryką ideologiczną. W artykule pod wymownym tytułem Zadanie radzieckiej polityki artystycznej (podpisanym inicjałami I.W) znajdujemy cele, jakie władze radzieckie stawiały przed działalnością twórczą. Brzmiały one następująco: (a) propaganda sztuki oraz (b) propaganda sztuką (a więc takie użycie artystycznych środków wyrazu, które służyć będzie idei komunizmu i rewolucji społecznej) (Ibidem, 1921, s. 89).

W owym czasie czasopisma nierzadko stawały się placami boju, na których toczyły się ostre dyskusje między zwolennikami różnych podejść. Ówczesna krytyka literacka, jako część literaturoznawstwa ogólnego, skupiona była na dwóch pytaniach: (a) za pomocą jakich metod należy prowadzić badania naukowe literatury ukraińskiej?; (b) jaki powinien być ukraiński kanon literacki? Te dwa pytania odnoszą się w rzeczywistości do tego samego problemu, dotyczącego metod kształtowania tożsamości narodowej. Jak stwierdza A. Assmann: Przewaga kanonicznego tekstu nad innym tekstem polega na tym, że ten pierwszy został przez społeczeństwo wybrany do reprezentowania doświadczenia historycznego, a także wartości danej kultury (…). (Assmann, 2015, s. 322).

Pojawienie się kwestii narodowej na początku XX wieku sprzyjało tworzeniu się nowych czasopism artystycznych, literackich i naukowych. Przez dłuższy czas głównym periodykiem, który reprezentował stanowisko właściwe dla nurtu historycznego, był „Literaturno-Naukowy Wisnyk” („Zwiastun Literacko-Naukowy”), założony we Lwowie w 1898 roku. Dla ukraińskiego dyskursu neoklasycznego takimi czasopismami były: „Nasze mynułe” („Nasza przeszłość”) (1917–1919, Kijów) i „Knygar” („Bibliofil”) (1917–1919, Kijów). Z kolei nurt marksistowski prezentowano na łamach „Czerwonogo szlachu” („Czerwonej drogi”) (1923–1936, Charków) oraz „Życia i Rewolucji” (1924–1934, Kijów). Należy tutaj jednak podkreślić, że przynajmniej początkowo nie istniały jakieś kategoryczne linie podziału, uniemożliwiające drukowanie tekstów stworzonych przez autorów, którzy nie reprezentowali stanowiska właściwego danemu czasopismu. Przeciwnie, bardzo często przedstawiciele poszczególnych nurtów publikowali swoje prace na łamach różnych periodyków, choć – trzeba to przyznać – ich recepcja pozostawała zazwyczaj zgodna z polityką redakcyjną czasopisma.

Sama koncepcja tych periodyków, ich forma, struktura i treść, pozostawała innym, a zarazem najbardziej klarownym, przejawem wskazanej polityki redakcyjnej. Wspomniany już „Literaturno-Naukowyj Wisnyk” utworzono na wzór pism zachodnioeuropejskich, zwłaszcza zaś francuskiego „La Revue”. Poświęcony był nie tylko problematyce naukowej, ale także współczesnej kulturze i literaturze, przez co pretendował do bycia swego rodzaju drogowskazem istotnie wpływającym na kształtującą się tożsamość narodową. Pojawienie się pewnej regularności w jego wydawaniu sprzyjało rozszerzaniu się świadomości kulturowej Ukraińców. Jego zasadniczym celem stała się zatem budowa ukraińskiej niepodległości kulturalnej, stanowiącej przesłankę dla niepodległości państwowej (Doroszenko, 2000, s. 529 za: Jasiński, 2000).

Na stronie tytułowej „Literaturno-Naukowogo Wistnyka” widniała antyczna muza z lirą stylizowaną na narodowy, ukraiński instrument muzyczny. Ten obraz najlepiej ukazuje istotę nurtu historycznego, którego działania ukierunkowane były na rozbudowę mitu narodowego. Z tego punktu widzenia, powinien był on symbolizować pradawny charakter ludu ukraińskiego, postrzeganego nawet jako dziedzica tradycji antycznej. Z drugiej strony jednak, pojawienie się narodowego instrumentu w rękach muzy świadczy o idealizacji samego ludu w ramach omawianego nurtu – ludu, który w świadomości Ukraińców stoi najwyżej w hierarchii. Biorąc do rąk ową lirę, muza jak gdyby mówi jego językiem. Stąd nurt historyczny wcielał w życie ideę pradawnego pochodzenia, a zarazem dokonał sakralizacji kultury ludowej.

Centralne miejsce na łamach tego czasopisma zajmowali pisarze oraz utwory składające się na postulowany przez nurt historyczny kanon literacki. Idea walki narodowej wywarła duży wpływ na sam sposób, zgodnie z którym ów kanon był kształtowany. Aby obronić pogląd o odrębności narodu ukraińskiego, a zarazem utrwalić w społeczeństwie określoną narrację o jego genezie, sięgnięto do narodowego mitu historycznego postrzegającego Ukrainę jako spadkobierczynię Rusi Kijowskiej i związanej z nią słowiańskiej spuścizny. Ze względu na to, że przez cały XIX wiek w kulturze rosyjskiej za kontynuatora Rusi postrzegano właśnie Moskwę, ukraińscy twórcy stanęli przed koniecznością obrony tego stanowiska. W swojej Historii literatury ruskiej (1888) Omelian Ogonowski jako pierwszy uwzględnił literaturę Rusi Kijowskiej w historii literatury ukraińskiej. Jego praca poświęcona mitycznemu autorowi, twórcy poematu pt. Słowo o wyprawie Igora, uznawanego dziś za zabytek literatury staroruskiej z końca XII wieku, stała się zaś przedmiotem ostrej krytyki ze strony humanistyki rosyjskiej, gdyż podważała idee typowe dla ówczesnej, imperialnej historiografii, zakładającej wyższość kultury rosyjskiej nad ukraińską.

Z kolei jeśli chodzi o nurt neoklasyczny w obrębie literaturoznawstwa ukraińskiego, to punktem przełomowym było utworzenie czasopisma „Nasze mynułe” w 1917 roku, na którego łamach podnoszono kwestie dotyczące ukraińskiej kultury, literatury i sztuki, a szczególną uwagę przywiązywano do publikacji archiwaliów. Jak zaznacza V. Panczenko, centralne miejsce w nim zajęła idea tradycji – narodowej, kulturowej, politycznej (Panczenko, 2015, s. 146). Przedstawiciele nurtu neoklasycznego również kierowali swoją uwagę na przeszłość. Skupiali się jednak na okresie krótkiej państwowości Ukrainy w XVII-XVIII wieku.

Niezwykle wymowna, odzwierciedlająca główne idee czasopisma, okazała się jego okładka, zrobiona przez grafika H. Narbuta. W centrum widzimy kozaka rejestrowego, z tyłu którego widnieją z jednej strony studenci oraz budynek Akademii Kijowsko-Mohylańskiej, z drugiej zaś – herb Iwana Mazepy. Uwagę przykuwa także czcionka wykorzystana przez Narbuta, opracowana wcześniej dla herbu i ukraińskich pieniędzy. Jak się wydaje, okładka ta pozwoliła zobrazować ideę ukraińskiej państwowości – od hetmana Iwana Mazepy do hetmana Pawła Skoropadskiego. „Nasze mynułe”, wzbogacone grafiką Narbuta, promieniowało poczuciem siły i pewności narodu – nie tylko w wymiarze militarnym, ale też w warstwie intelektualnej i kulturalnej (Panczenko, 2015, s. 147). Jeśli chodzi o kształtowanie kanonu literackiego, to przedstawiciele nurtu neoklasycznego skupili się na pisarzach i utworach reprezentujących tradycję elitarną w ramach kultury narodowej.

Kiedy nurty historyczny i neoklasyczny koncentrowały się na kwestii tworzenia tożsamości narodowej, to nurt marksistowski pracował nad formowaniem tożsamości klasowej. Przedstawiciele tego dyskursu nie tylko odrzucali przeszłość jako wrogą człowiekowi pracy, ale też deprecjonowali kulturę wysoką jako cudzą, martwą, daleką. Centralną dla nich ideą stała się równość klasowa, którą odzwierciedlać miała kultura proletariacka. Nie pozostało to bez wpływu na postulowany przez zwolenników tego nurtu kanon literacki. Rdzeń stanowić miały teksty autorów pochodzących z niższych klas społecznych, w których krytyce poddawano zarówno własność prywatną, jak i tożsamość narodową. Głównym bohaterem był zazwyczaj robotnik bądź chłop, a w roli jego antagonisty występował często inteligent.

Pierwsze ukraińskie czasopisma marksistowskie wyróżniały się dynamicznymi liniami, użyciem czcionek plakatowych i czerwonej barwy. W swej treści skupiały się one głównie na zerwaniu z poprzednią tradycją kulturalną. O ile w czasopismach reprezentujących nurt historyczny lub neoklasyczny dominowała retoryka podkreślająca odrębność Ukraińców, ich jedność jako narodu, odwołująca się do wątków obecnych w kulturze narodowej, historyczno-mitologicznych, o tyle w periodykach marksistowskich często mamy do czynienia z retoryką agresywną, podkreślającą istnienie konfliktu w społeczeństwie i ukierunkowaną na rozbicie solidarności narodowej. Co więcej większość pism reprezentujących dyskurs marksistowski umieszczała w tytule takie odniesienia, które miały w zwięzły sposób opisywać ich aktywność. Zastosowanie znalazły tutaj takie terminy jak: polityczny, społeczny, społeczno-polityczny, polityczno-artystyczny, literacko-społeczny itp.

Wraz z tym jak w drugiej połowie lat 20. XX wieku władze coraz wyraźniej zaczęły obierać represyjny, totalitarny kurs, następowało zahamowanie procesu ukrainizacji. W obszarze kultury, sztuki i nauki zaszły określone zmiany. Państwo radzieckie stopniowo brało pod kontrolę wszelką działalność, która miała charakter twórczy, intelektualny. Jeszcze na początku XX wieku Włodzimierz I. Lenin zaznaczał, że wraz z rozwojem kapitalizmu daje się zaobserwować dwie tendencje, wprost odnoszące się do tzw. kwestii narodowej. Pierwsza z nich odpowiada za pobudzenie życia narodowego i kształtowanie się ruchów narodowych, walkę z jakąkolwiek formą dyskryminacji na tle narodowościowym, tworzenie się państw narodowych. Z kolei druga oznacza rozwój i umacnianie się stosunków między państwami narodowymi, zanik granic, formowanie się międzynarodowego porządku ekonomicznego i politycznego. O ile pierwsza tendencja dominuje na początku, o tyle druga w pełni pojawia się, gdy w wyniku rewolucji proletariackiej kapitalizm przekształca się w socjalizm (Lenin, 1981, s. 121).

Po śmierci Lenina ów pogląd o istnieniu określonych tendencji historycznych dotyczących narodów został zaadaptowany przez Józefa Stalina na użytek jego własnej polityki. O ile na początku rewolucja rzeczywiście sprzyjała rozwojowi kultur narodowych, w szczególności tych dyskryminowanych w Imperium Rosyjskim, o tyle w latach 30. XX wieku pojawiła się idea, zgodnie z którą istnieje tylko jeden naród – radziecki. Ukształtował się też pogląd sugerujący, aby kultura i nauka radziecka były w swej formie narodowe, a w treści internacjonalne. Nie trzeba dodawać, że takie podejście prowadziło do całkowitego zakwestionowania tożsamości narodowej jako wartości. W taki oto sposób kształtowała się tożsamość radziecka, formalnie zachowująca pewne elementy poszczególnych tożsamości narodowych.

Ciekawym pozostaje fakt, że w Związku Radzieckim narodowość była rozumiana nie jako pewna konstrukcja polityczno-kulturowa, lecz jako cecha przypisana, dana przy urodzeniu i niemająca szczególnej wartości. Jak stwierdza S. Jakielczyk: (…) kategoria «klasy» straciła swoją wartość taksonomiczną. Narodowość stała się samotną uniwersalną etykietą dla klasyfikacji i nadzoru nad masami obywateli radzieckich. I co ważne – akcentuje badacz – kiedy w latach 20 XX wieku ZSRR był państwem równych narodowości i nierównych klas, to już w latach 30 mamy państwo równych klas i nierównych narodowości, gdzie centrum często utożsamiano z narodem rosyjskim (Jakielczyk, 2008, s. 19). Przedmiotem represji stały się m.in. ukraińskie elity i chłopi, traktowani jak ideowi i klasowi wrogowie.

Procesy redukujące tożsamość narodową do radzieckiej demonstrują transformacje, jakie odbywały się w obszarze praktyk społeczno-kulturowych literaturoznawstwa ukraińskiego. Literaturoznawstwo w okresie radzieckim przybrało formę hybrydową. Nabyło pewnych cech typowych dla tożsamości klasowej, zachowując jednocześnie niektóre właściwości tożsamości narodowej. Na płaszczyźnie tożsamości inkluzyjnej przejęło ono praktyki społeczno-kulturowe charakterystyczne dla dyskursu totalitarnego. Uznano, że dozwolona jest tylko jedna metoda badań naukowych, do druku dopuszczono zaś tylko jedno czasopismo – „Naukowe Zapiski Literatury im. T. Szewczenki NAN Ukrainy” (1938–1957). Jeżeli chodzi o kanon literacki to nie tylko tworzono go, uwzględniając określone przesłanki ideologiczne, klasowe, ale też znaczącą rolę przyznano w nim literaturze rosyjskiej. Zmiana przejawiała się również w tym, że odtąd wszystkie rozprawy naukowe miały być przygotowywane w języku rosyjskim, a stopnie naukowe zdecydowano się nadawać w Moskwie.

Z oficjalnej historii literatury ukraińskiej w całości usunięto okres modernistyczny jako degradujący, burżuazyjny, a w rzeczywistości jako ten, który zbliżał kulturę ukraińską do kultury zachodnioeuropejskiej, uwalniał ją spod rosyjskich wpływów. Słowiańska spuścizna zyskała na znaczeniu – w propagandzie radzieckiej była kołyską wspólną trzech bratnich literatur – rosyjskiej, ukraińskiej i białoruskiej. Bezprecedensowymi stały się represje wymierzone w kulturę ukraińską, w tym także w literaturę i literaturoznawstwo. Zakazem publikowania zostali objęci pisarze i naukowcy: (a) w których pracach dało się dostrzec tendencje narodowe i antykolonialne; (b) reprezentujący orientację europejską; (c) ostro krytykujący system radziecki; (d) przynależący do ukraińskiej diaspory. W swojej książce Ukraińscy działacze kulturalni lat 1920–1940 – ofiary bolszewickiego terroru W. Pietrow, ofiara represji systemu totalitarnego, pisze: Dziesiątki, setki i tysiące imion, absolutnie wartościowych (…) godnych każdego uznania i szacunku, archeolodzy, historycy, językoznawcy, muzykoznawcy, etnografowie, folkloryści, dialektolodzy, twórcy słowników, znawcy ukraińskiej składni, redaktorzy literaccy, pedagodzy, tłumacze, korektorzy, buchalterzy, agronomowie, nauczyciele, reżyserzy filmowi, operatorzy filmowi, autorzy scenariuszy filmowych, dramaturdzy, profesorowie, docenci, aspiranci, bibliotekarze, poeci, malarze, fotografowie, architekci (…). Wszyscy oni, przedstawiciele inteligencji ukraińskiej, kończyli jednakowo – gwałtownym zerwaniem, eksplozją katastrofy, doprowadzeni do desperacji, beznadziei, głodu, zsyłki, śmierci (Pietrow, 1959, s. 13).

Z kolei tożsamość ekskluzyjna przejawiała pewne oznaki podejścia narodowego. Język ukraiński zachował się jako język niektórych rozpraw naukowych – tych, które nie stanowiły podstawy dla uzyskiwania stopni naukowych. Jeśli chodzi o kanon literacki, to choć był on reformowany zgodnie z obowiązującą ideologią radziecką, to udało się w nim zachować szereg czołowych dzieł i autorów literatury narodowej. Uwagą objęto jednak inne utwory, głównie te, w których portretowano konflikty społeczne czy też walkę z elementem nierosyjskim. Na kanon składały się zatem takie dzieła jak: Hajdamaki Tarasa Szewczenki, Borysław się śmieje Iwana Franki, Fatamorgana Mychajła Kociubyńskiego i in.

Sytuacja, w której zakazem publikowania objęto setki imion, tysiące utworów, wykluczono całe okresy i kierunki literackie, dziesiątki metod naukowych, w istotny sposób obniżała możliwości radzieckiego literaturoznawstwa ukraińskiego. Paradygmat stalinowski, narodowy w swej formie i internacjonalistyczny w treści, oznaczał tylko jedno – masowy napływ dyletantów, profanujących kulturę narodową, przekształcających ją w ideologiczną mównicę. Nieliczni ocalali fachowcy nie byli w stanie ochronić ukraińskiej nauki i literatury, przeciwdziałać portretowania ich jako peryferyjnych, wtórnych do nauki i literatury rosyjskiej. Tragedia literaturoznawstwa ukraińskiego w owym okresie tkwiła jednak jeszcze w czymś innym. Akceptując ową hybrydową tożsamość narodowo-klasową, stało się ono częścią bardziej ogólnego światopoglądu, którego idee i wartości rozpowszechniły się – poprzez instytucje akademickie, uniwersytety i szkoły – wśród następnych pokoleń. Reformowanie kanonu literackiego w czasach radzieckich odcisnęło swe piętno na systemie wartości ukraińskiego społeczeństwa, co w konsekwencji doprowadziło do osłabienia tożsamości narodowej jego członków. Okazało się, że zmiany te stały się fundamentalną przesłanką odpowiedzialną za kryzys społeczny, z jakim współczesna Ukraina musi się zmagać. Kryzys manifestujący się rewolucjami, imigracją naukową, zacofaniem programów oświatowych, wreszcie – wojną na Wschodzie.

Lesia Demska-Budzuliak, doktor, od 2014 roku docent w Zakładzie Teorii Literatury Instytutu Literatury im. Tarasa Szewczenki przy Narodowej Akademii Nauk Ukrainy (NANU), wykładowczyni akademicka, historyk literatury, tłumaczka z języka polskiego, pisarka. Autorka książki pt. Драма свободи у модернізмі. Пророчі голоси драматургії Лесі Українки (Київ: Академвидав, 2009) (w tłumaczeniu na pol.: Dramat wolności w modernizmie. Prorocze głosy w dramatach Lesi Ukrainki). Jej zainteresowanie badawcze to: antropologia kulturowa, historia literaturoznawstwa ukraińskiego (od końca XIX wieku do pierwszej połowy XX), problematyka gender.

Afiliacja:

Lesia Demska-Budzuliak

Instytut Literatury im. T. Szewczenki

PAN Ukrainy

Email: demska_l@ukr.net

Bibliografia:

Assmann, A. (2015). Wprowadzenie do kulturoznawstwa. Poznań: Wydawnictwo Nauka i Innowacje.

Doroszenko, W., 2000 = Дорошенко, В. (2000). Літературно-науковий вістник. W: Б. Ясінський (red.), Літературно-науковий вістник. Покажчик змісту. Том 1–109 (1898–1932). Київ-Нью-Йорк: Смолоскип.

Jekelczyk, S., 2008 = Єкельчик, С. (2008). Імперія пам’яті. Російсько-українські стосунки в радянській історичній уяві. Київ: Критика.

Lenin, W., 1981 = Ленін, В. Критичні замітки з національного питання. (1981) W: В. І. Ленін. Повне зібрання творів у 55 томах. Київ: Політвидав України.

Panczenko, W., 2015 = Панченко, В. (2015). Кільця на древі. Київ: ТОВ «Видавництво «Кліо».

Petrov, W., 1959 = Петров, В. (1959). Українські культурні діячі Української РСР 1920–1940 – жертви більшовицького терору. Нью-Йорк: Вид-во Пролог.

Thompson, E. M., 2008 = Томпсон, Е. М. (2008). Трубадури імперії. Російська література і колоніалізм. Київ: Основи.

Szkandrij, M., 2004 = Шкандрій, М. (2004). Модерністи, марксисти і нація. Українська літературна дискусія 1920-х років. Київ: Ніка-Центр.

The Issue of National Cultural Identity in the Soviet Ukrainian Literary Study in the 1920s.

Summary:

This article is devoted to identification of inclusive and exclusive identity of the Soviet Ukrainian Literary Study in the socio-cultural practices. The main objects of this analysis are literary canon represented by literary journals. We may allow the Soviet Ukrainian Literary Study is hybrid phenomenon as results of the soviet government policy and relations between ideology and propaganda.

Keywords:
national identity, inclusive identity, exclusive identity, Soviet Ukrainian literary study.

Identity building through perpetual choice: lyrical self in Vasyl Stus’s poetry

Yelyzaveta Taranukha
National University of “Kyiv-Mohyla Academy”

Abstract:

Based on the oeuvre of Vasyl Stus, the article investigates the origin of personal identity in Ukrainian poetry of the 20th century. The lyrical self in Stus’s poetry is supposed to be represented by identity building provided through perpetual choice. The article indicates and explores the connection between the choice of lyrical self and the topical concepts of Stus’s poetry, such as alive-death and death-life are. The article states that the lyrical self builds the identity perpetually by choosing beyond or within these concepts.

Keywords:
lyrical self, Vasyl Stus, identity, personal choice, authenticity.

Introduction

As a synthesis of phonic, visual, and semantic hypostasis poetry is based on the certain system of concepts. Probably due to this poetry-reader is constantly trying to catch the speaker’s voice in order to indicate the point. Generally the message and the form of its delivery may be named as a lyrical self, or subject/actor of lyrics.

Lyrical self is the main source to represent the author’s worldview. In poetry, lyrical self outlines the specific problems and offers the ways to solve them. Generally it is the union of key-ideas (concepts), integrated into the text by the means of symbols, and a set of tools (rhythm, verse, rhyme, and visual structure of lines). All together it makes lyrical semantics. Consequently, lyrical self is a voice speaking ideas of exact lyrical semantics.

This article is a part of the research on the broader topic entitled Lyrical self in the poetry of V.Stus, O. Zuyevskyi, and M. Atwood. The author assumes that totalitarian conditions in some degree influenced the lyrical self in Ukrainian poetry of 20th century. It is well-represented by Vasyl Stus’s poetry as its lyrical self is strongly connected with the problem of personal and national identity. Probably, identity is a cultural pattern in Ukrainian mythopoetics, it’s a measure of creative work and human honesty with other people and own self. In the poetry of Stus the problem of identity is one of the most spoken by lyrical self. Identity belongs there to sacred sphere and is built by perpetual private choice of the lyrical self. The article is an effort to explore in-depth the unique key-concepts shaping the lyrical self in Stus’s poetry.

The Origin of Personal Identity

Personal identity is a complex structure of the self-building which is determined by both external and interior factors. Roman Ingarden remarks that strict identity of human is an ontological principle of personal responsibility (Ингарден, 2010, p. 107). Identity comprises at least three basic patterns which are individual’s self-cognition, person’s acknowledgment by society, and human’s admission to the group (Матузкова, 2014, p. 17–18). Personal identity building frequently requires outlining of the links between the human and special communities which may be national, local, professional, or other groups. According to Anthony Smith, national identity as a multidimensional construction requires at least areal, mythological, historical, cultural, economic, and law unity of the community. In stateless countries identity supports the forces tending to become political equivalents of state power. The sense of national identity determines and orientates the self in the context of original culture. Opening the culture persons newly open themselves, they find out their authentic Self. In most cases the substantial tool to build national identity is ethnical basis of nation building (Сміт, 1994, p. 23–30).

Identity means the links between the world-view and different concepts of self. It is created through expression and representation of human choice. Through special values and national culture societies do represent different ways of being human (Тейлор, 2005, p. 636, 141, 91). Charles Taylor indicates acknowledgment, lack of it, or wrong acknowledgment as basic factors to shape identity. Correspondingly, person is existentially imprisoned and oppressed by the non-recognition and wrong acknowledgment. Identity strongly depends on the person’s relations with others. Impossible isolated identity as a construction originates only through inner and external dialogue with others (Тейлор, 2004, p. 29–37; Гнатюк, 2005, p. 84).

The next important hypostasis of personal identity is authenticity. Authenticity includes the creation, the development, and the disclosure to be related with the opposition to society’s rules and to be shaped through the dialogue between the human and the community. Containing the disclosure of the life itself authenticity is an idea of freedom (Тейлор, 2013, p. 56–57). On the personal level it is chiefly represented by honesty. Being honest with yourself means keeping honesty to your originality. The articulation and representation of originality determine the self of particular person. Honesty to the person’s nature is unique element to be actualized by human being. The main principle of authenticity concept is the honesty enforcing moral dimension of the culture. Authenticity makes important the image of person’s self-becoming. Moreover, it should be mentioned that people are able to understand themselves and to determine their identity only after having mastered various languages of human communication. Self-understanding is probably reached through personal choice to be provided in different spheres of human life. This choice is mostly represented by pivotal problems, which are existential for concrete person, and by variety of ways to solve them according to unique moral imperative of human (Тейлор, 2013, p. 28, 36).

To conclude, personal identity is built through the dialogue between the person and the communities. This perpetual conversation is generally supported by searching for authenticity and reaching self-understanding. Having personal moral rules and keeping them strictly in all spheres of existence lead to identity shaping and development of the unique way to be a human.

Personal Choice as Identity-Builder

As a cogitative and a social creature human being seeks for self-understanding through being understood by community. Although this aspiration might be provided various ways, the tendency is that the person tries to achieve the self-understanding despite the hostility of the life conditions. Limited in social activities or imprisoned the human repeatedly immerges in the freedom of thought. This inner space allows person to confirm own unicity, to delineate the borders of personal self, and to build the personal identity. Moreover, identity building is often accomplished through creative work by retransmission of the person’s inner existence. The handholding of unsteady emotional states and desperate ideas, the perpetual self-filling, and the constant self-search altogether help the poet to build the personal identity and demonstrate it somehow by the form of the lyrical self. Totalitarian regimes of the 20th century showed that the human tends to seek for self-understanding against and despite: against complicated historical conditions and despite the lack of political freedom. Vasyl Stus is an outstanding example of such personality in Ukrainian poetry of the 20th century.

The self-assertion as universal and atemporal practice is related to human desire of self-cognition and personal identity building. It is strongly connected with the personal choice of the way to be a human. The self-assertion as the main principle of Stus’s life and creative work shapes the lyrical self of his poetry. The lyrical self of Stus’s poetry seeks for the answer of how to stay human in totalitarian conditions of personality eradication. According to Hannah Arendt (1996), prisoners of the totalitarian camp were the object of experiment provided by totalitarian power as there person’s individuality was exposed to be totally destructed (Арендт, 1996, p. 590). In conditions of public activities expropriation human being is led to submerge into the space of the freedom of thought. Correspondingly, the humaneness declines as much as the person refuses the freedom of thinking. Being simultaneously alienated from the hostile reality and taking this reality into account allow to open the sphere of freedom and to transmit this inner space of thought through creative work (Арендт, 2008, p. 32–46). This probably explains why imprisoned Vasyl Stus tried to send his poetry abroad so that to publish the created texts and share them with the human community.

Art itself is the dimension of artist’s freedom. Philippe Sers determines the art as a mechanism of the reasoning, the moral and the philosophical choice. The inner experience of the human living in totalitarian conditions is the kind of the evidence exposure (Серс, 2004, p. 14, 118). In case of Stus the experience of surviving in totalitarian conditions is probably transformed by the poet through the way that allows demonstrating of the reality by the means of the poetry. As Ingarden(1996) states, the literature text is intensional, intersubjective, and transcendental in reference to the feelings of both author and reader. The text itself in contradistinction from its concretely perceived version contains the gaps to be filled in by reader and includes the plan of images which possibly might be completed by interpreter (Інґарден, 1996, p.136–163). For this reason, the poetry of Stus is the colossal source of searching for authenticity which needs being explicated and reviewed through the prism of the lyrical self-development.

Personality building is supposed to be the key-tool to resist totalitarian regime. In totalitarian conditions creative work helps human to control the sense and to save personal freedom. The distinctive feature of personality is denial of the common consensus in favor of the subjective attitude to the absolute and inviolable things. That’s why personality building is the choice of the way to achieve this absolute. It requires specific tools to determine the sense and values. In such conditions the sense is originated as a result of the connection between the inspiration and the possibility. The creative work becomes an indicator of artist’s personality to be built (Серс, 2004, p. 187–210).

In USSR the building of personality started since the shaping of nationalistic sense which creation was strictly suppressed by the totalitarian system. Ernest Gellner (1991) claims the importance of nationalistic sense as a substantial element of personal identity in the post-industrial world. Nationalism is a principle in concordance with which political and ethnical units must coincide. In this paradigm nationalistic sense means both indignation caused by nationalism infracted and contentment resulted by nationalism embodied (Геллнер, 1991, p. 5–23). It should be noticed that strengthening of the person’s nationalistic sense occurs simultaneously with self-understanding and accepting the reality as it is, through searching the answer for eternal question “Who am I in this world?”. Taking into account the life and the oeuvre of Stus might be concluded that to be human in totalitarian condition means for person to choose whether cooperate with the system or resist it. Resistance foresees keeping ethical principles and nationalistic sense, living in the freedom of thought and creating art against and despite.

Totalitarian regimes demonstrated that staying human means behaving the way to correspond the keeping of personal ethical principles which contradict the ideology. The texts of Stus broadcast his inner life to the outside world by balancing on the edge of existence through the search of the self provided as an everlasting renewal and personality building. Therefore identity building means a perpetual self-development which in totalitarian conditions helps person to resist the system and to save the authenticity. Stus’s personal choice of the way to be human was developed at least in four aspects which might be determined as the direct resistance (writing of the letters-appeals, letters-accusations, letters to close people, and poetry creating), the outstanding behavior (indignation concerning the arrests of Ukrainian intellectuals, keeping the personal ethical rules, hunger-strikes, angriness caused by prison-workers’ behavior, and claim for justice), the freethinking provided in creative work (poetry, diary, and correspondence), and the connection with the free world (delivery of the texts abroad in order to have them published there).

In order to outline the personal choice of lyrical self in Stus’s poetry it should be noticed that his texts have specific character. For instance, Yuriy Shevelov (1987) defines Stus’s texts as the non-program poetry reflecting the thoughts and feelings in the process of their shaping. The treasure of such poetry is in the inconstancy of the feelings of lyrical self. The lyrics of Stus are produced by the shifting from the observed world to the poet’s inner feeling. The topics and motives are only the exits to the inner world, to the diary of the soul, to the unsent letters about interior world of Stus’s personality. The poorer external world is, the more separated and distinguished become the substantial, spiritual and mental aspects of lyrical self, the more noticeable appear the dynamics of psychical motions and the richness of transformed thoughts and moods (Шевельов, 1987, p. 371–372).

Having a closer look at Stus’s poetry reader might find out that it contains several typical motives to be varied from text to text accordingly to the emotional state of the lyrical self. All of these motives are connected to identity shaping. In this part of the article the attention should be paid to the motives which are related to the personal choice provided by lyrical self. The first and the strongest motif of Stus’s poetry is the free will of doom acceptance. For example, in the poetry (1) (“The broken branch of the evening is trembling…”) the lyrical self provides the supraliminal choice of the doom, the trials, and the precious death: “I bless your autarchy, / the road of doom, the road of pain!…Let me, God, be highly destroyed! / Freely is trembling the broken branch” (Стус, 2010, p. 10, 12). The motif of the free choice is repeated in the short poetry (52): “Haven’t live till the harvest, haven’t get the crop, / neither have loved. And nor lived. No regret” (Cтус, 2010, p. 84). This motif is modified in the (14) poetry (“The church of St. Iryna…”): “The darkness wraps the throat / you can’t breathe. / Hello, my black misfortune, / hello, my holy way” (Стус, 2010, p. 28).

Free choice motif is connected with the second one which may be entitled as being happy by the choice’s results. It is well represented in (53) (“God, angriness pure…”): “I disperse the yearning by thought / to be always the same / as my mom did bear me / and did bless me go in. / And for good that she couldn’t / save me from the misfortune” (Стус, 2010, p. 84). The happiness by results of the choice are shown in the (33) (“Workdays there are like holiday…”): “Although the creative house / is too drilled by gazes, / although your bare heart / is there touched by hands, / never mind, don’t be angry: / this eternal above us / will take out shafts from wound / and will kiss it; / wave desired / saves by killing” (Стус, 2010, p. 54). In this poetry the redemption of lyrical self is supposed to happen through eradication. In (60) (“Through hundreds doubts I go to you”) the choice is identified as the only right way to get: “Through hundreds doubts I go to you, / the good and truth of epoch. Through hundreds / disillusions… / And the ardour predicts me: never stop, go on. / This way is faithful. You are its precursor” (Стус, 2010, p. 98). Being sure that the way is right gives lyrical self the strength to keep on the self building. This motif is demonstrated, for instance, in (37) (“Only you consecrate the world…”): “Only you make my heart shout. / Only you give me force go / ahead the world storm, / Only You, only You” (Стус, 2010, p. 60).

In the context of identity building the third motif of the Stus’s poetry is probably the independence of lyrical self. It allows lyrical self to observe the world as if the self is out of the world: (34) (“On the equal quadrates…”) “Equal right for all to suffer / and to endure the same pressure. / Victim and the executioner both feel bad / but none happy. / All are doomed to die / behind the seven locks. / That is you, the human sorrow, / that is you, the black chaos, / the democracy of humility / and the freedom of the dumbness/… Violated souls in vain / with no reason, no goal / honeycomb of passionate distress / with wild honey of solitude. / With wild honey of solitude” (Стус, 2010, p. 56). There the lyrical self is beyond the world, it observes everything from outside. Through the independent view and evaluation the lyrical self chooses to leave the antithetical world, to rid of odd and usual things, to get an opportunity of being free in the space of thought. Lyrical self saves the ataraxy facing with the hard obstacles, stays estimable tending to have the revenge for personal origin and the death (9) (“Away the memoir – away from eyes…”): “If the lake we swim, / if the ford we go, / if the wall we creep / through the labyrinth of disasters / up to the personal time border / where the highest reward / and the most honest is revenge / for our arrival and our goal / being burden by the cross” (Стус, 2010, p. 20). Finally, the self is built through reaching the identity. It is clearly shown in the (35) (“Is it possible you are born, man…”): “Is it possible that your life doesn’t call you? / Or you cognized your life way / on this sad joyless job / where everything is covered by the human torment. / You are still standing in my deep grief / my weak heart / sympathizes your misfortune. You are twice more unhappy / than me. I am the self. You are just shadow. / I am the good. But you are rot and temporality. / The common is that we are both imprisoned, / for both sides of the door. You there and me here. / The wall us separated like the statute” (Стус, 2010, p. 58). The motif of self-creating is crystallized when the self is rid of the troubles and fears, when the self accepts the doom and the world as they are (150) (“A bit more better near God’s gates…”): “A bit more better near God’s gates / human soul can feel itself. / I rid of you, my alert. / There is no world. I exist myself. / Around me is only cold earth thick. / I am magma of magma, am voice of pain’s pain. / What did you get betraying own fortune, / you fiber of eternal shrub? / What did you find? You did fall deep in earth / from seven skies you fell with your head down”) (Стус, 2010, p. 254).

To summarize, the perpetual choice of the lyrical self in Stus’s poetry is connected with at least four motives to be shifted from text to text. These motives are the free will of doom acceptance, being happy by the choice’s results, the independence of the lyrical self, and reaching the identity through the self creating. The emotional state of the lyrical self fluctuates and changes but the motives are constant.

Beyond or within: the Lyrical Self and Alive-death/Dead-life Concepts

The image of palimpsest is symbolical for Stus’s poetry. Palimpsest is a metaphor of Ukrainian 1960th generation who reviewed the former arts experience through having extracted the new senses from it and by having created the new word on the tradition. Taking this into account the main principle of Stus’s poetry might be indicated as a conception of human self-actualization in the conditions of boundary existence (Тарнашинська, 2013, p. 55, 68). Thus, Stus’s poetry expressively represents the unique phenomenon of the creation of artistic word provided on the intersection of experience and boundary existence. This boundary being is based on self-destruction and self-burning. Simultaneously it is accompanied by the belief in eternal return and the expectation of supreme truth.

The lyrical self in Stus poetry is supposed to be beyond or within the observed reality. This principle is realized by the concepts which might be entitled as alive-death and dead-life. As a result of perpetual choice, lyrical self fluctuates between alive-death and dead-life. These concepts are strongly related to the motif of being honest with own self. It is transformed into different symbols such as a mirror, a fluctuating branch, or eternal movement. For instance, in (3) (“Hundred of mirrors are directed to me”) the mirror is a means to provide the self-reflection: “Hundred of mirrors are directed to me / exactly on my solitude and voicelessness. / Are you there? Are you really there? Maybe / not. Sure, you are not / …. Who are you? Alive or dead? Or maybe / both alive and dead and being yourself?”(Стус, 2010, p. 14). Moreover, the motif of fluctuation (not a branch but the pine-tree) is supposed to be a vision of Ukraine’s future, the important goal to be achieved through the accepting of the person’s doom: (12) (“The pine-tree emerged as a ship…”) “But you are already on opposite side, beyond the edge / where the frail phantom is being trembled. / There is Ukraine. Beyond. / Left turn from heart. Cause of young grief / pine-tree emerges through the night like ship. / God whispers thirstily: I will pay you back!”(Стус, 2010, p. 24).

The ability to watch out the space from beyond the daily reality symbolizes some sort of alternative existence to be achieved through the constant movement. It might be presented by the water flow or diving into space of thought. In (28) (”The water whimpers…”) the water appears as a metaphor of movement: “The water whimpers. The same way time is running / approximating me to the time term. / Away from memories – observed is only blackness of the holes. / The road’s free of mines – please go! / The blessed are climbings and the abysms / and glorified the native land!”(Стус, 2010, p. 48). Time rids the person of the memories and allows reviewing of the things: the observer is located beyond the reality, in the alternative space, out of the edge. Correspondingly existence is determined as a constant moving beyond or within the world.

Lyrical self is constantly exploring the inner space of personal thought. For instance, in (44) (“Meanwhile reading Yasunari Kavabata”) the goal of this movement is ideal middle located in the space of thought and self-understanding: “Spread, my soul, / for four tatami. / And don’t bend cause of strokes / and don’t close yourself with the hands. / Although you have two borders / the middle is true. / The enemy fails guessing / whether young this truth is or mature. / In the middle the trunk of the years, / on the sides their top. / In the middle the eternal trace is / from the cradle to death” (Стус, 2010, p. 70). Reaching the desired middle is the destination of identity building, the best expectation of self-becoming.

The concepts of alive-death and dead-life probably allow finding the way of identity creation. Stus’s lyrical self accepts the death as a logical way to exist. For example, in (42) (“It’s great I don’t afraid of death…”) the concept of alive-death is supported by the motif of eternal return: “My nation, I’ll come back to you / in death I turn to life / my face is not evil, it’s just afflicted. / As a son I will bow down you / and honestly will stare into your eyes / and in the death I’ll be connected with my native land” (Стус, 2010, p. 66). In (90) (“How strongly want die!”) lyrical self wishes to die in order to reach the alternative reality: “How strongly want die! / For silence avoiding, / for shout escaping… Being unnoticed, to reach / beyond the expectation border, / beyond the horizon of impossibility, / beyond the wall of humility, / beyond the grating of madness, / beyond the fierceness, the borders, / beyond the vines of appeals” (Стус, 2010, p.154, 156).

The motif of consciousness choice of death is connected with the concept of everlasting movement. For instance, in (140) (“Today is the farewell time…”) lyrical self appeals to fly ahead to the supreme aim despite the obstacles and against so called “half-reality”: “To sky, to upper height, to black / to sun, fly, Icarus, ahead! / Equivalent to death we are. / Equivalent to death we reach the goals. / Oh kingdom of half-hearts, half-hopes, half-piers, / half-intentions, the kingdom of half-struggles and half-soules! / The last way of testing is gnashing in metal, / is roaring in metal. / The fragile and florid, the all-falling road. / The road to God is fragile and florid” (Стус, 2010, p. 242). There the half-life is being criticized as the betrayal the self’s authenticity. The way of half-life might be generalized as alive-death concept. Conversely, to be a human means to move perpetually ahead and accept the doom as it is: (158) (“Let the night be lacklustrer than the dark…”) “Let the night be paler than the dark is. / Let the day be the blacker than night is”. / Let your secret be poured / in the tenderness’s shine let the lightest of faces be. /…Ought to die gloriously if this is doomed / for living your personal age, not the humility…/ Let the fire be burnt / let the grey spirit up-move / to be recollected by both stupid enemy / and incomprehensible friend” (Стус, 2010, p. 268).

To conclude, the personal choice in Stus’s poetry is the main tool to build identity of the lyrical self. Being beyond or within the reality, lyrical self surfs through alive-death and dead-life concepts. The eternal movement is supposed to be the only true means to find the identity. In this case the sphere of inner space is probably the main area to reach the personal authenticity. Thus, to be a human means to move perpetually ahead and accept the doom as it is.

Conclusions

Personal identity is built through the dialogue between the person and communities. This perpetual conversation is provided by searching for authenticity and reaching self-understanding. The texts of Stus broadcast his inner life to the outside world by balancing on the edge of existence through the search of the self provided as an everlasting renewal and personality building.

The perpetual choice of the lyrical self in Stus’s poetry is connected with at least four motives to be shifted from text to text. These motives are the doom acceptance, being happy by the choice’s results, the independence of the lyrical self, and reaching the identity through the self creating. The lyrical self is beyond or within the observed reality. As a result of perpetual choice, lyrical self fluctuates between alive-death and dead-life. Alternative existence is supposed to be achieved only through the constant movement beyond or within the world, through the deep dive into inner space of personal thought. This movement builds identity of lyrical self. Stus’s lyrical self accepts the doom moving perpetually ahead.

Yelyzaveta Taranukha is a first year PhD candidate at the Department of Literature Studies of the National University of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy (Kyiv, Ukraine); research profile – comparative literature studies. Yelyzaveta is also engaged in 4-year PhD program “Philosophy and Literature” at the Yuchymenko family Doctoral School. She is a researcher in Canadian-Ukrainian comparative studies. Yelyzaveta’s research topic is “Lyrical self in poetry of V.Stus, O.Zuyevskyi, and M. Atwood”. Besides literature studies, Yelyzaveta is Ukrainian language teacher in Ukrainian Language Department of the National University of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy. Her specific teaching method is based on fairy-tales. Moreover, Yelyzaveta volunteers leading English speaking club for children.

Afiliacja:

Yelyzaveta Taranukha

Department of Literature Studies

National University of “Kyiv-Mohyla Academy “

Email: zazafisher@gmail.com

Bibliography:

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Арендт, Х. (2008). Люди за темних часів: пер. з англ. Київ: ДУХ І ЛІТЕРА, 320 с.

Василь Стус в житті, творчості, спогадах та оцінках сучасників (1987). Упоряд. О. Зінкевич і М. Француженко. Торонто, Балтимор: Укр. Вид-во «Смолоскип» ім. В. Симоненка, 463 с.

Геллнер, Э. (1991). Нации и национализм:пер. с англ. Москва: Прогресс, 320 c.

Гнатюк, О. (2005). Прощання з імперією: Українські дискусії про ідентичність: пер. з польської. Київ: Критика, 528 с.

Інґарден, Р. (1996). Про пізнавання літературного твору (фрагменти): пер. Н. Римської. Слово. Знак. Дискурс. Антологія світової літературно-критичної думки ХХ ст. Львів: с.136–163

Ингарден, Р. (2010). Книжечка о человеке: пер Е. С. Твердисловой. Москва: Издательство Московского университета, 208 с.

Лефор К. (2000). Политические очерки (XIX–XX века): пер. с фр. Е.А.Самарской. Москва: РОССПЭН, 367 с

Матузкова О.П. (2014). Ідентичність як структура. Наукові записки НаУКМА.Т.164. Філологічні науки (Мовознавство). Київ, с.15–19

Серс Ф. (2004). Тоталитаризм и авангард. В преддверии запредельного: пер. с англ. Дубин С. Б. Москва: Прогресс-Традиция, 336 с.

Сміт Д. Ентоні. (1994). Національна ідентичність: пер. з англ. Київ: «ОСНОВИ», 223 с.

Стус В. (2010). Палимпсесты=Палімпсести: на укр. и рус. яз. Харьков: Фолио, 284 с.

Стус В. (1994). Твори у 4-х т. 6 кн. Т.4. Львів, 543 с.

Тарнашинська Л. (2013). Сюжет доби: дискурс шістдесятництва в українській літературі ХХ століття. Київ: Академперіодика, 674 с.

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Budowanie tożsamości poprzez nieustanny wybór. „Ja” liryczne w poezji Wasyla Stusa.

Streszczenie:

Opierając się na przykładzie Wasyla Stusa, w artykule przedmiotem badania uczyniono genezę tożsamości jednostkowej w dwudziestowiecznej poezji ukraińskiej. „Ja” liryczne w poezji Stusa wydaje się być reprezentowane przez tożsamość kształtowaną w wyniku nieustannych wyborów. W artykule wskazuje się na związek między wyborem dokonywanym przez podmiot a głównymi pojęciami obecnymi w poezji Wasyla Stusa, takimi jak żywy-martwy czy śmierć-życie. Zakłada się przy tym, że podmiot nieustannie buduje swą tożsamość wybierając między tymi pojęciami.

Słowa kluczowe:
„Ja” liryczne, Wasyl Stus, tożsamość, wolny wybór, autentyczność.

Thou Shalt Not Speak: Divine Violence in Serhiy Zhadan’s The Life of the Virgin Mary (2015)

Natalya Domina
University of Western Ontario

The fall sky above them is made of ice and steel.

Cold rivers. Unknown faces.

What they fear most is that this will keep going.

What they fear most is that nothing is on the way.

Serhiy Zhadan, The Life of the Virgin Mary[1]

Abstract:

Divine violence, says Walter Benjamin in his Critique of Violence, is “the sign and seal but never the means of sacred execution.” A Ukrainian writer Serhiy Zhadan in his 2015 collection of poetry and translations The Life of the Virgin Mary, frames his narrative of the war in Donbas as dystopia with divine violence being the driving force. The text also problematizes the possibility of a dialogue as the means to stop subjective violence.

Keywords:
violence, divine violence, dystopia, Serhiy Zhadan, Walter Benjamin.

The question of violence is linked to that of law and justice. More specifically, according to Walter Benjamin and Hannah Arendt, it is centered on the problem of means and ends. A question that arises is whether violence is still justified with moral means and just ends. For positive law violence is concerned with just means and natural law with just ends. The first is blind to ends and the second – to means, says Benjamin in his Critique of Violence (Benjamin, 1986, p. 279). He also suggests looking at sanctioned and unsanctioned violence that positive law uses to assess the legality of violence. The Law’s monopoly of violence, Benjamin argues, is not about preserving ends, but about preserving the law itself because (…) violence, when not in hands of the law, threatens it not by the ends that it may pursue but by its mere existence outside the law (Ibid., p. 281). As an example, he talks about civil strikes that, being sanctioned by the state, threaten the legal system that gave them this very right. Thus violence as a means is either lawmaking or law-preserving (Ibid., p. 287). What eliminates this problem is the idea of pure immediate violence or divine violence. This kind of violence cannot be seen and is never means of sacred execution. Benjamin distinguishes between mythical and divine violence saying: mythical violence is bloody power over mere life for its own sake, divine violence pure power over all life for the sake of the living. The first demands sacrifice, the second accepts it (Ibid., p. 297) Divine violence suspends the law and is considered “sovereign.”

A case study of such sovereign divine violence, as I argue, could be Serhiy Zhadan’s book of poetry and translations The Life of the Virgin Mary / Життя Марії (2015). Its central narrative mirrors the Book of Revelation and tells a story of the Donbas war as Apocalypse. It also problematizes the possibility of a dialogue as the means to stop subjective violence.

Zhadan frames his book with a translation of Rainer Maria Rilke’s poem Annunciation to Mary and a few poems by Czesław Miłosz. Together they refer to the Gospels. Zhadan juxtaposes his poems on the ongoing war in Donbas with the ones by Miłosz on pre – and post-apocalyptic Warsaw during World War II. Both Donbas and Warsaw are imagined as dystopian spaces that are ruled by violence. However, if Miłosz’s last poem in Zhadan’s book Escape/Втеча ends with the utopian dream (=escapism) of a new nation that is free from evil and happiness (We were destined to give birth to the new people in this desert/ free from evil and happiness. / Нам судилось новий народ народити по цій пустелі, / вільний від зла і щастя (Zhadan, 2015, p. 178)), Zhadan’s narrative remains in the time of history; in other words, it is the ongoing one: The lights are on, animals are falling asleep, winters keep coming / Горять вогні, засинають тварини, тривають зими (Ibid., p. 143)

For Zhadan there is still life after Apocalypse. Like in the short novella The Grand Inquisitor that is part of Dostoevsky’s novel The Brothers Karamazov, there is no place for Christ precisely because people choose happiness over freedom and consequently Satan over Christ. Choosing the latter would mean the end of history of mankind and Christ certainly understands it. His violent gesture, namely, the kiss which he grants the Grand Inquisitor with, only seals the deal. However, if Dostoevsky’s The Grand Inquisitor is a deliberately prophetic text, Zhadan’s The Life of the Virgin Mary plays with the posibility of being prophetic.

The choice of happiness over freedom is yet again reaffirmed:

One must come to terms with the fact that/Everything will pass. /One must not talk /about what is key and what is important. / one will come to fear freedom, /remain in the boundaries. /Happiness is not to be avoided/ Happiness is not to avoided.

Доведеться змиритися з тим, /що все мине. / Доведеться не говорити /про важливе та головне,/ Доведеться боятись свободи, / триматися меж. / Щастя не оминеш. / Щастя не оминеш. (Zhadan, 2015, p. 27)

Similar to The Grand Inquisitor, The Life of the Virgin Mary presents the opposition “our children” vs. Christ. The former (children of Donbas) force Christ out of their land but call for his return later to save them:

Let him take all these people, / let him amuse them with his ideas. / Let him come back later to save if not us, then at least our children.

Хай забирає звідси всіх цих людей, / хай тішить їх якоюсь із власних ідей. / Хай повернеться згодом, щоб врятувати якщо не нас, то хоча би наших дітей.

(Ibid., p. 9)

Here we see another opposition that has to do with subjective violence: people vs. their enemies (= “всіх цих людей” / all those people). The collective “we” is juxtaposed with “вороги”/ enemies , “чужі”, “чужинці” / others / foreigners:

But we who our enemies are / We know how many comb the beaches / How many work in out factories / How many pray to our gods (…) And that’s why our kids want us to tell him / Get out of here, go back to his darnkess / take all of these foreigners with you/ Everyone who, for some inexplicable reason trust him.

Але ми самі знаємо своїх ворогів. / Знаємо, скільки їх снує вздовж берегів, / Скільки їх працює на наших заводах, / Скільки їх звертається до наших богів {…} І тому наші діти просять переказати йому: / Хай забирається звідси в свою пітьму, / І хай із ним забираються всі ці чужинці, / всі хто вірить йому, невідомо чому.

(Ibid., p. 9)

The problem of the “other” is crucially important for understanding The Life of the Virgin Mary. The “others” are both internally displaced people and those who remain in destroyed towns. Moreover, the characters that are literally on the road continue Zhadan’s motif of homelessness that Tamara Hundorova in her Pislyachornobylska Biblioteka defines as the key of Zhadan’s oeuvre (Hundorova, 2013, p. 252). According to Hundorova, Sergiy Zhadan’s marginal characters – eternal teenagers from the 1990s – symbolically renounced their parents. They neither grew up, nor found home (Ibid., p. 253). Moving through various topoi – railway stations, asylum, church, check points – the homeless characters of The Life of the Virgin Mary simultaneously encounter violence and spread it further. In a way, they are the carriers of an infection. This theme is well illustrated in the chapter titled “why I am not in social networks” /“чому мене немає в соціальних мережах.” The characters such as a tattoo artist, brothers Adventists, mentally ill person, shop looter, quiet drunkard, etc. serve as object of the divine sacrifice to channelize violence. What defines them is their otherness and thus exclusion from the community.

Christian universality “love thy neighbor” already implies exclusion, notes Slavoj Žižek in his book on violence: the notion of neighbor is incompatible with that of universality. This so-called all-inclusive attitude involves (…) a thorough exclusion of those who do not accept inclusion into the Christian community (Žižek, 2008, p. 54).

As if following Žižek’s notion, Zhadan’s narrative is constructed in the way that “love thy neighbor” transforms itself into “fear the neighbor.” However, Zhadan insists on not embracing the differences, but on emphasizing the sameness:

I am just like you: i have the same bristle, same tanning, same angry wife, / same burns and cuts, and a thin net of wrinkles. / same outrage at our unfair treatment at the hands of the Lord; /The same willingness to use any chance / To show my strength, to demonstrate my guile. / So go ahead and kill me for our shared woes /for everything we’ve been taught. / Wake me up in the middle of the night with heavy keys. / In response I’ll also be killing you / Recalling all your flaws.

Я такий, як і ти: в мене така ж щетина, / Така ж невитравна засмага, така ж холодна дружина, / Опіки і порізи, зморшок тонка павутина. / Така ж образа на господню несправедливість, / Готовність використати найменшу можливість, / Показати незламність, виявити кмітливість. / Давай, убивай мене за наші спільні печалі, / Убивай за все, чого нас колись навчали, / Буди мене серед ночі важкими ключами. / Я теж у відповідь буду тебе вбивати, / Буду собі пригадувати усі твої вади.

(Zhadan, 2015, p. 17)

The question is, however, how can we approach the language of the other?

The problem of violence is that of language. To name something means to designate its borders, to reduce it to something else. Language, according to Žižek, (…) dismembers the thing, destroying its organic unity, treating its parts and properties as autonomous. It inserts the thing into a field of meaning which is ultimately external to it (Žižek, 2008, p. 61) By this logic speech itself is always an act of violence. Poetic narrativization of the war in Donbas is thus unconditionally imbedded in the discourse of violence and, perhaps, itself multiplies violence. However, entering into a dialogue leads to understanding of what sustains it. Slavoj Žižek puts it quite elegantly: The wall of language which forever separates me from the abyss of another subject is simultaneously that which opens up and sustains this abyss – the very obstacle that separates me from the Beyond is what creates its mirage (Ibid., p. 73)

What Zhadan does in his The Life of the Virgin Mary is precisely this: he draws an apocalyptic picture of divine violence where humans are the ultimate losers and another one, ruled by subjective violence, where there is still a possibility for a dialogue and first of all the dialogue with oneself.

Natalya Domina is a PhD student in Comparative Literature at the University of Western Ontario, Canada. She holds a BA and an MA from the National University of “Kyiv-Mohyla Academy”. Natalya’s research interests include utopian discourse, violence, and soviet and post-soviet literatures.

Afiliacja:

Natalya Domina

University of Western Ontario, Canada

Email: domina.nata@gmail.com

Bibliography:

Benjamin, W. (1986). Critique of Violence In: W. Benjamin, Reflections: Essays, Aphorisms, Autobiographical Writings (pp. 277–300). New York: Schocken Books.

Hundorova, T. (2013) Pislyachornobylska Biblioteka. Kyiv: Krytyka.

Zhadan, S. (2015) Zhyttya Marii. Chernivtsi: Meridian Chernowitz.

Žizěk, S. (2008). Violence: Six Sideways Reflections. New York: Picador.

„Nie będziesz bluźnił przeciw Bogu!”. Boska przemoc w Żywocie Maryi (2015) Serhija Żadana.

Streszczenie:

Boska przemoc jest, jak twierdzi Walter Benjamin w Krytyce Przemocy: znakiem i pieczęcią, ale nigdy środkiem świętej egzekucji. Ukraiński pisarz i poeta Serhij Żadan w wydanym w 2015 roku zbiorze poezji i przekładów pt. Żywot Maryi, wkomponowuje swą narrację o wojnie w Donbasie jako dystopii w ramy owej boskiej przemocy, stanowiącej jej siłę napędową. W tekście przedmiotem refleksji uczyniono także możliwość dialogu jako środka powstrzymującego subiektywną przemoc.

Słowa kluczowe:
przemoc, boska przemoc, dystopia, Serhij Żadan, Walter Benjamin.

1 Here and below the translations from Ukrainian are mine.

Sameness/Otherness: Identity, Time, and Body in Iryna Shuvalova’s Poetry

Iryna Borysiuk
National University of “Kyiv-Mohyla Academy”

Abstract:

The article studies different forms of identity representation in contemporary Ukrainian poetry using as an example the texts of Iryna Shuvalova. Shuvalova’s poetry is discussed in a liaison with ideological and artistic changes in a literary process from the late Soviet era till post-Independent times. The article examines the process of identity building based on interaction between the Self / the Other, the private and the national, the female and the male. Besides that, the article investigates interconnections between language, corporeality, and time, which are conceptualized as different forms of identity building.

Keywords:
identity, Iryna Shuvalova, national identity, contemporary Ukrainian poetry, the Self / the Other.

Introduction

Importance of the national identity problem for the Ukrainian humanitarian space under the current circumstances is conditioned by the requirement of not only an appropriate revision of the past, but also creation of the vision of the future. Taking into account current events, not the Independence of Ukraine, but Maydan and the continuing war with Russia appear to be the true farewell to the empire (O. Hnatiuk). Obsessively cultivated over recent years attractiveness of the Soviet and Russian in the Ukrainian information space becomes the past that has to be redefined in order to dispose of it finally. On the other hand, the European project becomes the future as the goal to be pursued. Undoubtedly, it means not only objectivity of the vector of policy or the cultural strategy, but also subjective projections, stereotypes and mythologizing. In this perspective the Soviet is felt as a collective shadow of the Ukrainian society, the reflection of defects and fears that have to be liquidated. Instead the European is conceptualized as an ideal image of the Self to be built. What is important, in discussions of the European identity we can observe the emergence of the controversial concept of the paradox identity understood as to become a European[1] (Кастільйо, 2014, pp. 446–456).

At the same time, the current war not only places everyone in the situation of the existential choice but also as litmus demonstrates fundamental diversity of the Ukrainian society; in this way ethnic (Crimean Tatar, Jewish, Polish, Georgian etc.), local (Donetsk, Galician, Crimean etc.), social (a middle class, a working class etc.) and other identities are actualized. Moreover, under such conditions, the identity expression means not exclusion (either Ukrainian, or Crimean Tatar, for example), but augment, creation of the complicated identity (for instance, the Russian speaking Ukrainian citizen of Jewish origin from Donetsk). From this point of view, it makes sense to speak about the hierarchy of identities: supernational (European / Post-Soviet), national (Ukrainian, Russian etc.), and subnational (local, ethnic, religious etc.). Moreover, a consistent pattern of identity creation can be observed – on the one hand, the Ukrainian and European, and, on the other hand, the Russian and post-Soviet.

Identity building is connected with re-thinking categories of memory, heritage, tradition/ modernity, the Self /the Other (acceptance/rejection of the Other). The conceptual pureness of these categories is clearly seen when functioning in the publicist discourse, in sociological, political or cultural domains as the direct position of the author. Therefore, basing on the publicist discourse, Olia Hnatiuk has analyzed coexistence and competition of the different identity projects in Ukraine in the first post-Independent decade (Гнатюк, 2005).

However, clear categorization and differentiation become problematical in case of studying the literature that is not connected with the actual moment – in particular, poetry. But the concept of identity (and the national identity as well) can serve as a basis for the analyses of Ukrainian poetry. Here are some questions concerning the problem of extracting of this concept from the poetic texts. In what way the problem of identity is outlined in a poetic text? Can we speak about generation peculiarities of identity representation in the texts of several authors? What are characteristics of a literary process observed particularly through the prism of changes in the identity representation? In this article, I propose to examine these questions through analyzing the poetic texts of Iryna Shuvalova – the author debuting in 2011 with her first collection Ran.

Identity as a Project

This paper is a part of a wider study that investigates consistent patterns of national identity representations in contemporary Ukrainian poetry since the 70s. That was when the emergence of the Kyiv School of Poetry and the Lviv Circle signalized about a decisive break with the tradition of Socialist Realism. The fact is, for the 60s generation the national was the natural part of the Soviet, but for the 70s and 80s generations the national existed beyond or rather above the Soviet as a non-official part of the cultural space (not least for the reason of the prohibition of printing for some representatives of the 70s generation).

First of all, an appeal to the problem of identity in the Soviet empire was conditioned by a desire of a human being to save the private territory of his (her) life in circumstances of a total control and manipulation. This total control (M. Foucault has applied the term panopticon, invented by J. Bentham, for describing the situation of destroying of the private space through total obsessive watching) indicates the situation of erosion of private and public space verges, whereas manipulation means unsteadiness of ethic, axiological, and worldview coordinates of the human existence. Accordingly, building of identity signifies foremost the search of fulcrum in the inverted world of obsessive watching and a total control. Besides that, the national identity was the only way for the 80s generation to form their otherness in the homogenizing space of the empire: according to Smith, nationalism became a vehicle for rapid social changes, for mobilizing people, for claiming a ‘homeland’ by redrawing the map (1999, p. 61).

Consequently, it is important to clarify the term “national identity”. In this context the definition of a nation by Smith seems to be the most appropriate: the nation is a named and self-defined human community whose members cultivate shared myths, memories, symbols, values, and traditions, reside in and identify with a historic homeland, create and disseminate a distinctive public culture, and observe shared customs and common laws (2008, p. 34). In other words, the first and most important characteristic of the nation for Smith is its cultural determination. Moreover, the nation may be defined more precisely as a cultural project (Ivan Lysyy), forasmuch as the nation is not inalterable, and it constantly creates and re-signifies itself (Lysyy, 2013, p. 49). Out of this, the nation is a project of not only shaping and re-shaping of the past, but also forming the future (Ibid., p. 30). In that perspective, the national identity may be defined as the continuous reproduction and reinterpretation of the pattern of values, symbols, memories, myths, and traditions that compose the distinctive heritage of nations, and the identification of individuals with that pattern and heritage (Smith, 2008, p. 34).

On the one hand, the problem of identity (from Latin: identitas as sameness) is drawn first of all as the search of the base of continuity and sameness of the Self over time. On the other hand, the identity project includes the comparison of the Self with the Other resulted in differentiation as well. As Lysyy (2013, p. 28) has claimed, identification in the same time is a process of verification of sameness with somebody in something and differentiation (and even contradistinction) of the Self and the Other in something; besides that, it is identification of the Self with the Self, caused by determinative permanent self-instability. Despite the fact that identity in the modern world can be defined as instable or troubled (Leonidas Donskis) by the reason of identification with many different groups, in the Soviet empire the idea of the national identity was the only way of an anti-colonial resistance. This idea allowed people to identify themselves with their national tradition and, more precisely, retrieved the national worldview; moreover, it allowed separating someone’s national identity from the identity of a Soviet man. According to Dariush Skurchevski, nationalistic aspirations of the Central and Eastern Europe societies subordinated to the Soviet hegemony till 1989 had the anti-colonial basis (Cкурчевський, 2014, p. 127); properly speaking, we can extrapolate Skurchevski’s deduction to the Ukrainian situation.

Zygmunt Bauman has said, that identity is revealed to us only as something to be invented rather than discovered; as a target of an effort, “an objective”; as something one still needs to build from scratch or to choose from alternative offers…” (2004, p. 16); in this way identity is regarded not only as a speculative and even illusive phenomenon, but also as an incomplete project. According to Donskis, modern identity is inevitably not only inherited but also more frequently consciously and freely constructed (2009, p. 6). Lysyy has claimed, that there are two important aspects concerning the problem of the national determination of a culture: on the one hand, objective features of a culture as a national phenomenon and, on the other hand, national and cultural self-determination and a personal choice of subjects of a culture (2013, p. 20).

Under the circumstances of the colonial oppression, cultural and national self-determination can be drawn as a moral choice – to be the part of the colonizing or colonized culture (as the German Yuriy Schneider has chosen to be the Ukrainian Yuriy Sherekh-Sheveliov). In the Soviet Union with its policy of corroding of a national memory, identification with the national culture tradition meant, first of all, discovery and implementation of this tradition. As for the term, the definition of tradition by Lysyy seems to be the most appropriate: a tradition is an actualized heritage; a heritage as an everlasting part of the past is preserved in a passive memory of successors, but, being selected, comprehended, and actualized in the active memory, a heritage becomes a tradition (2013, p. 142). According to Lysyy, a tradition exists in the form of a dialog of the present with the past, and in this way a tradition is structuring and shaping modernity (2013, p. 142). As for the substantial aspects of tradition, it is important to interpret it not only as a narrative, a coherent sequence of facts, but also as a way of thinking and representation connected with the specific national worldview, which is defined by Georgy D. Gachev as Cosmo-Psykho-Logos (Gachev, 2007).

In this perspective the differentiation of history and memory made by Pierre Nora seems to be the most accurate. According to Nora, the collective memory is a complex of conscious or unconscious memories about experience which can be transformed into the myth by a social (ethnic, religious and so on) group whose identity is connected with a feeling of the past (2014, p. 188). On the contrary, the historical memory is always unified; it becomes official resulted in the scholar tradition (Ibid., p. 189). Clearly, in this case a history in the Soviet time can be correlated with an official and institutionalized narrative produced by the Soviet authorities, albeit sometimes the official version was more propagandistic and mythic than scholar. On the contrary, a national memory has been preserving a national experience as a complex of unadulterated and veritable, although non-verbalized, facts.

A strategy of identity constructing for different literary generations provides changes in priorities and emphases. It was important for 70s and 80s generations to transpose their poetry to the context of the national and out of the context of the Soviet. That was demonstrated by their efforts to separate a national tradition from Soviet senses. First of all, that was actualization of ritual and folklore matrices in contradistinction to non-ritual folklore songs being a part of the official culture; that is, Hnatiuk has written about transposing folklore texts in the context of the official culture (Гнатюк, 2005, р. 94). Further, it was an appeal – on the level of worldview concepts, allusions, and reminiscences – to the heritage of the modern poets excluded from the official canon (see Моренець, 2002). Then, it was re-thinking and verbalization of events concealed by the Soviet historiography: repressions, the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) struggle, the Holodomor of 1932–1933. In other words, it was an attempt of re-thinking of the national collective experience. The challenge for the 80s generation was not only to re-discover and re-shape the national tradition based on the latent national memory, but also to form the way of its representation. In contradistinction to the 60s generation trying to reshape and humanise Socialist Realism through the discreet and diffident polemic, the 80s generation rejected the official Soviet discourse in order to avoid its rhetoric and hereby cognitive moulds.

On the contrary, poets of the 90s with a great enthusiasm practiced destruction of the Soviet discourse. From here it becomes obvious, that the 90s generation demonstrated rather anticolonial than postcolonial strategy. It should be pointed out that not only the Soviet discourse, which consists of Socialist Realism molds, journalistic propagandistic clichés, fragments of the Soviet mass culture etc., but also Romanticism and Narodnism clichés, national and patriotic rhetoric became objects of deconstruction. The cultural space cleared by Avant-garde devices was absolutely free from everything. In some cases the millennial generation adopted ironical and sarcastic intonations of the 90s poets by inertia, but in other cases they tried to re-think actual axiological and worldview vacuum. Nonetheless, these poets have established the interesting tendency that is fundamental for the late millennial poets and the 10th generation. This tendency includes their reflection on global things through the prism of a private bodily and verbal experience. In texts from the Two tones collected poems the bodily experience represented mostly as fragmentariness or hybridity. That is, it indicates existential distraction, instability of the Self verges, hostility of the world. Instead in Myroslav Laiuk’s, Yulia Stakhivska’s, Iryna Shuvalova’s, Lesyk Panasiuk’s poetry we can see both an attempt to expand the Self verges as much as possible and reflection on world polyphony through the lens of corporeality. The 80s generation tried to include the private experience into the context of the national, whereas the millennial generation included the collective cultural experience into the context of the private.

The Self as the Other: Time and Death

A closer analysis reveals prominent and rather significant tendencies in Ukrainian poetry of the beginning of the XXI century. On the one hand, the millennial generation poets complement and elaborate topics outlined in the last third of the XX century, but, on the other hand, they propose their new language, senses, and values. Restitution of the Other and, moreover, re-thinking nature as an embodiment of the Other, having been the specific feature of Lyshega’s poetry, is actualized now in the millennium generation texts. For instance, there are the concept of vegetation in Stakhivska’s poetry, the mystery of nature in Laiuk’s texts, and the language and world organic nature in Shuvalova’s poems. Impersonality of a poetic language as a specific for the Kyiv School of Poetry (Моренець, 2016, р. 31) is a dominant feature of millennial poetry as well. Moreover, reflection on problems of language and memory, represented in poetry of Laiuk, Shuvalova, Mamchych, and Stakhivska, is also typical for the 80s generation.

Furthermore, in the most natural way this generation affinity is represented by building of the coherent cultural narrative from fragmental stories, by segments joining, by fulfillment of memory, history, and language lacunas, by outlining of identity. The millennium generation tries to reflect on this cultural fragmentariness, whereas the 10th generation attempts to overcome it. Quite the same as the 80s generation attempting to create the fundamental cultural project, these poets appeal to myth as the universal method of comprehension. There is not only actualization of traditional mythologems and archetypes (it is a specific feature of 80s generation poetry), but also fundamental attribute of myth to be the framework for architecture of explanations, interpretation, and insights, which allows for the possibility of the sensible existence of a human being in the world.

The central point of its worldview for the 10th generation is a concept of vegetation. In Laiuk’s poetry vegetation is a way of life mystery embodiment, whereas in Stakhivska’s poetry it is a way of language, body, world, and landscape being. Furthermore, in Shuvalova’s texts vegetation is connected with time dynamics as well as with bodily and sensitive being of the world. Shuvalova as a poet is interested in life and death collision expressed by vegetation cycle (germination – maturing – withering), human experience (maturing – erotic experience – maternity), symbolic sphere (speaking / silence, waking / dreaming). Time for the poet is a result of this collision manifested by determinant dynamics; accordingly, motifs of changes, transformation, and otherness are typical for her poetry. Therefore, her personal existential experience is forming the vision prism for her lyric personality; thus, everything existing in the world can be conceptualized through the living body.

From this point of view, mythic and ritual life cycle scenarios, and especially initiation-maturing, erotic experience, maternity, and death, provide a basis for Shuvalova’s poetry. In this way, through actualizing life cycle scenarios, she appeals to 80s generation poets that have separated the personal and ancestral experience implemented in a living body and its memory from the abstract and social one existing only in language – in the specific totalitarian and manipulative language, which has no referent, as a complex of discursive practices. It is important to emphasize that continuity of the language and bodily experience for the Shuvalova’s lyric personality is a framework for reflection on world wholeness and expediency, on the contrary to the millennium generation with their Two tones collected poems, for whom a riven body is a sign of the world fragmentariness.

Therefore, problems of time, the Self / the Other relationship, erotica, language, and corporeality are dominant for Shuvalova’s poetry. A world in which the lyric personality lives and on which he (she) tries to reflect is neither the ideal home, nor the hostile space. Moreover, this world is neither harmonized and unison with the human space, nor the cold and comfortless home for humanity. This appears to indicate that the world is not anthropocentric, subaltern and subordinated to a human being. In the XXI century the bankruptcy of the 60s generation anthropocentric project that has already been called into question by the Kyiv School of Poetry representatives Mykola Vorobiov and Mykhailo Hryhoriv becomes obvious. It is worth recalling cosmic metaphors connecting with a human being, body, and world, which have been widespread in the 60s generation poetry. For instance, in Dmytro Pavlychko’s and Ivan Drach’s poetry we can see a human being enlarged to a cosmic size. According to Mykola Ilnytskyy, the beginning of the 1960 has brought into poetry the voice of intellect as well as cosmic and industrial realities that become the material texture of an artistic image: from the attitude toward and the view of the world to the artistic image microstructure (Ільницький, 1986, р. 135). On the contrary, in Hryhoriv’s poetry the completely uninhabited world that is majestic in its non-tragic wholeness and perfectness has appeared. It is seems to be significant that Holoborodko has characterized Shuvalova’s poetry as panopticon of different natural and physiological deviations, monsters, marginal situations in which not human and humanistic, but bestial, dark, and desperate can be shown (Поезія, 2015). However, I suggest that it is the crisis of anthropocentrism that brings together both Kyiv School representatives’, and Shuvalova’s poetry. In her poetic world a spring is easily rhymed with a war, and fruit maturity is conceptualized as flower sudden ruination: as if the wind does is eat the blossom, / as if all the elements have conspired and engaged themselves / in ruining the fragile fortress of living leaves, / filliping seed parachutes for flight (Шувалова, 2014, р. 33). In this world death is the inseparable part of the universe. However, in contradistinction to the 80s generation for which impermanence of vegetation has been connected rather with continuity of vegetable restoration (a seed’s death is germination of a living stalk), in Shuvalova’s poetry the fragility of vegetation exists as dynamics of transitional phases and conditions. In 80s generation poetry time is conceptualized as eternity as long as vegetation is rather the idea of vegetable; vegetation is immortal in so far as it is above the time of a single grass blade with its flowers and seeds. In this context time is measured by the individual bodily experience, and this implies an inside look, a thorough scan of the interior space that observes weakest bodily feels as a work of time. In general, this is conditioned by the angle of view: the look emancipated from an everyday experience rises over the tragedy of a single being in order to see the transition of death into immortality. In contrast, the look immersed in everyday being is watching the approach of life to death with every change in someone’s body. Vegetation for the poet is a flower picked by the wind, but not the abstract principle of vegetation as eternal continuity.

From here it becomes obvious, that extremity, pressure, and redundancy are central characteristics of time as finitude but not eternity. The sharp feeling of a lost caused by being in time provokes not only reckless resistance to time the monstrous killer (in this context motifs of hunting, dueling, fighting are rather typical), but also memory work as an attempt to remove moments of wholeness and advisability from the destructive flow of time. It follows that in this regard the vegetation code is the most appropriate as much as a winter and autumn are conceptualized as cropping of summer bounties: is there anything heavier than drunken peonies’ heads / slanted to the honey of the golden giant summer / than lazy hills occupied by the swarm of bumblebees / it all went away it all passed away none of this ever happened none of this will be (Шувалова, 2014, р. 100), October has dipped his broken finger in bile / and counted us wearing summer clothes / and determined for everyone the long separate way / in the joint stubborn winter in the empty space / children are learning to count on cranes / that will bring them a strange adulthood in spring (Ibid., р. 101), Is it so much to ask? / If only precision reapers / would wait with their sickles and scythes / and then we will perhaps wear out / our shirts worn next to the skin” (Ibid., р. 96). It is essential to emphasize that ritual scenarios and mythologems (a body as the shirt for a soul, immense roominess of the earth which is home for life and death, death the great reaper, death in water) symbolizing the cultural memory are the natural part of the Shuvalova’s individual mythology which contains plots such as a duel between the warrior (virgin) and the serpent, hunting the bird (deer), wandering and returning of the protagonist, blossoming and withering of the garden. Quite the same as the 80s generation poets, Shuvalova actualizes life cycle matrices connected with the existential drama of a human being. However, the 80s generation have built the myth with help of the language of a personal experience, whereas Shuvalova verbalizes the personal experience with help of the language of a myth.

The work of time as an approach to death is conceptualized in the plot of hunting. The poet has built wholeness of her own story from the fragmentariness of mythic plots and ritual scenarios, choosing for the base of her story the Kupala ritual of burning wheel lowering (Славянские древности, 1999, р. 367), which symbolizes the turn of the sun to winter at the summer solstice. Embodied in the Kupala ritual, the turning-point scenario: the sun is hunting deer on hills, a summer is perdition perdition the time of falls, the round quivering world reaches its zenith / the wheel of the song is rolling and spitting sparks (Шувалова, 2014, р. 49) is verbalized through signs and symbols connected with this myth (the sun, the summer, the hill, the wheel, and the deer as an embodiment of the solar God (Славянские древности, 2004, р. 545). The deer’s shadow over which whirlwinds of its legs stumbles as well as the shadow of the sun which the deer tries to reach are emanation of darkness: you will lay down your life for the glory of the day / just reach the shadow of the sun, deer / till the darkness will beat your croup with a lash (Шувалова, 2014, р. 50). In this context the shadow is the death that will be reached by every living being. In Shuvalova’s personal mythic plot (the sun wings an arrow at the deer) the moment of killing is treated not only as a meet of the living being with its shadow, but also as acquisition of wholeness outlined by retraction of plural and separate time flows (images of the potential future) in the irrefutable accomplishment. Clearly, this corresponds to interpretation of a natural time as a cyclic and discreet in the archaic cultures: it follows that in certain times of year connected with a solar cycle a time is ruined in order to be born again (Славянские древности, 1995, рр. 448–452).

In Shuvalova’s mythology the plot of hunting is in a liaison with widespread mythic and folklore interpretation of death as connected with eroticism. Death images and symbols are erotic in substance (Еремина, 1991, р. 130); furthermore, the death is conceptualized as the marriage with the Goddess of death whereas the marriage is interpreted as the metonymic substitution of a death (Еремина, 1991, р. 132).

In archaic cultures this symbolism is more expressive and clear as long as conceiving is conditioned by the contact of our and their world. What is more, according to Bronislaw Malinowski, on Trobriand Islands a pregnancy is caused by the baloma soul penetrating a female body. Baloma is interpreted as permeating through the double death: in the world of the living and in the world of the dead where it cycles the full or incomplete life depending on the age of the dead. After his / her second death in the world of the dead baloma is born again in the world of the living (Малиновский, 1998, р. 204–205). In the Slavic tradition images of a death and diseases are mostly female; in contrast, in the German cultural and mythic tradition a death is a male figure (Мифы, 2000, р. 457).

This motif is realized in Shuvalova’s poetry as the erotic union of a flesh and a weapon, a body and a pain: the moment of growing the thread into the bowstring / the metal flesh aims to the living flesh (Шувалова, 2014, р. 49), the pain has opened its arms put on the pavilion / straightened the grass scraped the bed (Ibid., р. 49–50), leave your throat wide open to the halter you have to go / to the dark abyss that will sting the bird with a gold (Ibid., р. 53), the thief is catching you like a wagtail with tenderness (Ibid., р. 53). Besides that, it is an aesthetic attractiveness of a death: deer the poor fellow do you know / how beautiful the face of your killer is? (Ibid., р. 49), the sharpshooter narrows his fiery eye / you see bloody clothes suit you (Ibid., р. 50), you are the poacher caballero you are the cunning trickster / and I wear colorful summer clothes / how can you not desire not gain this prey (Ibid., р. 53). Moreover, this motif is realized as sameness of death and maternity symbolism: red beads of blood (Ibid., р. 53), poppies with big mouths are baying the prey in death / through ravines hollows ditches (Ibid., р. 49).

The Other inside Me: the Shadow

The artistic image of a shadow is rather typical for Shuvalova’s poetry. According to Carl Gustav Jung, the darkness clinging to everyone is a door in unconsciousness and a gate of dreams through which these two indefinite figures – a shadow and anima – are going in our night dreams or, being unseen, possessing our ego-consciousness (1996, р. 262). As Jung has said, a shadow symbolizes everyone’s personal unconsciousness, the lowest level of everyone’s psyche (1996, р. 327). In Shuvalova’s poetry the image of a shadow and the motif of falling in a shadow are connected not only with chthonic, but also with erotic code. Out of this, a shadow is a metaphor of desire, and falling is a symbol of sexual appetency: a summer is perdition perdition the time of falls (Шувалова, 2014, р. 49), here there is a different demon in the every prison of ribs (Ibid., р. 51), the little demon / has put his foot in my bosom and is kneading my veins / is twisting long pigtails of heat / pouring fury under my feathery clothes (Ibid., р. 53). In Shuvalova’s poetry love and death are interconnected (in particular, it is correlated with the mythic symbolism) as long as it is not only the erotic component of death (the poem Hunting [Ibid., с. 49–50] ), but also the chthonic component of love: here he is, the insidious thief with a silk halter (Шувалова, 2014, р. 53).

Love and death are deeply interconnected by the motif of guests (the poem Guests (Шувалова, 2014, рр. 55–57); erotic and chthonic are conceptualized as entirely external powers to a human being. It makes sense as much as the fairytale widespread motif of a stranger on the road indicates the meet of a hero with a magic helper (Пропп, 1998, рр. 248–249) and, therefore, the important point of the initiation. In this context love and death signalize about the meet with the Other – with otherness of a new experience, with otherness of the Other. Images of a moon (the moon is prepared to knead the dough from bodies [Шувалова, 2014, р. 55]), a trace (you can hear the bird keens suddenly / the silk sleeve soughs into the archways / the guest is visiting the sleepy abode again / he has passed through the garden without getting his clothes dewed [Ibid., р. 55]), and a shadow (shadows are marking the skin with their thin fingers [Ibid., р. 55]) appear to be the night experience of a soul. Anonymity of the Other (somebody hides amongst flowers in the garden [Ibid., р. 55]) is correlated with a specific experience conceptualized as strange. This experience is brought outside the body (the moon was laughing and nuzzling a window [Ibid., р. 55]), and at the same time is deepened in bodily sensations (I would rather drown to lay low / in your drunken arms only [Ibid., р. 55]). In the first poem of the cycle we can see erotic symbolism. In the second one the chthonic mythology is presented by recognizable signs: ringing of bells (copper bells are ringing [Ibid. р. 56]), putting coins on eyes (for the road I will took / two ice coins / those which you have put / on my eyelids yesterday [Ibid., р. 57]), the space divided into two parts – the world of the living and the world of the dead (oh how stars are juggling / with sabers and knives / they are cutting mountains in half / they are carving rivers in half [Ibid., р. 57]), impossibility to speak with those who are on this side (my guests are far away / the yellow wind is pulling / pavilions of drunken wisterias / who do I talk to? [Ibid., р. 56]), and a long journey (it is time to go / to meet my guests [Ibid., р. 56]). A poppy as a flower of death is represented through symbolism of a fragile stalk and a bitter juice: poppy’s hand stalks / crackles delicately drily / splashes bitterly quickly [Ibid., р. 56]). As can be expected, erotic and chthonic fusion is conceptual; this experience may be described as travelling outside the body and at the same time as apotheosis of sensuality. In any case, this is the experience of perception of the Self as the Other conditioned by relationship with the Other: it is both otherness, strangeness of the body, and the time lag (the time stops or prolongs changing its specific features), and changed self-conscience in the act of non-identity acceptance.

Shuvalova appeals to plots in which life cycle ritual scenarios (initiation, love, death) is integrated into wholeness. This intention is resulted in Shuvalova’s collection Os based on intertextuality of the literature in which the process of maturing as well as a collision of childhood and adulthood are inserted – for instance, Peter Pan by James M. Barrie, The Snow Queen by Hans C. Andersen, The Nutcracker and the Mouse King by Ernst T. A. Hoffmann. What is important, these texts for the poet become not the object of reflection or re-thinking, but the base for building her own architecture of mythic plots. For example, the very interesting way of revealing shadow and darkness concepts connected with erotic and chthonic experience we can see in the cycle called Macabre. The baroque method of objectification, externalization of the internal conflict is built in the Hoffmann fairytale matrix. The darkness here is not just a satellite or absorber of the light but the detailed world of a dungeon which comes to the surface right after fusing “to love” and “to kill” in the point of no return. This world is sensually detailed (the crowned rabble / crawled out at the balls / wearing yellow dresses made of beeswax / and shoes made of tar [Ibid., р. 73]), and at the same time illusive (a shadow is rolling onto a shadow / the darkness is dousing all the whimpers [Ibid., р. 73]), somewhere in wide holes / rustles appeared [Ibid., р. 74]).

Balancing on the verge of the visible and the phantom is also conditioned by signifying or concealment of the names: mouse queens / mouse kings turn to those who have no ears no mouths / no bustling paws / those who know you to the touch. This represents not only the name concealment conditioned by ritual situations, which is typical for traditional cultures, but also the requirement for verbal outlining of things that cannot be named at all. Complexity and stratification of topography of underground / hidden resonate with sophistication of the narrative strategy: gliding (connected not with grammar, but with self-awareness of the lyric personality) between the second person (know you to the touch / know how you taste [Ibid., р. 73]), and the first person (one day I sewed a dress for myself [Ibid., р. 73]) indicate the feeling of the time lag being an integral part of the initiative scenario. What is important, the bodily experience is always primary even referring to the death. Perverse sensuality is connected with body and cloth images: under clothes (one day I sewed a dress for myself / and a jacket for my sweetheart [Ibid., р. 73]), my sweetheart bought a necklace / my sweetheart bought bandages [Ibid., р. 75]) the putrefied flesh is hidden (am not I a wife? / worms have eaten my eyes / and a snake in my belly [Ibid., р. 74]) as well as named object is hidden under clothes of a word.

However, at the same time phraseological nature of a language is conceptualized as a counterbalance to the verbal collapse (discontinuity between the language describing itself and the world staying unnamed). Under these conditions the process (the way of naming) becomes more important than the result (the named being). The linguistic strategy is represented in both an approach and eclipse. For instance, stringing and cutting the course of folklore formulae shot (one day a jay was flying through the garden, one day a little mouse was running), outlining the semantic aura of a word (the jay’s feather is correlated with a knife, a slang word; the mouse’s tale is connected with fairytale symbolism of death; a knife is the last needle in the ribs of the sweetheart), the poet fragments the narrative, but summation of particles contained in fragments seems to be the more adequate than the monolith of an uncrushed narrative. Similarly, whimpers barely audible in the darkness become toneless rustles and then turn to sounds of quadrille (somewhere in deep hollows / the quadrille is whistling famously / go straight then to the left and straight / and then go to us [Шувалова, 2014, р. 74]). In the same way a lack of voice (my teeth are gritting / a hundred of needles [Ibid., р. 73]) becomes speaking (do you wish a half of the kingdom, boy? [Ibid., р. 74]) to reach to the other world of silence (one day a little mouse was running / whisked its tale / that is all [Ibid., р. 75]). Therefore, the borrowed literary or folklore word becomes the mask for the poet’s word that cannot be verbalized, but this word’s formulary seems to be the most adequate method of verbalizing of a shadow that cannot be caught by consciousness directly.

Body, Language, Death

In the poem Ophelia Shuvalova has interpreted a death as an initiation connected above all with the problem of language and self-identification. In contradistinction to other poems with intertextual elements, Ophelia is closely related to the pretext both on the plot level (Polonius’ warning to the daughter, a fateful dialogue of Hamlet and Ophelia) and the symbolic one (Ophelia’s clothes that are heavy with water, and flowers). Turning to social and cultural dimensions, we will find that Ophelia in the masculine and patriarchy world is a great mute as long as the only adequate way for her to verbalize unspoken is a language of madness. On the one hand, this language is formulary and clichéd (song and riddle matrices), and on the other hand, this language is beyond the conversational context as much as it is loosely connected or totally unrelated to speeches of other characters. From this point of view the language formulary indicate the conflict of Ophelia’s muteness and a strange word; this can be interpreted as inadequacy of existing language to the context to be verbalized. At the same time it signalizes about Ophelia’s attempt of avoiding the logic and rational way of speaking that is not appropriate for verbalizing the complicated feeling of love to Hamlet, regret at father’s death, and guilt. In her essay The Ellipse of Fear and Specular Temptation Julia Kristeva has written about embodied in rhythm, shifts, condensations, and figures lectonic traces that appear through the massif of verbalized as unspoken and unrepresented; lectonic traces outline concealed in its identification: the non-symbolized instinct that is not brought to object-sign-language (Шувалова, 2014, р. 328). The concept of lectonic traces can explain Ophelia’s tense relationship not only with other characters, but also with conventional language and social rules.

Perverseness of self-identification experience (disparity of Me-for-Myself and Me-for-Others images) is realized for Ophelia first of all in the verbal domain: only reality of rhythm and reduplications is fundamental for her language, in contradistinction to the representative language that seems to be senseless for her. Afterlife of language (communication gaps) and mind (madness) can be interpreted as a metaphor of subordination of the female treated in the masculine world as the strange. Besides that, this poem can be interpreted as an attempt of re-thinking of the female voice and female madness as problems appearing in the context of Lesia Ukrainka’s, Lina Kostenko’s, Oksana Zabuzhko’s writings. In fact, Zabuzhko’s The Reedpipe Tale, Kostenko’s Marusia Churay, and Shuvalova’s Ophelia can be analyzed as the texts about heard or unheard female voices.

Moreover, Shuvalova requires the Shakespeare’s text for actualization of the motif of the death in water, in particular the female death in water. According to Gaston Bachelard, the death in water is the most motherly amongst all the deaths (Башляр, 1998, р. 109), and the death of a woman in water can be interpreted as her interflow with a female element. It is evidenced by textual allusions: Hamlet calls Ophelia the nymph, and Gertrude calls her the mermaid. In Shuvalova’s Ophelia a death is also motherly, but at the same time pet and domestic as a cat on gentle paws. Similarly to other experiences, the experience of death in Ophelia is linguistic (speaking / silence, speaking / listening) and bodily (breathing, chill, numbness). Motifs of clothes (wet clothes cling to her skin, full skirts become heavy with wet, a shoe embroidered with a silver thread / has lost from her tiny feet [Шувалова, 2014, р. 11]), and a body as clothes (Славянские древности, 2004, р. 523) (and we will kiss your milky hands / till there is no hands and no kiss left [Шувалова, 2014, р. 12]), acquire unexpected explanation: to be free from clothes, body, and life is to float on water to touch little fish / with her light-hearted dead fingers / to be herself (Ibid., р. 12). In this context a death becomes for Ophelia an existential choice, release from her roles and masks imposed by others, and the only way for her self-fulfillment.

Similarly to The Search of the Involved by Hryhorii Chubai Ophelia by Shuvalova seems to be the poetic attempt of looking beyond the verge of life and death. In contradistinction to Chubai’s poem in which soul post-mortem ordeals is described (Борисюк, 2015) Shuvalova’s Ophelia is an attempt to fixate the subtle moment of passing. Balancing between life and death is balancing between sleeping and waking, memory and amnesia, speaking and silence; the death is conceptualized as a dream about a death (her face appears and disappears without a trace / but muddy water becomes to grow / and flows hustle boldly and thrust into her throat [Шувалова, 2014, р. 13]), and the dream is conceptualized as a repetition before a death (and when at last you breathed being powerless and scared / then suffocation and fear disappeared and all you had to do was sleep / and floating on a tender flow [Ibid., р. 13]).

Ophelia’s inner speaking before the moment of sleeping / death is a recollection of current events and everyday troubles, connected with her external life and her social role, but not concerning her inner Self: I thought that it was time to take my dress from the seamstress / that my father was not in the mood when he came to me the day before / that yesterday the little bird flied into my apartment / that boys were throwing pebbles into the old beggar / that my red shoes were too old / that I had to take a knife and cut roses off (Шувалова, 2014, р. 13). But even these at first sight irrelevant fragments become signs of the accomplished future; besides that, these signs concerning the mythic sphere. For instance, a bird flying into the house is a sign of the inevitable death of somebody living in this house, and old shoes in folklore tales symbolize the journey to the other world (Пропп, 1998, р. 143–144). Correspondingly, according to the principle of parallelism, cut flowers are correlated with somebody’s death. Besides that, on the level of the plot cut roses correlate both with the speech of demented Ophelia talking about flowers in her garland and Gertrude’s announcement of Ophelia’s death. Old shoes about which Ophelia has thought before sleeping correlate with the lost shoe of dead Ophelia. The moment of passing beyond the edge of sleep / death is marked by the Hamlet’s face appearance; with his thin lips weariness and disdain were laughing, and it is symbolic that every time it seems to death cuddling closer / that it is her own appearance (Шувалова, 2014, р. 13).

Reflection on her own death for Ophelia is an escape not only beyond verges of a body but also beyond verges of a language conditioned by her body; it is destroying her bodily subjectivity and observing her body as an object. In this case the poet appeals to the mythic motif of macro – and microcosm identity realized in folklore not only as metamorphose but also as dissolving of a body in nature: Ophelia becomes the part of observed nature. Inner speaking is anchoring Ophelia in the space of memory, in continuity of the present, past, and future, whereas a death in this case is the eternal current moment, a loss of the past in words and recollections. Treating death as amnesia and silence was typical for the 80s generation as well; but for these poets conceptualization of the ancestral and national experience was important, whereas for Shuvalova the female private bodily and linguistic experience is determinant.

I am as He: the Motif of Fighting with the Snake and the Gender Inversion

Analyzing the symbolism of overcoming of the snake as a Christian or psychoanalytic plot, we can see that all the aspects of fighting with the inner snake – fears, sins, temptations, and the call of flesh – advance the forefront. In Shuvalova’s personal mythology the concept of a shadow (darkness) is very similar to that of a snake (monster); the sole exception is that a shadow is only recognized, but a snake needs to be fought. Generally, both a shadow and a snake are parts of the central mythic plot of Os; they symbolize the image of time destroying a body, confusing a soul, erasing memories and words, and severing the connection with the past. It follows that bodily and linguistic self-consciousness for Shuvalova’s lyric personality is the only way to overcome the snake of time by imprinting herself in transition of the current moment.

One way or another, the motif of fighting with the snake in Os is connected with the erotic plot (St. George, Greet me from the city, My lunar brother): the bloody duel can become the metaphor of the game of love as soon as interconnection of erotic and chthonic is rather typical for Shuvalova’s poetry. For this reason the poet is playing with transformations of images: George turns to the bling knight with a toy sword (the sun is so cautious like the blind / knight with a paper toy sword / who is poking childish faces of inflorescences / is praying that the snake would wait till the evening [Шувалова, 2014, р. 54]) as well as the snake becomes the magnificent angel (be the snake the snake oh my angel change your skin / be the mystic shell cast your flesh beyond flaps [Ibid., р. 40]). Furthermore, the snake is not always a monster that needs to be overcome: it can be Minotaur (the time is shaking with bull horns. How will I / overcome this monster and walk through the blackthorn? [Ibid., р. 40]), the dinosaur (here the horizon is arching his spine of a dinosaur / the conqueror of the little tomorrow is moving sideways [Ibid., р. 91]) or an unnamed monster. The function of the-word-as-the-mask is demonstrated in conventionality of naming as soon as naming is partly connected with the named. It follows that in the context of Shuvalova’s poetry antiques and Christian images are interchangeable, and plots are mixed and complimentary; applying the bricolage technic and fragmenting the narratives of earlier eras, the poet incorporates the cultural experience and memory into her private sphere, involves these in plexus of her own stories.

What is important, one of the strategies of cultural code actualization in Shuvalova’s poetry is a gender inversion: the virgin becomes the knight (I am your knight gawain don quixote lancelot paladin [Шувалова, 2014, р. 40]), the beloved turns to the virgin-helper (to be ariadne for me my angel and then / we will see [Ibid., р. 40]). Oleh Kotsarev has paid attention to passiveness and even non subjectivity of male characters in Shuvalova’s lyric, reasonably treating this feature as an attempt of a literature game (Коцарев, 2011). I suggest that Shuvalova follows the tradition generated by Ukrainka’s, Kobylianska’s, and Zabuzhko’s writings – this is re-writing of European and Ukrainian matrix plots from the point of female view, crystallization of the voice of the Other in monological patriarchy culture. For instance, in Ukrainka’s The Autumn Tale and The Stone Master of the House as well as in Zabuzhko’s poetry ironic treating of knighthood is connected with self-consciousness of a woman that does not wish to be unseen in changed social and politic circumstances. But for Shuvalova the existential dimension of the problem rather than the social and culture is important. Despite the fact of ironic re-thinking of romance plots, this inversion appears to be the device for the personal choice expression: the virgin has to become the knight for herself in order to find herself under names and masks or abandon names and masks in favor of the name and core (whose children we are peter and what are our names / now when as much names as there are pearls between the fingers [Шувалова, 2014, р. 25]). Her personal battle with time the virgin has to win herself, even if she should turn to the knight for this. But the Other for achieving her inner wholeness is also important, thus love in Shuvalova’s poetry is a shadow (death), and a snake (temptation), and a transcendent impulse (an angel), and Ariadne’s thread on the road to self-discovery (tired of fighting against monsters in the sacred land / I will come to you / and that will be the way to home [Ibid., р. 41]).

Conclusions

The characteristic feature of Soviet era was cultivation of the black and white worldview drawing the Other as the stranger and therefore enemy; otherness was treated as anomaly and thus a death sentence. It should be appropriate to compare so called deviations in Soviet art and projects for re-education of natural and human deviations. All of this is founded on the fundamental ideological basis of the only point of view, the only truth, the only way of thinking. Igor Klekh has paid attention to such feature of totalitarianism as narrowing or widening of the human sphere and elimination from the orbit of being of such important elements as erotic feelings or relationships with Absolute and nature (Клех, Комський, Возняк 1990). In relation to this thought, I suppose that typical for the postcolonial situation (in social and cultural spheres as well) of totalitarianism overcoming should be return of the Other to the culture (first of all as the Other in Myself).

Shuvalova’s literary strategy includes incorporation of the collective memory in the private one as well as incorporation of cultural plots in her own story. Under these conditions not my past becomes the part of my experience, but not as the revealed in texts cultural catalog of names and plots. The specific female experience reflected in her lyric is in a liaison with ritual scenarios as well as with mythic and literary matrices. The bodily experience of the lyric personality becomes a language for speaking about the drama of self-identification, about perception of time in herself and herself in time, about collision of Self and Other relationship influencing on authenticity and wholeness of the Self. This, in turn, means acceptance of subjectivity of the Other over which the Self has no power; in this case the Other can be another human being as well as the world and nature.

Iryna Borysiuk is an Associate Professor of Philology in the Department of Ukrainian Literature, Comparative Studies and Social Communication at the Borys Grinchenko Kyiv University and a Senior Lecturer at the Literature Department of the Kyiv-Mohyla Academy. In 2007 she received a Ph.D. in Philology from the National University of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy for the dissertation entitled “Poetics of the 80s generation: the structure-forming role of the mythic and ritual forms”. Her main interests are contemporary Ukrainian poetry, myth in literature, literature and the problem of identity. She is currently working on the question of representation of national identity in contemporary Ukrainian poetry.

Afiliacja:

Iryna Borysiuk

Department of Literature Studies

National University of “Kyiv-Mohyla Academy”

Email: odnoklasnyk@ukr.net

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Swojskość i Obcość: tożsamość, czas i ciało w poezji Iryny Szuwałowej

Streszczenie

W artykule przedmiotem badania uczyniono różne formy reprezentacji tożsamości obecne na gruncie współczesnej poezji ukraińskiej. Za przykład posłużyły teksty Iryny Szuwałowej. Tworzona przez nią poezja rozpatrywana jest w kontekście przemian ideologicznych i artystycznych, jakie zaszły w literaturze w okresie od schyłku Związku Radzieckiego do czasów współczesnych. W artykule skupiono się na procesie tworzenia tożsamości opierającym się na interakcjach zachodzących między Swoim i Obcym, jednostkowym i społecznym, żeńskim i męskim. Ponadto celem autorki stało się prześledzenie związków istniejących między językiem, cielesnością a czasem, reprezentujących różne formy tworzenia tożsamości.

Słowa kluczowe:
tożsamość, Iryna Szuwałowa, tożsamość narodowa, współczesna poezja ukraińska, Ja/Inni.

1 Here and further in this article, Ukrainian texts are translated by Iryna Borysiuk.

Fotogaleria

Anja Lange
National Technical University of Ukraine “Kyiv Polytechnic Institute”

In 2013–2014 I was working as a DAAD language assistant in Kyiv at the Kyiv-Mohyla-Academy. My five students studied political science – so there was a lot to talk about at that time. When the Euromaidan started I was thrilled because I just knew Ukrainians as very politically apathetic people. Now something was going on, students were on strike and went with Ukrainian flags to the Maidan. I was there almost every day to have a look how things are going. The Euromaidan turned violent soon – the beatings of students in the end of November were just the beginning, the clashes between the police forces and the protesters at the Hrushevsky St. followed and finally the bloody ending in February 2014. There were several moments when I asked myself if I should go there. But I felt more secure when I saw what happened with my own eyes. The protest posters at the Maidan caught my interest: Protesters, students and even babushkas would write their statements down. Sometimes they are funny and sometimes driven by hate and anger about the current political situation in the country. Of course Taras Shevchenko is there to protect the protesters. And Putin is enemy number one, ‘shot’ and ‘hang’ on the posters several times.

Now, several months later when I look at the almost 10,000 pictures I made, this seems to be really unreal. When I now walk through the city I remember the barricades, the ice, the sounds and the pictures. Kyiv seems to be normal nowadays, like any other European capital. But for me it is not and it never will be again. The Euromaidan did not just change the city, it changed the inhabitants. Even as a foreigner and just visitor to all the actions going on in the city, I can say that it changed me a lot. I was never afraid though. Even when you are at the Maidan, metro stations around you are closed and the Berkut is storming the square – I would have the faith that everything will be ok.

Rewolucja zaczyna się od słowa

Łukasz Kutyło
Uniwersytet Łódzki

Recenzja książki
Nadia Tracz
„Разом – Сила!”: Риторика українського спротиву
Wydawnictwo „KLIO” 2015, Kijów

Przedmiotem mojej recenzji jest książka poświęcona wydarzeniom, jakie miały miejsce na Ukrainie na przełomie 2013/2014 roku i później. Mam tutaj na myśli tzw. Rewolucję Godności, która obaliła urzędującego wówczas prezydenta – Wiktora Janukowycza i zapoczątkowała pewien zwrot – chciałoby się rzec cywilizacyjny – w ukraińskiej polityce. Mimo, że sama Rewolucja obfitowała w dramatyczne momenty, zwłaszcza kiedy zaczęli ginąć w niej ludzie, to z perspektywy czasu coraz bardziej zasadne wydaje się mówienie o niej jako o momencie przełomowym w historii wschodniego sąsiada Polski. Być może dzięki tym wydarzeniom Ukrainie udało się zamknąć etap postsowiecki, postkomunistyczny i rozpocząć nowy rozdział w funkcjonowaniu państwa i społeczeństwa. Trzeba jednak pamiętać, że ostateczny wynik Rewolucji jest nadal nieznany, zwłaszcza że na wschodnich rubieżach kraju twa wojna z separatystami i wspierającymi ich rosyjskimi oddziałami.

Autorką książki jest Nadia Tracz, badaczka z kijowskiej Akademii Mohylańskiej, a więc uczelni założonej jeszcze w XVII stuleciu, odgrywającej dziś ważną rolę w życiu kulturalnym i naukowym Ukrainy. Przedmiotem zainteresowania Autorki pozostaje socjolingwistyka, a recenzowana praca jest dobrym tego przykładem. Sama książka liczy ogółem 144 strony. Poza wstępem oraz zakończeniem składa się na nią siedem rozdziałów. Każdy z nich pozostaje odrębnym esejem, co ważne jednak – podejmowane w nich zagadnienia dopełniają się, a sama Autorka uniknęła problemu, jaki w tego rodzaju pracach często się pojawia, tj. koncentrowania się w poszczególnych częściach książki na tych samych kwestiach. Do pracy dołączone zostały zdjęcia przedstawiające hasła Rewolucji, a także inną, twórczą aktywność jej uczestników (w tym: plakaty, graffiti itd.). Ponadto, Nadia Tracz zdecydowała się załączyć do książki analizowane przez siebie slogany oraz teksty pieśni, które wyrażały nie tylko emocje protestujących, ale także bliskie im wartości i poglądy.

Rozważania Autorka zaczyna od kwestii metodologicznych. Z jednej strony tego rodzaju fragmenty prac należą do najważniejszych, prezentują w końcu warsztat badacza, sposób realizacji przez niego przedsięwzięcia, a przy okazji stanowią potencjalne źródło inspiracji dla tych, którzy chcieliby przeprowadzić podobne badanie (bądź poddać weryfikacji te, które w danej pracy jest omawiane). Z drugiej jednak rozważania w tym względzie nierzadko są trudne do zrozumienia, zwłaszcza dla osoby, która nie jest obeznana z teoretycznymi i metodologicznymi aspektami podejścia wybranego przez autora, a zdarza się też, że tego rodzaju refleksje są po prostu nudne. Biorąc pod uwagę te zastrzeżenia można stwierdzić, że Nadia Tracz dobrze poradziła sobie z tym problemem. Nie ignoruje skądinąd ważnych założeń metodologicznych, ale zarazem też nie zanudza Czytelnika, nie wchodzi w szczegóły, które byłyby właściwsze dla artykułu naukowego, wprost przeznaczonego dla specjalistów w danej dziedzinie. Autorka informuje, że przedmiotem jej badania były slogany, jakie pojawiły się podczas Rewolucji Godności, a także w okresie po niej następującym, kiedy doszło do aneksji Krymu przez Rosję oraz do wojny w Donbasie. Nadii Tracz udało się przeanalizować ogółem ponad 800 zebranych przez nią haseł. Tutaj należy podkreślić, że Autorka nie ukrywa swojego udziału w Rewolucji i zaangażowania na rzecz sprawy, którą wydarzenia na Majdanie Niezależności zapoczątkowały. Uczciwie informuje o tym Czytelnika, a zarazem wskazuje, że przemyślenia i wnioski do jakich dochodzi nie są obiektywne i takie być nie mogą. I dobrze, że tak jest. Trudno sobie wyobrazić zimny, akademicki wykład toczący się wokół wydarzeń tak istotnych dla własnego kraju, tak dramatycznych w swym przebiegu i konsekwencjach.

Punktem wyjścia dla swej analizy Autorka uczyniła teorię dyskursu opracowaną przez Theo van Dijka. Jej celem stało się prześledzenie tego, w jaki sposób ludzie zgromadzeni na kijowskim Majdanie konstruowali wiedzę na swój temat oraz na temat przeciwnika – obozu rządowego, a także jaką rolę w tym procesie odegrał język. Z punktu widzenia socjologicznego jest to ciekawy przykład transformacji quasi-grupy, a więc zbiorowości, której nie łączy jeszcze wspólnota celów i wartości, a jedynie niepewna, emocjonalna zazwyczaj reakcja na pewne wydarzenie czy okoliczności, w grupę interesu, a więc zbiorowość ludzi świadomych swego położenia i mających jasno zdefiniowane oczekiwania. Innymi słowy, Autorka uczyniła przedmiotem swojego zainteresowania to, jak język wpływał na zachowania protestujących i odwrotnie, jak ludzie uczestniczący w walkach przeciwko rządowi używali języka do wyrażenia swych interesów, do ekspresji swych emocji. Mimo, że celem Nadii Tracz nie było prześledzenie kolejnych etapów tego procesu, uchwycenie dynamiki opisywanego przez nią konfliktu społecznego, a jedynie zobrazowanie zależności istniejących między językiem a działaniem (w myśl kognitywnych założeń wybranego przez nią podejścia), to i tak Czytelnik uzyskuje pewien obraz zmian, jakie następowały w toku wydarzeń. Z punktu widzenia polskiego odbiorcy ważne wydaje się to, że Autorka umieszcza swe refleksje w określonym kontekście społecznym i historycznym. Zyskuje na tym recenzowana praca, mającą w związku z tym interdyscyplinarny charakter.

Ze względu na to, że moim celem nie jest szczegółowe zreferowanie omawianej książki, a jedynie oddanie jej charakteru, to skupię się teraz na najważniejszych zagadnieniach podjętych przez Autorkę. Swe rozważania Nadia Tracz rozpoczyna od konstatacji, że w sytuacji konfliktu następuje transformacja dyskursu obecnego w danym społeczeństwie. Tworzy się nowy słownik. Warto w tym miejscu oddać głos samej Autorce, która ujęła ten proces, odwołując się do języka socjologicznego: Rewolucja zaczyna się od słowa. Od postu czy tweeta w mediach społecznościowych, napisu na plakacie, okrzyku na placu, od pierwszej rewolucyjnej ulotki. Jak dla dziecka ważnym staje się wypowiedzenie pierwszego słowa, tak dla społeczeństwa – wysłowienie trapiących je problemów, zdefiniowanie własnych wartości, oczekiwań, wyartykułowanie pragnienia zmian. Opanowując język dziecko socjalizuje się, dojrzewa, staje się człowiekiem. Ucząc się mowy protestu, ukraińskie społeczeństwo z postsowieckiego, buntującego się podlotka powoli staje się społeczeństwem dojrzałym, obywatelskim (Ibidem:17). Jak zauważa Nadia Tracz, w tym kształtującym się w sytuacji konfliktu słowniku języka ukraińskiego pojawiają się nowe słowa, a inne, które dotychczas miały peryferyjny status, nagle stają się powszechne w użyciu. Całkiem zwyczajnie zaczynają brzmieć m.in. takie pojęcia jak: aneksja, agresor, barykada, batalion, bojownik, ewakuacja, grupa dywersyjna, katastrofa humanitarna, konwój humanitarny, korytarz humanitarny, ochotnik, separatysta, terrorysta i in. Do łaski wracają terminy historyczne, odzwierciedlające burzliwą historię Ukrainy, w tym: czata, orda, rewolucja, sotnia, wici. Tworzone są też neologizmy, np. jewrolucja (od europejska rewolucja) czy majdanizacja. Interesująca w tym kontekście wydaje się historia słowa tituszka, znanego w Polsce z medialnych relacji opisujących wydarzenia mające miejsce w Kijowie. Sam termin, używany do opisu agresywnego osiłka wynajętego przez władzę do rozpędzania protestujących, pochodzi od nazwiska ukraińskiego sportowca – Wadima Tituszki, który podczas mityngu opozycyjnego w maju 2013 roku pobił dziennikarzy. Co ciekawe, gdy doszło do wydarzeń na Majdanie Niezależności, to Tituszka ostatecznie wyraził dla nich swe poparcie. Jak wskazuje Nadia Tracz, wywodzące się z jego nazwiska pojęcie nie dość, że samo stało się popularnym terminem używanym na Ukrainie (i poza nią), to jeszcze stanowiło rdzeń dla innych, rozwijających się w toku Rewolucji określeń. Pojawiły się zatem m.in. takie neologizmy jak: mentuszki (do opisu milicjantów współpracujących z tituszkami), prostituszki (opłacani uczestnicy prorządowych manifestacji), putituszki (żołnierze rosyjscy, którzy po obaleniu Janukowycza pojawili się na Krymie i w Donbasie).

W swej pracy Nadia Tracz wiele miejsca poświęca słowu majdan, które w wyniku omawianych wydarzeń zyskało nowe znaczenie. Samo słowo zostało przeniesione na grunt ukraiński z języka tureckiego, a pochodzi prawdopodobnie z języka perskiego, gdzie oznacza plac. Początkowo takie znaczenie miało też i na Ukrainie. Sytuacja uległa zmianie wraz z Pomarańczową Rewolucją w 2004 roku. To wówczas nastąpiła jego personifikacja i mitologizacja. Słowa majdan zaczęto odtąd używać w takich znaczeniach jak: protest, wspólnota protestujących, symbol sprzeciwu, wola narodu itd. Pojawił się także czasownik majdanować (po ukr. majdanuty). Znaczy on tyle, co „pognać”, „odsuwać kogoś od władzy”. W trakcie Rewolucji Godności dochodziło także do takiego użycia omawianego słowa, że traciło ono swe pierwotne, przestrzenne odniesienie. Dla przykładu, pojawiły się nowe formy aktywności nazwane odpowiednio: automajdan (po ukr. avtomajdan), viełomajdan (czyli majdan rowerowy), czy e-majdan (majdan wirtualny, internetowy). Okazało się zatem, że wskazane słowo może być używane nie tylko do opisu miejsca, gdzie odbywają się demonstracje, czy wspólnoty manifestujących, ale także do zdefiniowania nowych form protestu, mających ruchowy, dynamiczny charakter, bądź odbywających się w cyberprzestrzeni.

W swych rozważaniach Autorka przedmiotem uwagi uczyniła także wartości demonstrowane przez uczestników Rewolucji, znajdujące swe odzwierciedlenie w analizowanych przez nią hasłach, sloganach. Z punktu widzenia socjologicznego jest to ciekawa część pracy. Majdan, rozumiany tutaj jako wspólnota protestujących, okazuje się ogólnonarodowym ruchem społecznych, a w zasadzie to – używając terminu zaproponowanego przez Naomi Klein – siecią ruchów społecznych, zjednoczonych nie tylko przeciwko rządom Janukowycza, ale oczekujących także budowy bardziej sprawiedliwego porządku społecznego (choć ta sprawiedliwość różnie jest przez nie rozumiana). Biorąc zatem pod uwagę dwie główne, wskazane przez Piotra Glińskiego, cechy definicyjne ruchów społecznych – istnienie interakcji między uczestnikami i ich orientowanie się na zmianę – omawianą wspólnotę protestujących można traktować jako przejaw wskazanego zjawiska społecznego. Jakie jednak wartości przyświecały osobom biorącym w nim udział? Jeśli przyjmiemy, że mamy do czynienia z siecią ruchów społecznych, to zasadne wydaje się wyodrębnienie wartości ogólnych, łączących wszystkich protestujących, oraz partykularnych, typowych dla poszczególnych grup. Taki punkt widzenia przyjęła i Nadia Tracz. Autorka wskazuje, że protestujących łączył nie tylko sprzeciw wobec Janukowycza, ale też i pewne uniwersalne idee. Dobrze to widać w serii plakatów, które poddane zostały analizie. Nacisk położono w nich m.in. na takie wartości jak: pokój (co było wyrażone w haśle: Euromajdan jest wtedy, gdy żywi berkutowcy są dekoracją dla Twoich fotografii), wolność (Euromajdan jest wtedy, gdy represjom mówimy – nie!), odpowiedzialność (Euromajdan jest wtedy, kiedy sami zmieniamy świat), przyjaźń (Euromajdan jest wtedy, gdy na Twoich urodzinach jest milion ludzi lub Euromajdan jest wtedy, kiedy jest u Ciebie milion znajomych na Facebooku). Pojawiły się też hasła nawiązujące do tego, że aktywność na rzecz własnego państwa nie powinna ograniczać się do działań spektakularnych. Istotne, a na pewno dużo ważniejsze w czasie pokoju, są zwykłe, codzienne postawy obywatelskie. W swej pracy Nadia Tracz wymienia m.in. takie przykłady tych haseł: Majdan – to parkowanie zgodne z prawem, nawet jeśli to niewygodne; Majdan – to oryginalne oprogramowanie na kompie; Majdan – to sprzątanie po swoim psie na spacerze.

Ważną rolę w procesie mobilizacji uczestników wydarzeń odegrały także te hasła, które miały partykularny charakter. Slogany te odzwierciedlały zróżnicowany charakter Majdanu. Odwoływały się do tożsamości europejskiej (Ukraina – to Europa), płciowej (Ukrainki przeciwko niewolniczej przyszłości), regionalnej (Kołomyja – to Europa), zawodowej (Naukowcy przeciwko przemocy), narodowej (Ukraina jedyna, Ukraińcy – to siła). Jak stwierdza Nadia Tracz, źródłem inspiracji dla części haseł była tradycja, w tym sensie, że wynikały one z pewnych mitów czy narracji historycznych zakorzenionych w ukraińskim społeczeństwie. Z kolei inne nawiązywały do nowoczesności, zarówno w swej treści, jak i w formie. Przykładem tych pierwszych były slogany odwołujące się m.in. do kozackiej przeszłości Ukrainy, przedstawiające Majdan jak dawną Sicz, czy hasła i obrazy, które nawiązywały do tradycyjnego wizerunku kobiecości (kobieta jako siostra, córka bądź żona wspierająca mężczyznę występującego przeciwko władzy). Z kolei część haseł stanowiła twórczą rekonstrukcję sloganów reklamowych czy szerzej – treści typowych dla kultury masowej. Dobrym tego przykładem są takie hasła jak: Janukowycz – connecting people; Majdan – connecting people; Akcja: uwolnij Ukrainę od Janukowycza i otrzymaj bonus! (na wzór akcji promocyjnej). Wreszcie, pojawiały się też pośrednie formy wyrazu, nawiązujące do tradycji, ale w nowoczesny sposób zmodyfikowane. Przykładem tego mogą być graffiti, na których nie tylko prezentowano cytaty pochodzące z dzieł wieszczy narodowych, ale ich samych przedstawiano jako zwolenników Rewolucji (dekorując ich głowy kaskami, jakie nosili protestujący czy zasłaniając ich twarze chustami).

Wartości odgrywają istotną rolę w definiowaniu tożsamości ruchu – pozwalają zdefiniować „swoich” i „obcych”. Interesującą częścią pracy stają się zatem rozważania poświęcone na temat tego, w jaki sposób w trakcie Rewolucji Godności i tuż po niej definiowano wroga. Opisując demaskatorską funkcję sloganów, Nadia Tracz wskazuje, że protestujący portretowali Janukowycza tak, aby podkreślić autorytarny charakter jego rządów. Określano go m.in. takimi epitetami jak: Josif Adolfowicz Pinochet, Januczesku, Januczar, Bandjukowicz (od słowa bandyta), czy po prostu – Cham. W odpowiedni sposób budowano także obraz Władimira Putina. Tutaj znalazły zastosowanie takie określenia jak: Putler, Liliputin czy Bloodymir the Great. Wraz z aneksją Krymu i walkami w Donbasie pojawiły się też nowe hasła. Wschodnie regiony Ukrainy zaczęto określać mianem Donbabwe i Ługandy. Po stronie rosyjskiej i ukraińskiej zastosowanie znalazły neologizmy, za pomocą których definiowano przeciwnika. Do opisu Ukraińców używano m.in. takich terminów jak: zombimajdowny, ukry, wyszywatniki (od charakterystycznych ukraińskich wyszywanek na koszulach), żydobanderowcy, cyborgi, faszystowska (kijowska) junta, liberasty itd. Z kolei Rosjanie obrazowani byli za pomocą następujących słów: watniki (od waciaków), akwafresze (od barw pasty Aquafresh, przypominających rosyjską flagę), separy, federasty, putinoidy itd. Za pomocą tych sformułowań w obu przypadkach próbowano zbudować taką reprezentację przeciwnika, która by go ośmieszała, poniżała, czy szerzej – dehumanizowała. Użyto do tego tradycyjnych stereotypów, obecnych w obu społeczeństwach, jak też i innych sloganów, odwołujących się do nieakceptowanych przez ich twórców zachowań seksualnych.

Na koniec chciałbym podkreślić, że recenzowana praca jest znacznie bardziej rozbudowana i tematycznie zróżnicowana. W swojej recenzji zdecydowałem się przedstawić te wątki, które wydają się szczególnie interesująca dla socjologa. W swych rozważaniach Nadia Tracz pokazała bowiem, jak duży wpływ na zachowania aktorów politycznych ma dyskurs. Zatem mimo tego, że praca skupia się na przypadku Ukrainy i Rewolucji Godności, to ma ona jednak bardziej uniwersalny charakter. Rekonstruuje proces uzyskiwania tożsamości zbiorowej przez członków ruchów społecznych, a także kształtowania ich opinii, postaw, wartości. Podobne procesy zachodziły zapewne w Polsce w czasach Solidarności, a obecnie pozostają typowe dla innych społeczeństw, np. arabskich. Recenzowana praca zasługuje zatem na to, aby była czytana, także przez Polaków, których przekonanie o posiadaniu wyjątkowej wiedzy na temat sytuacji w Europie Wschodniej często jest nieuzasadnione. Pozostaje mieć też nadzieję, że Autorka będzie dalej kontynuować swe rozważania, analizując już dyskurs rzeczywistości postrewolucyjnej na Ukrainie, czy obejmując swoimi badaniami także inne formy wyrazu (np. wizualne).

Łukasz Kutyło – absolwent socjologii na Uniwersytecie Łódzkim, obecnie adiunkt w Katedrze Socjologii Polityki i Moralności UŁ. Do jego zainteresowań badawczych należą: behawioryzm, kognitywistyka, socjologia duchowości, socjologia moralności, metodologia badań społecznych.

Afiliacja:

Uniwersytet Łódzki

Katedra Socjologii Polityki i Moralności

Instytut Socjologii UŁ

Email: lukas.kutylo@gmail.com

War on the other side of the camera

Liudmyla Pidkuimukha
National University of “Kyiv-Mohyla Academy”

Review of the book
Ukraine’s War as Viewed by TSN Journalists
(Війна очима ТСН)
publishing house “Osnowy”, Kyiv, Ukraine

As the war in Ukraine continues for over two years, more and more Ukrainian journalists find themselves as war reporters. Important battles take place not only on the Eastern Front, but also on the fronts of visual arts, literature, and journalism – fights for being honest and keep high standards, fights for people’s trust and colleagues’ respect. Journalists of 1+1 TV channel’s daily news production TSN (Television News Service) have been working in a war zone since the very beginning of the armed conflict in Eastern Ukraine, The subject of my review is the book Ukraine’s War as Viewed by TSN Journalists. This book is an attempt to make a panoramic view of military events in 2014–2015, happening in Donbas region. The authors of this book are journalists of Television News Service; some of them had previous experience as war reporters. For example, Alexander Motornyy worked as a journalist in such hot spots as Georgia, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, and finally got to Donetsk airport. Andriyy Tsapliyenko has been working as a war reporter since 2001; he told stories of conflicts from Colombia, Nepal, Iraq, Afghanistan, South Ossetia, Macedonia, Kashmir, Liberia, etc. Alexander Zagorodniy’s first mission was to Kosovo in 1998; after he was sent on a mission to Afghanistan and Iraq. Moreover, Ruslan Yarmoyuk was an exclusive Ukrainian reporter who got a chance to cover from the ground an armed conflict in Georgian-Ossetian-Russian in August of 1998.

Ivan Hrebenyuk and Ruslan Kharchenko have not had any presence experience at wars before the events in East Ukraine; however, by now Ivan has traveled along the entire front line from Mariupol to Luhansk region. The editor in chief of Ukraine’s War as Viewed by TSN Journalists is Olga Kashpor, born in Druzhkivka (Donetsk region).

Despite the fact that “war does not have a woman’s face”, there are many women among the war correspondents in Donbas region. Natalya Nagorna always had a dream to become a war reporter, but before the armed conflict in Ukraine she has never been sent to the zone. She caught the moment and became the first woman in TSN team willing to work at Anti-Terrorist Operation Zone (ATO zone). In opposite, Alla Khotsyanivska has been making a go/no go to Eastern Ukraine decision for a long time. At the end of the day, she got no more tolerance to peaceful life in Kyiv, being deeply involved into producing news from the hottest place of the country. Similar inside changes through the time of Ukrainian struggles have happened to Yevhenia Tsvetanska, Marjana Bukhan, and Hanna Boka.

The very first thing I would want to touch in regard to the book is its title, which sounds as Ukraine’s War as Viewed by TSN Journalists. It has to be noticed that the discussed historical event is a difficult, treacherous and hybrid war. This is not just a conflict; this is not an anti-terrorist operation any more. This is a war in every sense of this word. ‘On the other side of the camera’ is a subtitle, chosen as a reference to remained off-screen stories that impressed our reporters the most.

Ukraine’s War as Viewed by TSN Journalists contains of 28 soulful stories – about real people, met in daily situations of unpeaceful routine. “Any resemblance to actual persons or events is not coincidental” – states the epigraph of the book. The characters of these stories are journalists; taking business trips to the ATO zone they live in a new reality, and recall on 224 pages of the book what they saw and felt over 12 months. It is a Ukrainian language edition with the war essays and lots of war photos taken by best Ukrainian photojournalists. A combination of essays and photographs makes this book one of the most important documentary evidences of our time. Photos successfully supplement the written history of a changing country; convey the spirit, emotions, and soldiers’ daily life. The main goal of this book is to open eyes to the war that is happening in Ukraine and to show people that a war is not something distant and incomprehensible, that this becomes a common problem.

Despite their own patriotism and sympathy to Ukrainian military forces, these reporters follow traditions and keep the standards, trying to remain objectivity. That is why the official data, facts, statistics, and chronological description of events become critically important for the book. All the main events of the war between Ukraine and Russia since the very beginning (April 2014) and until February of 2015 are described in the book Ukraine’s War as Viewed by TSN Journalists. There is information about occupation processes in Sloviansk, Luhansk and Donetsk in April 2014, about battle of Mariupol and etc. The timeline includes strategic battles as a fight on the Saur-Mohyla height, Karachun, thermal power plant in Shchastya attack.

According to data of official military prosecutors, 459 people were killed and almost 500 were injured in Ilovaisk when the city was under siege. As we can see, official information is given in this book together with alternative data, used in order to stay unbiased. For example, “according to various sources from 150 to 200 Ukrainian soldiers were killed in the “Debaltseve kettle” (Ukraine’s War, p. 156). “As results of bombardment 19 servicemen were killed (according to the other data at least 30 military men were killed) and more than 100 were injured near Zelenopillya” (Ibidem, p. 82). The basic concepts are determined and explained in the book: for instance, during the battle of Donetsk airport the word cyborg (Ukrainian: кіборг) was used to refer to the Ukrainian defenders of the airport. It refers to the way that the airport defenders were able to fend off constant attacks by DPR forces in close quarters with little sleep or support, just as science-fiction cyborgs are “indestructible half-men, half-machines”, or “superhuman”.

Ukraine’s War as Viewed by TSN Journalists is not just a collection of facts and background reports; more than all, it is an important source about what was happening on the front line, a unique evidence set of war. The main part of this book is a collection of 28 essays written by 1+1 TV journalists. Authors try to convey emotions as impressionistic strokes, but each story is completed, has a beginning and a closing part, a starting point and an end thought. For example, in a story Higgs Boson by Alexander Motornyy a so-called frame is used. At the beginning there is such a sentence: “A parcel is posted to you, – it was said on a portable radio transmitter” (Ibidem, p. 27). And the last sentence sounds like that: “A parcel is delivered, – a portable radio transmitter has wheezed” (Ibidem, p. 28). The film crew was called “a parcel”. The soldiers had a task to deliver journalists firstly from the secret place to Pisky and then to the Donetsk airport, through a terrible fire the crew was safely delivered. Alexander Motornyy focuses on the battle of the Donetsk airport and his second essay Cyborg’s Father is dedicated to the colonel “Redut” who commanded at the airport. It is described how his kindness, wisdom and professionalism helped Armed Forces of Ukraine to battle at that strategic point.

Andriy Tsapliyenko in his stories describes a world of hunger. In the first essay, which is called Hunger, the author introduced us to an old woman who has been waiting for food and got disappointed when did not receive any. War and hunger go together, side by side. The other kind of hunger – hunger of information – is presented in the essay The Passengers.

In several cases journalists make friends with soldiers. Artillery Scout “Jackson” phoned Andrew each morning. He told how the night passed in Debaltseve, what else the enemy artillery has bombed out, how answered ours. Tsaplienko was waiting for the news not only as a journalist. Another call meant that his friend “Jackson” was alive, his team was good, and Debaltseve was still our (Ibidem, p. 49). So, there are stories which are entitled as “Jackson”, “Ernesto”, “Tooth and Funny” etc. All these titles are soldiers’ nicknames. Through a story of one particular military man tragedy of others is shown and built into a common tragedy; through a problem of one soldier all difficulties of others are presented.

It is very important to be human in every situation, to respect dead people, even if they are enemies. In the essay “Jackson” Ukrainian military men covered dead Russian soldiers with white sheets – it was a sign of a military honor act. The Russians were so impressed by such a behavior that allowed soldiers to go and did not attack Ukrainian Army positions. On the other hand, there is a story untitled Cold-bloodedness by Marjana Bukhan where Donbas residents’ apathy could be observed. Those people simply walk around, worry about trifles and even do not think of covering up dead bodies. Similar situations and different behavior are described in these two essays. It is underlined that it is very important not to allow a war to kill everything human inside of us.

Each story in this book has a line. The line is between light and darkness, life and death, beauty and ugliness, love and hate. The concept of death is present in the stories because wars and death are interrelated things. One of the stories by Aleksandr Zagorodniy is even called Death. The author writes that death is not heroic at the front. It is senseless and stupid (Ibidem, p. 96). In the book Ukraine’s War as Viewed by TSN Journalists death is personified. In contrast to the historical reference, there is no statistics or general data. It is said about particular person or people. It hurts to understand that this man to whom you have recently spoken is already dead. It is much harder to survive the loss of a person when you know his a little (essay “Ernesto” by Alla Khotsyanivska). Despite that fact that “blood and death at the battlefront are everyday things” (Ibidem, p. 165), there is also little pleasures there, for example, French chocolate (the essay French Сhocolate by Hanna Boka). This thing has surprised a journalist the most (Ibidem, p. 165).

Any war changes people, their characters and the way they take life. For example, a soldier, whose nickname was “Tooth”, has totally changed his temper after being injured – before this accident he was funny, joked every moment, but then he became nervous and sad (“Tooth and Funny” by Alla Khotsyanivska). War also makes people take important steps in their lives, for example, to make a marriage decision. In the essay Marriage Ceremony where “church bells argue with shots” (Ibidem, p. 169) two people decided to get married. They understood that life was too short to delay important moments.

Dichotomized “beauty and ugliness” are well-recalled in the essay The War Flowers by Natalya Nahorna. There are different types of flowers, described in the story. First of all, soldiers found long and beautiful rose in the bombed village. Another type of war flowers is 120-mm mortar mine which was given to Natalya. It looks like a flower when has already detonated. This iron flower was not even scary for the journalist; it was almost beautiful. It is nice until starts to “kiss the soldiers”, killing them.

The authors in their stories also define local residents and their attitude to Ukrainian Army. I have distinguished 4 types of people there:

1. To the first group belong those people who stay against Ukrainian Army, but continue to use Ukrainian resources and receive help from Ukraine (The Passengers by Andriy Tsapliyenko).

2. The second group consists of those people who were against Ukraine and Ukrainian Army, but who have changed their opinions after conversations with TSN journalists (as in the essay Reeducation by Alexandr Zagorodniy). It is very hard to speak with people who are influenced by Russian propaganda.

3. To the third group belong those people who are pro-Ukrainian, but they were afraid to speak it loudly (the essay Confession by Ivan Hrebeniuk). “We are guilty in everything that has been happening in Ukraine. We are for Ukraine. But we did not say about it when it was necessary. Last spring when everything had started we should shout but we kept silence because we were frightened. I did not think that our hush could cost so much”. (Ibidem, p. 124)

4. Finally the fourth group is represented by those people who are ready to fight for independent Ukraine. For example, Masha (from the essay Masha by Ruslan Kharchenko) who was not afraid of saying about her love to Ukraine and wrote about it on her social network pages, who helped Ukrainian Army and TSN journalists. This girl for her pro-Ukrainian position was convicted and sentenced to 25 years to life in basements. Ukrainian Army fights for those people as well. As Ivan Hrebeniuk worded: “We can not abandon them” (Ibidem, p. 124).

The book Ukraine’s War as Viewed by TSN Journalists is written to keep the history, to keep the evidences for future generations. It is believed in every essay that everything is not for nothing.

Liudmyla Pidkuimukha

Affiliation:

Ukrainian Language Department

National University of “Kyiv-Mohyla Academy”

E-mail: liudmyla.pidkuimukha@gmail.com

Władza Sądzenia

redakcja

Redaktor naczelna: Danuta Walczak-Duraj

Redaktorzy prowadzący: Konrad Kubala, Marcin Kotras

Redaktorzy tematyczni: Iza Desperak, Barbara Ober-Domagalska, Alicja Łaska-Formejster, Łukasz Kutyło

Sekretarz redakcji: Karolina Messyasz

Redaktor językowy: Barbara Fronczkowska

Redaktorzy graficzni: Tomasz Ferenc, Mariusz Libel

rada naukowa

Zbigniew Bokszański, Uniwersytet Łódzki

Janusz Mariański, Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski Jana Pawła II

Yali Cong, Peking University, China

Kazimierz Kik, Uniwersytet Jana Kochanowskiego w Kielcach

Katarzyna Grzeszkiewicz-Radulska, Uniwersytet Łódzki

Andrew McKinnon, University of Aberdeen, UK

Tomasz Ferenc, Uniwersytet Łódzki

Krzysztof Konecki, Uniwersytet Łódzki

David Ost, Hobart and William Smith Colleges NY

Mikołaj Cześnik, IFiS PAN

Anna Horolets, Uniwersytet Gdański

Adam Ostolski, Uniwersytet Medyczny, Warszawa

Krzysztof Kędziora, Uniwersytet Łódzki

Stanisław Kosmynka, Uniwersytet Łódzki

Krzysztof Nawratek, University of Plymouth, UK

Guglielmo Meardi, University of Warwick, UK

Hasan Hüseyin Akkaş, Univeristy of Usak, Turkey

Lista recenzentów umieszczona jest na stronie internetowej

www.wladzasadzenia.pl

kontakt

Władza sądzenia

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podziękowania

Przed artykułami i na okładce: © Magdalena Patalong, Free University Berlin (M.A. Eastern European Studies/Politics).

Fotogaleria na str. 218–254: © Anja Lange (National Technical University of Ukraine “Kyiv Polytechnic Institute”).